Search results

Disaster responders play a crucial role in providing aid to individuals and communities following catastrophic events. Being tasked to protect and preserve life and property, these groups of professionals are constantly exposed to various hazards, which puts them at risk of negative mental health consequences. This chapter describes and discusses these mental health effects and interventions for disaster responders in Southeast Asia. The chapter defines who the disaster responders are in Southeast Asian countries. Drawing from the literature, this chapter enumerates the various positive and negative psychological consequences of disaster response, and the risk and protective factors associated with disaster response work. This chapter also describes the different interventions, such as psychological first aid and psychotherapy, following the Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC) (2007) guidelines on conducting mental health and psychosocial support services (MHPSS), and focusing on the Southeast Asian context. This chapter ends with a discussion of the different challenges of providing MHPSS in Southeast Asia and with some recommendations on how to improve the delivery of these services and the mental health of disaster responders in general.

This chapter reviews the empirical evidence for Psychological First Aid (PFA) in the context and experience of the Southeast Asian (SEA) region. First, this chapter provides the definition and background of PFA and its core principles, to explain the basis for doing PFA as part of an integrated approach to disaster mental health. Second, the existing literature on the effectiveness of PFA is reviewed. Third, this chapter examines the application and adaptation of PFA in SEA. Implications and recommendations are provided at the end of the chapter.

Advances in disaster prevention and mitigation in Southeast Asia (SEA) have increasingly included plans for mental health and psychosocial support. However, substantial challenges remain, particularly in the areas of (a) disaster communication and preparedness, (b) institutionalized disaster education, (c) culturally adapted and evidence-based tools and interventions, (d) developing capacities and caring for disaster responders, and (e) enabling collective resilience. In addition, the impacts of poverty, lack of access to education, and other forms of marginalization result in less resources to prepare for hazardous event and increased vulnerability to environmental hazards for SEA countries. These issues highlight the need for SEA governments to address deeply rooted human development issues that put communities at risk and heighten vulnerabilities of SEA populations.

Southeast Asia (SEA) is a region highly susceptible to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis, though the region has been underrepresented in disaster mental health research. This chapter addresses risk factors for SEA, including its disaster-prone location, the psychological toll of frequent disasters, and stigma and shame and lack of psychoeducation about psychological help-seeking. Collectivism, strong family ties, and religious faith are among SEA’s resilience factors. Culture should be heavily accounted for in mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), considering the wide array of cultural differences in spirituality, affect and expression, power distance, and gender and masculinity in SEA. Because culture affects treatment satisfaction, treatment engagement, and treatment outcomes, future research should explore how aspects of SEA culture impact accessibility and engagement in MHPSS.

This chapter analyzes the link between the digital divide, infrastructure regulation, and disaster planning and relief through a case study of the flood in San Jose, California triggered by the Anderson dam’s overtopping in February 2017 and an examination of communication failures during the 2018 wildfire in Paradise, California. This chapter theorizes that regulatory decisions construct social and disaster vulnerability. Rooted in the Whole Community approach to disaster planning and relief espoused by the United Nations and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, this chapter calls for leadership to end the digital divide. It highlights the imperative of understanding community information needs and argues for linking strategies to close the digital divide with infrastructure and emergency planning. As the Internet’s integration into society increases, the digital divide diminishes access to societal resources including disaster aid, and exacerbates wildfire, flood, pandemic, and other risks. To mitigate climate change, climate-induced disaster, protect access to social services and the economy, and safeguard democracy, it argues for digital inclusion strategies as a centerpiece of community-centered infrastructure regulation and disaster relief.

Purpose – This study seeks to identify the factors that made Hurricane Katrina the worst disaster in American history. Although the inefficiency of the centralized government is often cited as the primary reason for failure in disaster mitigation and recovery, more fundamental reasons are left unexplored.

Design/methodology/approach – This study points out that comparative case analysis is inadequate to substantiate the claim that private actors are better responders to disaster than public agents. Instead, it takes a single case study approach of hurricane response in New Orleans. This method allows for two things: first, extending the temporal scope helps to understand that disaster management is not a single event but a cumulative result of the past responses. Second, one can trace the interplay between public and private agents rather than their separate reactions.

Findings – A series of legal conditions within the federalist framework have discouraged effective disaster management by the federal government. Using both legal and extralegal means, local actors tried to avoid the federal government's involvement in land use and building control that may prohibit local economic activities. Instead, the federal government was pressured into providing structural protection such as levee construction, which is costly yet ineffective in preventing a mega-disaster like Hurricane Katrina.

Originality/value of paper – This study warrants caution in conducting a comparative case analysis in evaluating the role of the federal government in disaster response and recovery. By conducting an in-depth case study of New Orleans hurricane response over the past 50 years, it reveals that the current government failure stems from structural and legal conditions rather than bureaucratic inefficiency.

Research evidence developed over more than five decades of research on human responses to disasters shows that those responses are overwhelmingly adaptive and positive. However, despite what is known, myths about disaster behavior persist. These include the assumption that the public will panic during large-scale emergencies and the idea that disasters are best managed through hierarchies of command and control. Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, these myths are again gaining wide currency even though actual individual, group, and organizational behavior in the World Trade Center disaster directly contradict those assumptions. This is no accident. Beliefs concerning the fragility of the public in the face of emerging homeland security threats are consistent with the perspectives and objectives of organizations that seek to expand their influence in the domestic crisis management arena. These organizational actors, which include the information technology industry, the intelligence and defense establishment, and security think tanks, are generally not familiar with empirical social science research on behavior during disasters and see little value in public participation in the management of newly-recognized threats. Recycled disaster myths support a case for “expertise-based” crisis planning that excludes the public from those activities.

This chapter focuses on emergency and hastily formed knowledge networks. All six facets of knowledge networks are described. The importance of four of the six facets is called out, including domain, topology, nodes, and relationships among the networks’ members. The authors provide four network profiles, including emergency and disaster response networks, law enforcement networks, military networks, and militia and vigilante networks.