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The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between fiscal federalism and accountability in Nigeria. Corruption is a global plague and is endemic in nature. Several policies have been adopted by the Nigerian Government to institutionalize accountability and combat the scourge of corruption that have hindered socio-economic progress but to no avail.

Thus, this study examined fiscal federalism and accountability issues in Nigeria using secondary data and used the auto-regressive distributed lag econometric technique to analyse the data.

The results from this study reveal that fiscal federalism fails to mitigate corruption in the long run in Nigeria because of poor bureaucratic quality (BQ) and ineffective law and order (LOR).

Fiscal decentralization must be accompanied by legislations that will strengthen BQ of fiscal institutions at subnational levels and promote effective LOR.

This study recommends that for fiscal federalism to mitigate corruption in the long run, government must adopt appropriate policies to improve BQ and further strengthen LOR in Nigeria. The finding also suggests that to promote public sector accountability in Nigeria, government should ensure the simultaneous decentralization of expenditure and revenue to lower tiers of government. This study provides detailed empirical evidence that fiscal decentralization without accountability will accentuate public sector corruption, and in the long run, weaken local economic development initiative to boost growth and development.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how local government bodies in Nepal are empowered to play their constitutional roles and engage in activities to deliver public services at the doorsteps of the people effectively. The focus is on the institutionalisation of federalism, its implications for local governance, and capacity development of local authorities.

Ideas of decentralisation, governance and public management have been used to interpret findings based on qualitative research methods by key informant interviews, focus group discussions and personal observations conducted in five selected municipalities in Nepal.

The process of operationalising the power of local government bodies is more conventional and hierarchic. At the same time, the formulation and implementation of inclusive plans and budgeting are confined with certain formalities that do not necessarily allow citizens the space for voices. Federal government grants constrain fiscal jurisdiction and control over resource mobilisation. The mere preparation and administration of local government legislation and relevant by-laws have weakened the capacity of local government bodies.

From interpretation of first-hand data, this paper has identified the pitfalls of the federalisation process, the constraints deter the devolution of power to local bodies as well as the transformation of local governments into autonomous institutions in Nepal.

With the global financial crisis, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) experienced its own unraveling of macro-financial imbalances and thus presents an interesting case to analyze the underlying fragilities in federal governments. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the evolution of fiscal policy in the UAE at consolidated and subnational levels in the run-up and after the crisis, and provide pertinent insights about the importance of policy coordination in other federal fiscal systems – and monetary unions, as brought to light by the recent developments in Europe.

In measuring the cyclicality of fiscal balances at the consolidated and emirate level in the UAE, this paper uses the non-hydrocarbon primary budget balance, excluding interest spending and hydrocarbon revenues, investment income of the sovereign wealth fund, scaled by non-hydrocarbon GDP. The cyclically adjusted primary balance is estimated by deducting cyclical components from the actual balance. It is important to correct for cyclical changes because the budget balance tends to vary endogenously according the state of the economy – deteriorating during a bust and improving in a boom. Furthermore, since hydrocarbon revenues are dependent on the erratic behavior of hydrocarbon prices, the cyclically adjusted non-hydrocarbon primary balance is computed, using the elasticity of non-hydrocarbon revenues and primary expenditures relative to non-hydrocarbon GDP, to assess whether fiscal policy exacerbates economic fluctuations in the UAE at the aggregate and emirate levels.

The empirical findings show that procyclical fiscal policies prior to the crisis reinforced the financial sector cycle, exacerbated the economic upswing, and thereby contributed to the build-up of macro-financial vulnerabilities. The paper also sets out policy lessons to develop a rule-based fiscal framework that would help strengthen fiscal policy coordination between the various layers of government and ensure long-term fiscal sustainability and a more equitable intergenerational distribution of wealth.

The lack of fiscal policy coordination among subnational governments complicates macro-economic management at the federal level. Since the UAE has a pegged exchange rate regime and consequently a limited scope to use monetary policy, the burden of macro-economic stabilization falls on fiscal policy. Accordingly, this paper shows that procyclical fiscal policies prior to the crisis reinforced the “financial accelerator” effect, exacerbated the economic cycle, and thereby contributed to the build-up of economic and financial vulnerabilities in the UAE.

