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The principal–agent literature often draws criticism for its ahistorical, acontextual and static nature, particularly when theories such as the agency or the stewardship theory are being used. This is because the field of economics tends to develop universalistic models and theories, excluding history, context and change, which renders them unusable for practitioners whose behavior is (partially) guided by the complex and differing environments in which they find themselves. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this criticism by investigating how (and if) history, context and change influence the principal–agent relationship.

Instead of using the typical economic methodologies to study the principal–agent relationship, this paper makes use of the methodologies of the field of history to investigate how history, context and change affect principal–agent relationships in three cases in the early modern Southern Netherlands (the Dukes of Arenberg, the Roosewalle farm and Abbot De Loose of the Abbey of Ename). This methodology is especially suited, as it results in historical narratives that incorporate all of these three elements.

The main finding is that the cases show how history, context and change clearly affect the principal–agent relationship. These aspects are intricately intertwined, as earlier choices and context can cause a change in the principal–agent relationship, this creates a new presence (with an altered history) and sometimes even a new context. This results in a highly dynamic relationship that can evolve in very short periods, mostly in a path-dependent manner.

The paper advocates by example for a shift in principal–agent research, emphasizing the necessity of considering history, context and change. This study demonstrates that these factors greatly affect the nature of the principal–agent relationship. In doing so, it may provide practitioners with better insights, as real-world principal–agent relationships are indeed impacted by these three factors.

By using historical methods, this study shows for the first time how context, change and history indeed influence principal–agent relationships. The findings of this paper encourage the development of theories and theoretical frameworks that more closely resemble reality, rather than being universalistic.

This study explores the emergence of discrimination based on observable characteristics. In many instances, agents presume differences arising from traits such as race or gender, even when these parameters are irrelevant to the situation at hand. This paper intends to reveal an emergent behavior and a persistent culture of discrimination caused by miscategorization in strategic interactions.

We assume that agents occasionally engage in conflicts modeled as asymmetric hawk and dove games, where boundedly rational agents may categorize their opponents based on observable traits to make effective decisions. Three categorization strategies are considered: fine-grained, regular, and coarse-grained. Subsequently, an evolutionary agent-based model is employed to examine the performance of these strategies in a dynamic environment.

The results demonstrate that fine-grained categorization provides an advantage when the cost of fighting is low, while coarse-grained categorizers exhibit more peaceful behavior, gaining an advantage when the cost of conflict is high. Our primary finding indicates the emergence of discrimination based on non-relevant traits, manifested through consistent aggressive behavior towards individuals possessing these traits.

This paper is the first to investigate the emergence of discrimination without assuming prior differences between groups. Previous studies have assumed either an initial population difference or a homophily-based approach. In contrast, we demonstrate that discrimination can emerge even in the absence of such assumptions. Discrimination between two groups may arise as long as there are agents who label these categories.

Information was obtained in interviews with Richard Nagel in Winter/Spring 2022. This information was supplemented by material from secondary sources. The only information that was disguised were the real names for Bob Crater, Tim Landy, Jane Tolley and Mary Nagel.

The case was classroom tested in Summer 2022. The responses from students helped to shape the writing of the case.

Richard Nagel, the owner of the RE/MAX Elite real estate agency in Monmouth Beach, New Jersey, has just learned that one of his agents, Tim Landy, quit and left the industry. Tim was a young real estate agent and Richard had spent considerable time training him. Tim was motivated and he worked hard to prospect for business, but he showed that he was experiencing difficulty closing on his sales. Richard decided to recommend that Tim work with another agent, Bob Crater, as Bob was an experienced salesman but was not doing the up-front prospecting that Tim was doing. Richard suggested two different strategies to the two agents – a pairing up arrangement and peer-to-peer learning. The outcome that Richard envisioned was that both of the struggling salesmen would benefit from either of these strategies, but Bob refused to collaborate.

Tim’s quitting was characteristic of an ongoing problem with employee retention that Richard had been experiencing as a manager in recent years. This problem caused Richard to think about how he recruited his real estate agents, how he developed them through coaching and how he motivated them so that they would stay happy in their job and not leave. He recognized the importance of thoroughly examining his retention strategy within the next 12 months so that he could better manage the problem and strengthen the productivity of his real estate agency.

The case is intended for an undergraduate course in human resources management, as it deals directly with recruiting, coaching and retaining employees.

The purpose of the study is to investigate and analyze the dynamics of the government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanism, particularly, focusing on profit-driven speculative behaviors exhibited by enterprises within this context. The study aims to understand the various factors influencing the behavior of stakeholders involved in grain storage, including government storage departments, agent storage enterprises and quality inspection agencies.

The study employs a tripartite evolutionary game model to investigate profit-driven behaviors in government-enterprise grain joint storage. It analyzes strategies of government departments, storage enterprises and quality inspection agencies, considering factors like supervision costs and speculative risks. Simulation analysis examines tripartite payoffs, initial probabilities and the impact of digital governance levels to enhance emergency grain storage effectiveness.

The study finds that leveraging digital governance tools in government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanisms can mitigate risks, enhance efficiency and ensure the security of grain storage. It highlights the significant impact of supervision costs, speculative risks and digital supervision levels on stakeholder strategies, offering guidance to improve the effectiveness of emergency grain storage systems.

The originality of this study lies in its integration of digital governance tools into the analysis of the government-enterprise grain joint storage mechanism, addressing profit-driven speculative behaviors. Through a tripartite evolutionary game model, it explores stakeholder strategies, emphasizing the impact of digital supervision levels on outcomes and offering insights crucial for enhancing emergency grain storage effectiveness.

