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The paper aims to investigate the forms of power, politics and leadership exercised by project leaders within asynchronous virtual project environments (VPEs). The purpose of this paper is to link effective project leadership to particular forms of power and politics within a VPE.

The empirical data are based on a quantitative telecommunications sector case study, complemented with some interviews, following a semi‐structured approach. The research was approached based from a positivistic philosophical paradigm and using a survey research strategy. The questionnaire‐based survey consisted of a sample of 28 respondents split between project managers (39.3 percent) and team members (60.7 percent).

The research results indicated a significant finding which linked leadership effectiveness to asynchronous VPE usage and communication. Factor analysis of the type of leadership exercised within an asynchronous VPE revealed two forms of effective leadership. The first one, named, Structured Charismatic Exchange, is underpinned by three forms of leadership styles: charismatic, virtual and transactional leadership. The second insight from the factor analysis also revealed significant loadings for two forms of leadership: Participative and Shared leadership. The common strand in both is the need to elevate the ethos of teams, which effectively implies that control in VPE ought to be decentralized responsibly to enhance sharing. This is possibly relevant in a bid to minimize conflicts and thus develop a project organization that encourages teamwork. Therefore, this factor was named Decentralized Team Leadership. Unlike the first factor, where the focus is on how the project leader projects his/her personality to influence people, the realization is that for a project organization to succeed, project goals and decisions emerge from bargaining, negotiating, and jockeying for position among members of different coalitions.

Reported limitations are based on the sample size, effect of sectoral culture on the findings and constrained view of the virtuality construct. Future research should investigate other sectors with a large sample and expand the dimensions of the virtuality as a construct.

The paper concludes that project leaders should re‐orient leadership practices to fit virtual project environments, taking into account the need for a more decentralized form of leadership and systematic trust building.

The recognition of the uniqueness of particular forms of power and politics relevant for the exercise of effective leadership in asynchronous virtual environments is emphasized in this research paper.

Despite existence of a constitutional demarcation of functions and finances between the centre and the states, it is alleged that the centre-state funds transfer systems in India have a political bargaining aspect that goes beyond the normative considerations. This paper makes an attempt to investigate if the political system allows to evolve a simple, equitable, objective and rule-based system of transfers. The aim of this paper is to explore the political economic determinants of discretionary fiscal transfers in India.

This paper is based on a panel data set of 28 Indian states for the period 2001–2014. After diagnostic checking for fixed effects/random effects, the authors prefer to use fixed effects regression with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors and Arellano–Bover/Blundel and Bond system estimation model that uses moment conditions in which lagged first differences of the dependent variable are instruments for the level equation.

The findings of this study reveal that fiscal performance, economic capacity and political alliance are significant but some other political determinants such as bargaining power and election years are not significant in influencing discretionary transfers.

Considering the limited availability of literature on federal finance, the present paper is an addition to the existing research, especially on a crucial issue concerning extra-constitutional fiscal transfers in India. Analysing a balanced panel comprising all the Indian states and examining the role of various political-economic determinants makes this paper topical.

The paper argues that the form, structure and ideologies of elites are embedded in particular forms of capitalism. Whilst elites in these different societies are engaged in a common task of ensuring that their position is sustained and protected in the light of economic and political uncertainties, the way in which they are able to do this is shaped by the particular forms of legitimation, coordination and cohesion that are embedded in particular institutional trajectories, path dependencies and complementarities. However, the paper emphasizes that these institutional structures are dependent on particular international economic orders and when these change either over the short or the long term, elites often find themselves struggling to maintain their position without significant changes. The paper examines firstly how the long-term change from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism in the international economic order led to changes in the terrain on which elites in different countries formed and exercised power and secondly how the immediate and drastic short-term changes in the global economy arising from the financial crisis has impacted on elites.

