Search results

Many manufacturers implement a dual channel strategy, which can be defined as the simultaneous use of integrated and independent channels of distribution for the same product line. This study employs the resource-based theory and examines how manufacturers' and distributors' capabilities affect manufacturers' choices of dual channel strategy. The study also examines how fit between organisational capability and channel structure affects channel system performance.

Empirical testing was conducted using survey data collected from 262 Japanese business-to-business manufacturers. This study performed a multinomial logistic regression analysis to examine the antecedents of dual channel strategy and a t-test to examine its performance implications.

The results show that manufacturers' information capabilities and the availability of distributors' selling capabilities affect whether manufacturers choose a dual channel strategy, and that market turbulence moderates the effects of these two capability factors. The results also indicate that manufacturers can improve their channel system performance by choosing channel strategies that fit organisational capabilities.

Most previous studies employ transaction cost theory to identify the factors driving the choice of dual channel strategy. However, these studies neglect the heterogeneity of resources/capabilities. Little is known about whether capability factors affect the dual channel strategy, and how this choice can be linked to channel system performance. By addressing this knowledge gap, this study contributes to enhance our understanding of dual channels.

This paper aims to explore product pricing and green promotion effort policies and further analyzes the influences of financing interest rate, green promotion effort and free-riding behavior on the optimal strategies.

Research will be conducted with the aid of Stackelberg game research method, considering that the manufacturer has financial constraints and financing from e-commerce platform, and consumers have dual preferences, based on the two models of no green promotion effort for physical store and green promotion effort for physical store to explore dual-channel green supply chain strategies.

This research puts forward the following findings, in the two models: the rise in financing interest rate leads to an increase in wholesale and selling prices of dual channels and a decrease in demand of dual channels. The green promotion effort has a positive impact on wholesale prices, selling prices and demand of dual channels. The rise of free-riding rate makes offline wholesale and selling prices fall, whereas online wholesale and selling prices rise.

This research results can provide reference for the decision-making in the context of supply chain financing and free-riding.

The paper attempts to discuss the impact of reference price effect on pricing decisions.

With the growth of the Internet and e-commerce, more and more customers purchase products in through online channels and choose products by comparing different prices and services, and the reference price effect has an impact on pricing decisions. To investigate the impact of consumers' reference price effect on the dual-channel supply chain, the authors establish a basic model consisting of a single dominant manufacturer and a single downstream retailer, and analyze the optional decisions under different situations and discuss the influence of reference price effect. Finally, a number case verifies the validity and rationality of the proposed model.

The results show that (1) the reference price effect has varying effects on the price, channel demand and income of manufacturers and retailers in the channel depending on the role of customers' channel preferences. (2) The manufacturer's online channel demand and profits always increase with the reference pricing effect, whereas the retailer's offline demand and profits always decline. (3) When the proportion of consumers preferring offline is higher, the manufacturer's network price and wholesale price increase with the reference price effect, while the retailer's retail price decreases with the reference price effect; when the proportion of consumers preferring offline is lower, the opposite is true, and the centralized decision results are consistent with the decentralized decision results.

This paper can clarify the impact of consumer reference price effects on the operation of dual-channel supply chains, and help inform pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers in dual-channel supply chains.

The proposed approach can well analyze the impact of consumer reference price effect and give channel their optional decisions.

In dual distribution channel systems, integrated channels (manufacturer-owned) and independent channels (distributor-owned) are likely to adopt destructive behaviours. To suppress such behaviours, manufacturers need to implement conflict management systems. The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating role of conflict-learning capability (CLC) in the relationship between conflict management system and destructive behaviour. This study also investigates whether interactions between conflict management systems and CLC improve the overall channel performance.

Using survey data from 157 Japanese industrial manufacturers, this study conducted regression analyses and mediation analyses.

The results show that boundary and compensation systems have different effects on destructive behaviours. On the one hand, compensation systems with strong CLC have a larger impact, although those with weak CLC can also suppress destructive behaviours to some degree. On the other hand, boundary systems with strong CLC suppress destructive behaviours, but those with weak CLC do not. In addition, this study reveals that manufacturers with strong CLC can indirectly improve overall channel performance by implementing conflict management systems and suppressing destructive behaviours.