This study combines different perspectives on herding, viewing it as a social network heuristic in comparison to other heuristics. The purpose is to use the heuristic view of herding as found in early literature and test it on grounds of efficiency and payoff, in essence, combining the heuristic and rational agent view of herding. The simulated double auction setting includes agents embedded in a social network, allowing for an examination of herding alongside rational behaviour and imperfect signals.

In each round of the simulation, levels of homophily, density and fractions of types of agents is set and agents are allowed to follow their respective heuristics under those conditions. Characteristics of the social network, such as the size, levels of different homophilies, density and fractions of different types of agents are varied randomly to gauge their effect on the performance of herders vis-à-vis others and the overall market efficiency through simulation based approach. The data used for the study has been developed in Python and linear models are estimated using R.

Herding decreases total surplus in private value double auctions, but herders are not worse off than other agents and perform equally in common value auctions. Further, herders and random offerers reduce payoffs of other agents as well, and herding effects the surplus per transaction and not the quantum.

This study explores herding as a strategic behaviour coexisting with rationality and other strategies in specific circumstances. It presents intriguing findings on the impact of herding on individual outcomes and market efficiency, raising new avenues for future research. Implication to research includes a dent on the “sieve” argument of markets rooting out irrationality and from it, a policy implication that follows is the need for corrective measures as markets cannot self-correct this, given herders do not perform worse than others.

The study links the phenomenon of herding to the dynamics of social networks and heuristic-based learning mechanisms that sets apart this research from the majority of existing literature, which predominantly conceptualizes herding as an outcome derived from a perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and a rational learning process.

This study aims to explore how managers exercise agency in strategic investment decisions (SIDs) by drawing on their knowledgeability of the strategic context. Specifically, the authors address the role of position–practice relations and irresistible causal forces in this conduct.

The authors examine SID-making (SIDM) practices in four case organisations operating in highly competitive markets, conducting interviews with managers at various levels and analysing company documents. Drawing on strong structuration theory, the authors show how managerial decision makers draw upon their knowledge of organisational context when exercising agency in SIDs.

The authors provide insights into how SIDM behaviour, specifically agents’ conduct, is shaped by a combination of position–practice relations and the agents’ comprehension of their organisation’s context.

The authors extend the SIDM literature by surfacing the issue of how actors’ conjuncturally-specific knowledge of external structures shapes the general dispositions they draw on in exercising agency in practice.

The authors extend the SIDM literature by surfacing the issue of how actors’ conjuncturally-specific knowledge of external structures shapes the general dispositions they draw on in exercising agency in practice. Particularly, the authors contribute to this literature by identifying irresistible causal forces and illuminating why actors might not resist in SIDM processes, despite having the potential to do so.

The purpose of this study to improve the efficiency of customer acquisition and retention through the design of salary information disclosure mechanism.

This study develops a stylized game-theoretic model of delegating customer acquisition and retention, focusing on how firms choose delegation and wage information disclosure strategy.

The results confirm the necessity for enterprises to disclose salary information. When sales agents are risk neutral, firms should choose multi-agent (MA) delegation and disclose their wages. However, when agents are risk averse, firms may disclose the wages of acquisition agents or both agents in MA delegation, depending on the uncertainty of the retention market.

This paper contributes to the literature on delegation of customer acquisition and retention and demonstrates that salary disclosure can be used as a supplement to the incentive mechanism.

We attempt to construct a grey three-way conflict analysis model with constraints to deal with correlated conflict problems with uncertain information.

In order to address these correlated conflict problems with uncertain information, considering the interactive influence and mutual restraints among agents and portraying their attitudes toward the conflict issues, we utilize grey numbers and three-way decisions to propose a grey three-way conflict analysis model with constraints. Firstly, based on the collected information, we introduced grey theory, calculated the degree of conflict between agents and then analyzed the conflict alliance based on the three-way decision theory. Finally, we designed a feedback mechanism to identify key agents and key conflict issues. A case verifies the effectiveness and practicability of the proposed model.

The results show that the proposed model can portray their attitudes toward conflict issues and effectively extract conflict-related information.

By employing this approach, we can provide the answers to Deja’s fundamental questions regarding Pawlak’s conflict analysis: “what are the underlying causes of conflict?” and “how can a viable consensus strategy be identified?”

This paper aims to study the agent learning from expert demonstration data while incorporating reinforcement learning (RL), which enables the agent to break through the limitations of expert demonstration data and reduces the dimensionality of the agent’s exploration space to speed up the training convergence rate.

Firstly, the decay weight function is set in the objective function of the agent’s training to combine both types of methods, and both RL and imitation learning (IL) are considered to guide the agent's behavior when updating the policy. Second, this study designs a coupling utilization method between the demonstration trajectory and the training experience, so that samples from both aspects can be combined during the agent’s learning process, and the utilization rate of the data and the agent’s learning speed can be improved.

The method is superior to other algorithms in terms of convergence speed and decision stability, avoiding training from scratch for reward values, and breaking through the restrictions brought by demonstration data.

The agent can adapt to dynamic scenes through exploration and trial-and-error mechanisms based on the experience of demonstrating trajectories. The demonstration data set used in IL and the experience samples obtained in the process of RL are coupled and used to improve the data utilization efficiency and the generalization ability of the agent.

Individuals develop and perform and process their identities in relationships with others as well as with the environment in which they find themselves, Many of these relationships with others are characterized by fundamental inequalities. In finding their identities, the subordinate in the relationship develops an identity that typically take steps – by vocal and non-vocal gestures – to perform this particularized identity. The identification of self is not only related to the others, with eachindividual in reflective communication, but also reflections characterized by inequality. In continuing to do so, he or she will experience a certain powerlessness, indeed what Marx called alienation.