Drawing on network and fiscal federalism theories, we investigated central government patronage and donor aid as antecedents of budget performance in local government (LG). A mixed methods design with data collected from 18 LGs, two ministries, and four donor agencies in Uganda was employed. Results revealed that both central government patronage and donor aid predict budget performance. Moreover, autonomy does not mediate the interactions as initially hypothesized. Implications for theory and practice are discussed and future research direction is provided.

The COVID19 crisis has thrown wide open the debate on Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’s (EMU) future. Next Generation EU (NGEU) has broken the stalemate over a central fiscal capacity. The open question is whether NGEU is a one-off or a first step. The suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact has given new urgency to the debate on reforming EMU’s fiscal rules.

There is no debate as yet about how these two prospects relate to each other. This paper argues that a permanent fiscal capacity and revised rules should be seen as alternatives.

This study makes two claims: first, a fiscal capacity renders a reformed pact unnecessary and second, that is an optimal solution politically. A fiscal capacity would provide an efficient asymmetric shock absorber and therefore reduce the need for pre-emptive action against negative cross-border externalities. It would also provide an abundant supply of an EU-wide safe asset around which to structure the EU’s financial system, thus rendering unnecessary the backstopping of member states' debts.

This would restore democratic accountability while eliminating moral hazard and enforcement problems.

Decentralization has been a continual focus of attention of both scholars and practitioners for more than half a century. Even though there is a general agreement on what decentralization is, there is no consensus about how it should be measured. This article builds on the existing body of literature that specifies three major dimensions of decentralization: political, administrative, and economic. The article offers a measurement model that unifies these dimensions in a meaningful manner that allows for comparison across countries. The proposed model is then empirically tested using confirmatory factor analysis of a data set of 37 countries over the period 2000-2009. This factor analysis reveals that there are, in fact, only two dimensions of the decentralization process. The newly developed modelʼs index illustrates that the conceptually challenging processes of decentralization can be accurately measured and analyzed. The index can be used for hypothesis testing of the causality role of decentralization.

Even though fiscal autonomy plays a role as one of the prerequisite conditions for fiscal decentralization, there has been little research into why fiscal autonomy is important or how it works for subnational governments. This study aims to examine the effectiveness of fiscal autonomy by using a panel dataset of US state governments from 2001 to 2013.

According to the results of general method of moments, the author find that fiscal autonomy leads to reducing volatility in total expenditures.

It indicates that fiscal autonomy is necessary for state governments performing one of the three Musgravian role of government (e.g. stabilization). However, when we look at the more detailed relationship between fiscal autonomy and volatility by applying expenditures from major categories such as capital outlay, general expenditure and public welfare, this study finds no statistically significant results. Interestingly, balanced budget requirement and tax and expenditure limitation indicate different effects on expenditure volatility, even though they belong to the same institutional factors.

This paper is meaningful because it can support the importance of fiscal autonomy on fiscal performance.

This study examines five national public policy areas where states and local governments received grants-in-aid from the federal government; these grants approximate a fifth of their yearly revenue budgets. Knowing the historical trends and concentrations can minimize expectation errors of practitioners and policy makers and facilitate future revenue planning. The grants examined between 1940 and 2010 include income security, health, education and training, economic and regional development, and transportation. The study uses agency theory to rationalize relationships among the governments, and applies statistical modeling, multiple means comparisons and discriminant analyses to test whether there are distinct policy concentrations and differences among policy regimes. Our findings show transfers were continuous, physically important and unaffected significantly by adjustments due to size and prices. The study found concentrations and differences among policy regimes.

The objective of the study is to determine if an over-borrowing bias emerges when the state fiscal base is shared by multiple general-purpose and special-purpose jurisdictions serving different groups of citizens.

This study uses panel data from all 50 states in the US from 1997 to 2007 to estimate models of total debt levels of state governments and total debt levels of all local governments aggregated at the state level. For comparison, it also estimates total debt levels of state and local governments taken together for the same years.

This study finds that jurisdictional overlap will increase state government debt, local government debt, as well as combined state and local government debt.

The finding from the study suggests that the fiscal common-pool model provides a more accurate analysis and more appropriate understanding of the institutional composition at the state and local public sector, especially for the vertical dimension of the local public sector where there are more specialized and overlapping jurisdictions.