Previous studies reveal that boundary and compensation systems suppress destructive behaviours. However, these studies neglect the importance of organisational capability in the successful implementation of conflict management systems. By focusing on CLC, this study advances our understanding of dual distribution and channel conflict.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of information asymmetry on revenue sharing contracts and performance in a dual-channel supply chain. First, the authors model the optimum revenue sharing contract in a dual-channel supply chain under both the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Second, they contrast the optimal decisions of a dual-channel supply chain between the full information case and the asymmetric information case. Third, they explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value.

The authors present two main issues associated with revenue sharing contracts to alleviate manufacturer–retailer conflicts in a dual-channel supply chain. In the first issue, a revenue sharing contract is designed in a dual-channel supply chain under asymmetric cost information conditions, based on the principal-agent model. In the second issue, an optimal revenue sharing contract under full information conditions, based on the Stackelberg game is discussed. They explore the impact of asymmetric cost information on the performance of a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the information value based on comparative static analysis.

First, the direct sale price is unchanged and independent of the retailer’s cost construct, but the wholesale price increases and the retail sale price does not decrease under asymmetric cost information. The information asymmetry leads to higher direct sale demand and lower retail sale demand. Second, information asymmetry is beneficial for the retailer, but imposes inefficiency on the manufacturer and the whole supply chain. Third, the performance of the dual-channel supply chain is improved if the retailer’s cost information is shared and the dual-channel supply chain reaches coordination. The retailer is willing to share its cost information if the lump sum side payment that the manufacturer offers can make up the retailer’s reduced profit due to sharing this information.

The authors proposed a contract menus design model in a dual-channel supply chain. They examine how information asymmetry affects optimal policies and performance. They compared the optimal policies under symmetric information and asymmetric information. Conditions under which the partners prefer sharing information are identified. They quantified the information value from the points of partners and the whole system.

In recent years, many firms from developing countries (LDCs) have engaged in foreign direct investment (FDI). Interestingly some of these firms locate their investments in developed countries (DCs) (i.e., upstream FDI), instead of in countries economically similar to or less than their home countries (i.e., downstream FDI). However, only a few researchers have examined the issues related to upstream FDI. Furthermore, when examining FDI, most studies have focused on manufacturing subsidiaries but paid less attention to sales subsidiaries. Due to the differences in nature, management of manufacturing and sales subsidiaries should be different. Using a case study approach and focusing on the behaviors of Taiwanese firms, we address two research questions: (1) what are the channel strategies adopted by the sales subsidiaries of Taiwanese high-tech firms (i.e., multinational corporations (MNCs) from LDCs (LDCMNCs)) in DCs? and (2) how do these subsidiaries manage their channels in DCs? Our findings are: (1) LDCMNCs tend to use multiple sales channels, to work with large national distributors, and to adopt high touch channels to market products in DCs; (2) to reduce channel conflict, less powerful LDCMNCs tend to adopt multiple independent channel system, instead of dual channel system; and (3) due to limited resources, LDCMNCs make more effort on designing channel conflict prevention mechanisms than designing channel conflict resolution mechanisms, emphasize more on building relationships with distributors and tend to use financial incentives/high-power incentives than use other types of incentives to motivate distributors. The findings of this study are helpful for LDC firms to operate their sales subsidiaries more effectively in DCs.

This paper considers a supply chain with a manufacturer (she) selling through an online retail platform (he) and studies the channel structure choices of two firms when investing in advertising.

The authors assume that the platform provides the manufacturer with an agency and/or reselling channel; thus, there are three possible channel structures: agency channel, reselling channel and dual channel. By developing a game-theoretic model, the authors investigate the channel structure choices of two firms when advertising separately, simultaneously and cooperatively and analyze the optimal combination strategy of channel structure and advertising scheme for both firms.

When the advertising efforts of the two firms are independent of each other, the equilibrium results show that different advertising schemes lead to different channel choices. For the manufacturer, it is optimal to choose the dual channel structure and adopt the advertising scheme that both subsidizes platform advertising and advertises on her own. For the platform, this combination is also optimal at a high commission rate; otherwise, the advertising scheme in which both firms advertise simultaneously is optimal and he is better off switching from the dual channel structure to the reselling channel structure as interchannel substitution intensity increases. The above results still hold for complementary advertising efforts and asymmetric marginal advertising costs, while in the case of substitutable advertising efforts, one firm may ride on another firm's advertising efforts, leading to different strategic combinations.