Purpose – This chapter examines the campaign, election and governance of Antonio Villaraigosa as Los Angeles’ first Latino mayor in over 130 years. The intersection of electoral coalitions, governing regimes, political incorporation, and deracialized/racialized campaign methods has wide-ranging implications for 21st century urban and racial politics. This study seeks to better understand the high expectations placed upon minority mayors as they develop policies and programs that benefit minorities and others as well.Method – This chapter employs the case study method. A form of qualitative research grounded in theory, scientific in nature, and investigative in approach. The examination of official city documents, archives of local newspapers, exit poll data, and select interviews join to make a rigorous ethnography. The data were complemented by the use of racial politics as a lens through which to interpret results.Findings – This chapter provides empirical insights about the realities of racial politics, the impact of extreme demographic shifts, and the prospects for coalition formation. Governance and resource allocation among minorities by minorities may be the challenge of the 21st century. Deracialized/racialized campaigns and elections make governing a difficult proposition. Even when broad progressive movements are underway (shared ideology) those arrangements seem much more fragile when long-term alliances cannot be forged.Research implications – This chapter applies the case study method. This approach uses the researcher as the primary tool of data collection and employs rigorous methods to avoid bias and ensure accuracy of data. However, because of the chosen approach, the research results may lack generalizability. Hence, we recommend further testing of the research propositions.Practical implications – This chapter posits implications for long-term coalition building and alliance formation among minority voters; the realities of race and representation; and a re-examination of governance style (“racialized” vs. “deracialized”) in municipal government.Originality/value – This chapter intersects urban and racial politics and purports to examine 21st century minority voting behavior and the impact of such behavior upon the policy process (policy responsiveness). Hence, can political incorporation be better achieved with the interests of minorities’ merged (universal interests)?

In many developing countries and some developed countries, government by coalition is the rule. In the Indian central government for the last two or three decades, there was a coalition of the left or right: on the right, the BJP and like-minded party; and on the left, the secular Congress party, like-minded parties, and the Communist party. This coalition of government politics is very much guided by both domestic and international situations. For example, Congress, the major party in the ruling coalition, is in favour of the USA–India nuclear deal. It was not finalized due to the opposition of its coalition partners, particularly the Communist party. As a result, the deal is almost dead. There are many examples in economic policies that are greatly influenced by coalition politics. The same situation exists in state politics. There is considerable scope in using the material in coalition theory literature to determine when and what type of coalition will form and break the pay off, etc. The subject discussed below of such a situation is based on a grossly outdated scenario. We hope a more up-to-date and sophisticated study will be available not only for India, but also for other countries.

Develops a “politics‐first” theoretical framework to explain why, how, and when innovative IT projects are implemented successfully in public organizations. Explains how individuals who share a technological interest find each other in issue‐networks. Describes why and how the interests of technologists, bureaucrats, and politicians converge to a point where a coalition with a concrete project agenda emerges. Argues that, frequently, more than one coalition emerges from a single issue‐network and describes how these coalitions compete against each other to institutionalize new dominant designs. Discusses the reasons why some coalitions win while others lose. Provides examples based on innovative national and municipal IT projects in Australia, China, Israel, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the UK, and the USA.

At a time when the US federal government failed to act on climate change, California's success as a subnational climate policy leader has been widely celebrated. However, California's landmark climate law drove a wedge between two segments of the state's environmental community. On one side was a coalition of “market-oriented” environmental social movement organizations (SMOs), who allied with private corporations to advance market-friendly climate policy. On the other side was a coalition of “justice-oriented” environmental SMOs, who viewed capitalist markets as the problem and sought climate policy that would mitigate the uneven distribution of environmental harms within the state. The social movement literature is not well equipped to understand this case, in which coalitional politics helped one environmental social movement succeed in its policy objectives at the expense of another. In this chapter, we draw on legislative and regulatory texts, archival material, and interviews with relevant political actors to compare the policymaking influence of each of these coalitions, and we argue that the composition of the two coalitions is the key to understanding why one was more successful than the other. At the same time, we point out the justice-oriented coalition's growing power, as market-oriented SMOs seek to preserve their legitimacy.

Coalition formation and dissolution are integral parts of social movement politics. This article addresses two questions about the effect of coalition politics on organizational processes within social movements. First, how does coalition leadership influence who attends mass demonstrations? Second, how does the dissolution of a coalition affect the locations of organizations in activist networks? The case of schism between United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ) and Act Now to Stop War and End Racism (ANSWER) in the contemporary American antiwar movement (2001–2007) is examined. Survey results demonstrate that variations in coalition leadership do not significantly affect protest demographics, though they do attract supporters with different political attitudes, levels of commitment, and organizational affiliations. Further, network analysis establishes that coalition dissolution weakens the ties between previous coalition partners and creates opportunities for actors uninvolved in the split to reaffirm and improve brokerage opportunities. The end result is that preexisting network structures serve to mitigate the effects of coalition dissolution on social movements.