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The purpose of this paper is to examine the dramatically changed role of Russia in the global economy since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, as the Soviet institutions collapsed and were either reformed or replaced in a new Russian institutional landscape. The paper presents a fact-based and balanced view of Russia’s evolving role in the global economy, as distinguished from the sometimes one-sided view presented by some Western commentators. The authors establish that the two countervailing views are fundamentally based on different cultural perspectives about institutions, primarily the roles of business and government.

This paper is developed as a perspectives article drawing upon the decades of academic and business experience of all three authors with Russian business, management and the economy. The paper focuses on the structure of Russian institutional change and places it within the historical context of the challenges of various periods of time from the late 1980s to the present. The authors posit that cultural foundations complicate that institutional evolution.

Russia will remain a major player in world markets for energy, raw materials and armaments for the near future at least. Principal institutional questions facing Russia have to do with how to reduce the country’s overall dependence on raw material exports, with its vulnerability to world market fluctuations, and how to modernize Russian economic and political institutions. The degree of success in addressing these questions will depend largely upon the ability of the new and reformed economic institutions to show the flexibility to respond to changes in the global order, on whether political considerations will continue to supersede economic issues, and how markedly cultural traditions will continue to impede positive changes.

The entire system of international trade is under question, disrupted by the growing nationalism that is threatening the globalization that became institutionalized over decades in the wake of the Second World War. Russia’s future role is partially dependent upon how new patterns of international trade develop in response to the current disruption of established trade regimes, and by how political conflicts are expressed economically. The authors observe that Russia’s historical and cultural traditions, especially acquiescence to a highly centralized government with a strong autocratic leader, limit the country’s options. The authors explore how Russia’s reactions to Western sanctions have led to a new strategic approach, moving away from full engagement in the global economy to selective economic, and sometimes political, alliances with primarily non-Western countries, most notably China. The authors contrast Russia’s situation with that of China, which has been able to make substantial economic progress while still embracing a strong, centralized political institutional structure.

Many Western analysts have viewed Russian institutional evolution very critically through the lens of Western politics and sanctions, while Russia has continued along its own path of economic and institutional development. Each view, the authors argue, is based upon differing cultural perspectives of the roles of business and government. As a result, a distinct difference exists between the Western and Russian perspectives on Russia’s role in the world. This paper presents both points of view and explores the future of Russia’s position in the world economy based upon its evolving strategy for national economic policy. The authors contrast the situations of Russia and China, highlighting how Western-centric cultural views have affected perceptions of each country, sometimes similarly and at times with decided differences.

The rediscovery and analytical reconstitution are present tendencies in much of social science, especially economics and sociology. The emergence and expansion of the so‐called new institutional economics exemplify these tendencies as do attempts at revival and rehabilitation of the old institutional economics. Analogous tendencies have been manifested in sociology by the further development of economic sociology, especially by various reformulations of its classical premise of institutional structuration and embeddedness of economic behavior. Nevertheless, much of mainstream economics tends to neglect or play down certain salient divergences between the latter's neoclassical or orthodox institutionalism, and heterodox or critical institutionalism advanced by the old institutional economics as well as by economic sociology. Identifies and elaborates such divergences between these seemingly homologous varieties of institutionalism. Since institutionalist varieties and tendencies in both economics and sociology are considered, represents a contribution to an interdisciplinary treatment of social institutions, a treatment originally proposed by the old institutional economics of Veblen et al., the German historical school as well as by Weberian‐Durkheimian classical economic sociology.

This study aims to analyse the observation that the economics of many countries have boomed after the input of substantial investments into physical and social infrastructures.

A structural equation model is formulated to examine the effect of transportation infrastructure on the relationship between institutions and gross domestic product per capita (GDPPC). This study further differentiates between developed and developing economies.

The study identifies the different roles of transportation infrastructure in mediating the relationship between institutions and average income in these two types of economy. Institutions and transportation infrastructure positively influence GDPPC, whereas institutions positively influence transportation infrastructure. In addition, the results found indirect influence of institutions on GDPPC via transportation infrastructure.

This study provides new insights into international business studies based on institutional theory and factor-mobility theory.

The evolution of property right institutions and their consequence on investment decisions are central issues in the political economy of development. Effective and well‐defined property rights are deemed essential in providing the preconditions for economic growth. The importance of property right arrangements stems from the fact that they impact and alter the distribution of income. Economists are, therefore, in agreement that market transactions are more efficient when property rights are enforced. According to North and Thomas (1973), observed variations in economic performance across countries were related to the presence (or absence, for that matter) of property right institutions. Recently, Beseley (1995), and Feder and Feeny (1991), have argued that economic development and well‐established property right institutions are positively correlated. Meanwhile, there are two arguments in the literature in favour of establishing property rights institutions. First, assigning ownership of valuable assets and designating the parties bearing the rewards and costs is expected to strengthen market forces. In particular, the private control over assets and the ability to reap the rewards from exploiting these assets create incentives for investment and production. Second, enforcing contractual agreements is expected to provide economic agents with the incentives to use resources effectively and efficiently. When property rights are poorly defined, contracts become hard to enforce and fraud and corruption go unpunished. Bureaucrats responsible for formulating government policies will use their positions to influence the allocation of resources whereby, business managers find themselves forced to buy favours. The need to pay substantial bribes will, therefore, reduce the entrepreneur's incentives to invest and impose a significant burden on economic growth. Empirical evidence based on cross‐country comparisons does indeed suggest that corruption has large, adverse effects on private investment and economic growth. Mauro (1996) showed that when a country improves its standing on the corruption index, say, from 6 to 8 (0 being the most corrupt, 10 the least) it will experience a 4 percentage point increase in its investment rate and a 0.5 percentage point increase in its annual per capita GDP growth rate. These large effects suggest that policies that establish institutions to curb corruption could have significant payoffs. Political corruption will also undercut the government's ability to raise revenues from issuing licenses and permits, and lead to ever‐higher tax rates being levied on fewer and fewer taxpayers. This, in turn, reduces the government's ability to provide essential public goods, including the rule of law. When institutions are weak, bribes can alter outcomes of the legal and regulatory process by inducing the government either to fail to stop illegal activities (such as drug dealing or pollution) or unduly favour one party over another in court cases or other legal proceedings. Furthermore, theoretical and empirical studies have shown that corruption and political control usually raise transaction costs, uncertainty, and are associated with free‐rider problems. These costs will, therefore, constitute a dead‐weight loss to the society. Unless political and economic reforms are made, these inefficiencies will certainly hamper growth and development.

