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The majority of start‐up businesses fail, many for marketing‐related reasons. Estimates of the new product failure rate across all sized companies range anywhere from 30% to 80% or more, which is high even on the conservative side. These kind of results make one adage apropos: “If people learn from their mistakes, many are getting a fantastic education.”

The notion of “market share” has ravaged the board‐rooms of corporate America for a generation. There are hundreds of classic examples of where share leaders—probably low‐cost producers—have picked up all the marbles and won. However, there are other examples of market‐share blunders that should alert businessmen to be wary of unrestrained share strategies that can be devastating. Despite these blunders, many corporate managements have failed to realize that while low delivered cost can create the opportunity for larger market share, share itself does not assure high profitability.

In this day of internationalization and electronic information, communication competency is truly required for global managers. Japanese global managers, however, are often criticized as lacking the power of expression. It is said that they are very poor at communicating with their foreign counterparts because they are not good at English. Is it really so? The discussion will be focused on the author’s research on Japanese managers’ use of English as a means of business communication with local businesses in Singapore. The research was to see if the cause of their communication blunders is related to English or to fundamental differences in communication patterns. The results support the author’s claim that their problem is not because of a lack of English grammar but is due to the lack of communication competency irrelevant to grammar. Japanese global managers should understand that English alone cannot be a panacea for communication blunders.

This article advances the view that British Airways could be less prone to disruptions and public‐relations blunders if it adopted the human‐asset approach.

Describes the main aspects of the human‐asset approach, shows how it has been successful at Toyota and Jet Blue, and reveals the ways in which it could help British Airways to rediscover the success it enjoyed in the aftermath of privatization.

Argues that BA's drive for efficiency – in terms of relentless cost‐cutting and outsourcing – came at a cost as the airline experienced industrial disputes and employee unrest that dented its image. Puts forward the opinion that approaching efficiency from a human perspective provides organizations with a more sustainable and effective business model, where values drive the efficiency and productivity necessary for success. Explains how Toyota and Jet Blue have adopted such a model.

Reveals that there is no magic formula for developing a human asset model for a particular business; it needs thorough analysis of the needs of human assets, and the main factors and values that drive the quality of relationships between them.

Contends that the human‐asset model provides an effective framework for integrating HR with the business strategy.

This article has been withdrawn as it was published elsewhere and accidentally duplicated. The original article can be seen here: 10.1108/eb008177. When citing the article, please cite: William L. Shanklin, (1986) “SIX TIMELESS MARKETING BLUNDERS”, Journal of Consumer Marketing, Vol. 3 Iss: 4, pp. 31 - 39.

This article has been withdrawn as it was published elsewhere and accidentally duplicated. The original article can be seen here: 10.1108/eb008177. When citing the article, please cite: William L. Shanklin, (1986) “SIX TIMELESS MARKETING BLUNDERS”, Journal of Consumer Marketing, Vol. 3 Iss: 4, pp. 31 - 39.

FEW aircraft projects have started with such high hopes of fulfilling a multitude of requirements and with such a high potential production as the TFX project. Still fewer have aroused such bitter controversy over such a long period. A report issued last month by the U.S Senate Committee on Government Operations examines the history of the TFX (now the F‐111) from the award of the initial contract to its entry into service. Uninhibited in its comment on the management of the programme, it concludes that it was a ‘failure’ and ‘a fiscal blunder of the greatest magnitude’. The report was published a fortnight after General Dynamics Corporation, the prime contractor for the F‐111, had issued a statement on the programme status and replied to some of the errors that had been perpetrated in comment on the aircraft.