This paper not only provides useful guidance for manufacturers and platforms in channel selection and advertising strategy, but also theoretically enriches the literature on manufacturer encroachment.

Distribution systems usually utilize both traditional retailing channels in conjunction with e-channels. The purpose of this paper is to investigate a dual-channel supply chain, comprising a traditional retailing channel and an e-channel under disruption. By benchmarking against the centralized decision structure, the authors intend to propose a collaboration model to achieve channel coordination as well as more reliable decisions.

Four different channel disruption scenarios, with customers’ reaction toward disruptions, are examined, and then, optimal pricing decisions for both centralized and decentralized decision-making structures are extracted. Next, a collaboration mechanism based on the dominancy power of channel members is developed to entice all channel members to participate in channel coordination. By benchmarking the proposed collaboration model against both the decentralized/centralized structures a win–win solution is guaranteed for all channel members. In addition, the proposed model ensures more reliable decisions than the centralized structure, as it guarantees less fluctuated income levels.

This study shows, as the disruption probability grows, the channel profit decreases while the channel-retailing price increases. Furthermore, the exact alignment of the centralized decision-making approach and the proposed collaboration model is not achievable due to the problem infeasibility. Numerical experiments and sensitivity analyses benchmark the performance of the proposed collaboration mechanism against the centralized structure for the full alignment with centralized decision-making approach.

This study contributes to the channel conflict literature as jointly considers pricing decisions, disruptions and coordination. Further, consumers’ reaction toward disruption is analyzed through a transshipment agreement.

The purpose of this paper is an attempt to design a proper incentive coordination mechanism to deal with the channel conflicts between the traditional sales and online direct sales.

With respect to the problems of channel conflicts between the traditional sales and online direct sales, to optimize the sale system and get more profits, considering the influences of consumer network acceptance, the authors establish demand and profit function based on consumer's utility, respectively. What's more, we exploit the game theory to analyze the optional decisions of the supply chain under the incentive coordination condition and no incentive coordination condition, and then we discuss the supply chain's optimal pricing, demand, profit and compensation incentive levels with the different effect of consumer network acceptance.

The level of compensation incentive provided by the manufacturer is influenced by consumer network acceptance and product cost. The lower the consumer network acceptance, the better the compensation incentive coordination effect of manufacturers. Manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers and consumers are all important players in real supply chain relationships. When a manufacturer exists as a dominant role, it should pay full attention to the impact of consumer behavior on supply chain decisions.

The research can clarify the influence and mechanism of consumer behavior on supply chain channel conflict coordination, and deal with channel conflicts.

The proposed incentive coordination can effectively realize supply chain channel conflict resolution, and provide decision-making ideas and methods for manufacturers to develop the supply chain management of online direct sales channels.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the optimal sale effort deployment under dual-channel distribution which combines a traditional brick and mortar retail channel from the partner retailer and an online direct channel from the manufacturer.

A sales effort competition game is set up in the dual-channel distribution between the manufacturer and the retailer. Demand under sales efforts is determined based on the consumer valuation, consumer’s channel preference and sales efforts. Then, the optimal sales effort deployment is studied with a game theory approach which allow the retailer and the manufacturer to maximize their own profit.

Consumer’s channel preference is a key parameter of the demand assignment in the dual-channel distribution. Interestingly, the optimal sales effort and the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer can be limited by the other’s efficiency of sales effort. The finding suggests that the manufacturer and the retailer should collaborate to enhance the efficiency of the sales effort. It also shows that the manufacturer can utilize the direct channel as an important marketing channel even though no profit is obtained through the direct channel.

This research provides a new method to model the sales effort in the dual-channel distribution. The optimal sales efforts based on the consumer behavior are determined. However, since this study assumes a consistent product price across channels, the results is not applicable for a retailer who can set their own price.

It is a win-win situation for adoption of the dual-channel distribution although the manufacturer can benefit more. Additionally, direct channel can be used as an effective marketing channel.

This research contributes to a better understanding of demands in dual-channel distribution under sales efforts. Additionally, the research results provide a useful framework of sales effort deployment under different consumers’ channel preferences in the dual-channel distribution.