In contrast to traditional welfare economics, new institutional economics has made a major contribution to analyzing institutions as both preconditions and elements of economic activities. By including institutions’ incentives and restrictions on human beings, it has made a significant first step toward the further development of economic science. The usual starting point, however, is a world without uncertainty where so‐called “anomalies” from “rational” behavior cannot occur; but in this world, institutions are not necessary either. Related research demonstrates the relevance of factors like intrinsic motivation, internalization of norms, habit formation, etc., but these characteristics are typically treated in a half‐hearted way as mere anomalies. Instead, it is time to take the full second step and to include the effects of institutions on economic actors as well as to take the third step, namely, to consider the fact that economic agents form institutions. We exemplify these further steps and look on the interaction between institutions and economic actors which leads to a general institutional economics.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the potential pathway of influence of formal and informal institutions and economic development on the business productive behaviour at the national level.

In the paper SEM models and regression analysis are used to define the causal relationships. Using data from cultural dimensions of Hofstede, Inglehart and Tabellini, proxies for formal institutions and economic development this research empirically examines the way of influence of these factors on entrepreneurship performance in the national economy.

This paper demonstrates that, stimulating by the economic growth, formal and informal institutions could affect business productive behaviour at the macro level in both direct and indirect ways through each other. Formal and informal institutions were found to act as substitutes. The author argues that the decision to act productively is not just a result of the formal institutional framework – “bad” outcomes of business development may also be a consequence of the activity of certain informal institutions as well as caused by poor levels of national economic development.

Based on the findings of this research it is possible to improve the methods of formation of stimulation policy for driving business behaviour in a productive way by taking into account existing formal and informal institutions and the level of development of the national economy.

This paper by using SEM techniques examines the causal relationships between the quality of formal and informal institutions and productivity of entrepreneurs at the national level.

The main purpose of this study is to examine the impact of different dimensions of institutional quality indices on the economic growth of Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries.

The study uses a panel data set of 31 SSA countries from 1991 to 2015 and employs a two-step system-GMM (Generalized Method of Moments) estimation technique.

The study's empirical results indicate that investment-promoting and democratic and regulatory institutions have a significant positive effect on economic growth; however, once these institutions are taken into account, conflict-preventing institutions do not have a significant impact on growth.

The study's findings suggest that countries in the region should continue their institutional reforms to enhance the region's economic growth. Specifically, institutions promoting investment, democracy and regulatory quality are crucial.

Unlike previous studies that use either composite measures of institutions or a single intuitional indicator in isolation, the present study has employed principal component analysis (PCA) to extract fewer institutional indicators from multivariate institutional indices. Thus, this paper provides important insights into the distinct role of different clusters of institutions in economic growth.

There has been a diverse range of research on the factors enabling informal entrepreneurship as well as the means to avoid or to eradicate its incidence. However, the authors may also identify how a significant proportion of research on this field of study centres around developing economies and correspondingly justifying the application of such analysis to countries with different levels of economic development as is the case of Europe. The purpose of this paper is to depict the ways in which economic and political institutions influence informal entrepreneurship.

To this end, the authors apply aggregate data at the national level collected from different sources, in particular the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor and Freedom House, for the years between 2006 and 2015 and for 23 European countries amounting to a total of 229 observations (unbalanced panel).

Through recourse to econometric estimations, based upon multiple regression model methodologies for panel data, the authors may report that the greater the quality of economic and political institutions, the lower the level of informal entrepreneurship.

The authors thus seek to contribute towards a better understanding of the influence of institutions and the policies that may feasibly influence informal entrepreneurship.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework that illustrates how resource-based countries, such as those in the Gulf Cooperation Council, can move their economies towards a more sustainable diversified model, through creating and fostering institutions that are conducive for opportunity entrepreneurship.

Several key variables pertaining to formal and informal institutions which impact opportunity entrepreneurship are presented in a conceptual framework based on a comprehensive, non-systematic literature review.

Findings from the comprehensive literature review suggest that institutions play a moderating role between opportunity entrepreneurship and economic development. Institutions can stimulate entrepreneur’s behaviour leading to economic growth and subsequently development. Proposals worth pursuing in empirical studies in the future are presented based on the review of the literature.

This framework offers a model for oil-based countries in resolving structural problems in fostering entrepreneurship when responding to economic challenges.

The proposed framework in this study takes into consideration a comprehensive set of formal and informal institutional factors, rarely discussed in the existing literature, that link opportunity entrepreneurship and economic growth and development. Insights offered by this study have implications for government policy changes in developing effective institutions.

It is demonstrated that the Austrian school in economics had very different ideas about the creation and change of social institutions and especially about the relation of state and market, which is still one of the fundamental problems of economic theory. Menger′s fundamental distinction of pragmatic and organic institutions and Wieser′s contrary model are discussed, followed by the “impossibility theorem” of Mises and the contrary position of Schumpeter. Hayek′s liberation model of society is presented and criticised, and finally Menger′s position is interpreted as one of moderate liberal interventionism.