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This chapter develops a no-arbitrage, futures equilibrium cost-of-carry model to demonstrate that the existence of cointegration between spot and futures prices in the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) crude oil market depends crucially on the time-series properties of the underlying model. In marked contrast to previous studies, the futures equilibrium model utilizes information contained in both the quality delivery option and convenience yield as a timing delivery option in the NYMEX contract. Econometric tests of the speculative efficiency hypothesis (also termed the “unbiasedness hypothesis”) are developed and common tests of this hypothesis examined. The empirical results overwhelming support the hypotheses that the NYMEX future price is an unbiased predictor of future spot prices and that no-arbitrage opportunities are available. The results also demonstrate why common tests of the speculative efficiency hypothesis and simple arbitrage models often reject one or both of these hypotheses.

John McGee's 1958 paper, “Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ) Case,” has had an astonishing influence on both antitrust policy in the United States and economic lore. McGee argued that predatory pricing is irrational and his analysis of the Standard Oil Company Matter, decided in 1911, led him to conclude that the Record in this case does not show that Standard Oil engaged in predatory pricing. This single publication appears to serve as a foundation of the U.S. Supreme Court's position on the issue of predatory pricing, as well as the assertion by many economists that predatory pricing is irrational and rarely occurs.

Numerous arguments have been advanced during the past 25 years that predatory pricing can be a rational strategy. As to McGee's empirical findings, there has been no re-examination of the Record of the Standard Oil case to determine the validity of his finding that the trial “Record” does not support the claim that Standard Oil engaged in predatory pricing.

We examined this Record and have found that the trial Record contains considerable evidence of predatory pricing by Standard Oil. Therefore, the Record does not support McGee's conclusion that Standard Oil did not engage in predatory pricing.

Thus, the decisions of the Supreme Court in recent years, as well as the opinions of many economists, concerning predatory pricing are not consistent with either current theory or the empirical record.