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Purpose of this paper – This study investigates compliance with the corporate governance code in an African developing economy (Mauritius).

Methodology/approach – We examine the annual reports of 41 listed companies to assess the extent of compliance with the code and to analyze the wording of compliance statements. We also carry out in-depth semi-structured interviews with selected company directors to understand the reasons for compliance (or non-compliance).

Findings – Initial findings indicate a reasonable level of compliance with the more visible requirements of the code but noteworthy non-compliance also emerges, particularly in relation to the low number of company boards being chaired by independent directors, to uncertainties on the actual operation of board committees, and to the widespread non-disclosure of directors’ remuneration. Furthermore, compliance statements were found to be vague, ambiguous, or even inconsistent with the extent of compliance disclosed in the reports. We believe these are indications that many of the companies are adhering selectively with the code to project an image of symbolic compliance. Our in-depth follow-up interviews with directors largely confirm this behaviour of selective compliance.

Research implications – We suggest that the pursuit of legitimacy as an operational resource – rather than efficiency-led rationales – emerges as a potential theoretical explanation for the adoption of the corporate governance code in Mauritius.

Originality /value of paper – We bring evidence on how the corporate governance code is being understood and rationalized in a developing economy. We rely on a combination of annual report disclosures, compliance statements, and interview data to investigate corporate governance compliance.

Purpose of paper – Rural Banks (RBs) are unit banks owned by members of the rural community through the purchase of shares and are licensed to provide financial intermediation in rural areas of Ghana. This paper reports on the external and internal mechanisms through which corporate governance is maintained in these banks.

Design/methodology/approach – The findings reported in the paper are based on evidence obtained from a review of relevant documents and interviews with the managers of selected RBs.

Findings – The corporate governance system in the RBs is mainly a rational western model recommended by the World Bank and implemented by the Central bank of Ghana. Under this model corporate governance is expected to be maintained externally through regulatory agencies (the Central Bank of Ghana and the Association of Rural Banks) and internally through the respective Boards of Directors. However, we observe that because of the locations and ownerships of these banks, board appointments and decisions are often embedded in local political and social relations. This affects the independence of the boards and impacts on their role in maintaining corporate governance.

Research limitations/implications – We argue that any attempt to design corporate governance systems in these banks without taking these social and political factors into consideration is likely to lead to failure. This is particularly important given that the World Bank and other international donors are continuously proposing rational western models of governance to institutions in the developing world, such as the RBs. Given that these organizations operate under different sets of environmental conditions, there is likely to be differences between the actual and the idealized corporate governance systems.

Originality/value of paper – The study is important because of the role the rural banks play in the socio-economic development of Ghana. Several other developing countries have established similar institutions to support the development of the informal sector through the provision of microcredit. The research will contribute to the design of appropriate corporate governance systems so as to improve the overall contributions of these institutions.

Purpose – The objective of this paper is to examine how state-owned entities (SOEs) engage with the requirements of the corporate governance code in an African developing economy (Mauritius).

Approach – A content analysis of the annual reports of SOEs and National Audit Office (NAO) reports is undertaken. This is supplemented by semi-structured interviews with relevant directors and regulatory bodies.

Findings – We report a substantial non-implementation of the code and identify several impediments to the transposing of the corporate governance model to the state-owned entities. The salient issues relate to the inadequate definition of SOEs in the code, the different conceptualisations of ownership and accountability, the influence of political rivalries and the low level of financial accountability in SOEs. We also consider our findings in relation to the theoretical perspectives of ‘efficiency gains’ and ‘social legitimation’.

Originality/value – Very few studies have looked into the applicability of codes of corporate governance in SOEs. In spite of the prominence of SOEs in many African developing countries, empirical evidence on corporate governance implementation in such entities has been scant.

Recommendations/implications – The findings are of relevance to policy-makers and regulators who seek to rely on mainstream corporate governance principles and practices to enhance the accountability and transparency of SOEs. Key enabling conditions for corporate governance implementation involve a depoliticisation of board appointments and a redefinition of the accountability relationships between SOEs and their ultimate owner (i.e. elected representatives and taxpayers).

PS21 is the most comprehensive administrative reform to be introduced in Singapore as it is “an extension of existing schemes and campaigns” such as Work Improvement Teams (WITs), Suggestions, Service Improvement, Staff Welfare, Organizational Review, Public Contact Improvement, Courtesy, Healthy Lifestyle, Zero Manpower Growth, Productivity, and so on (Prime Minister's Office, 1995, p. 2).

In any time and space and under any circumstance, we find peasants are never passive actors in their livelihoods and rural development. Instead, they always create space for manoeuvre in order to make changes. This chapter analyses the innovative actions taken by the majority of rural inhabitants in rural areas during the overwhelming modernization process, so as to affirm that peasants are the main actors of rural development. It is they who have shaped the transformation of rural societies and the history. Through the analysis, this chapter concludes that rural development is not an objective, a blueprint nor a design. It is not the to-be-developed rear field in modernization. It is not the babysitter for cities, nor a rehearsal place for bureaucrats to testify their random thoughts. Rural development is what peasants do. The path they have chosen reveals scenery so different from modernization. If we regard development as a social change, or a cross with influential meanings, we could understand rural development as peasants’ victories over their predicament. Villages accommodate not only peasants, but without peasants villages would surely vanish. In this sense, the most important part in rural development or rural change is peasants – their conditions and their feelings.

As a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) extension tool, cross-evaluation method was developed to evaluate Decision Making Units’ (DMUs) performances in a competitive situation with limited demand. It identifies DMUs with best performances and rank them by applying peer evaluation mode instead of self-evaluation mode. However, it has limitations in efficiency improvement. That is, it fails to give direct information on how to improve efficiencies of the inefficient DMUs. In this chapter, we propose an alternative way to apply cross-evaluation in efficiency improvement. First, an appropriate and feasible suggestion is proposed to minimize the variation between the weights of a DMU's own optimal Charnes-Cooper-Rhodes (CCR) efficiency and the weights guaranteeing its cross-efficiency score. We exploit several transformations to convert nonlinear programming into a linear one. As a result, an overall optimal set of the weights is obtained, which precisely illustrate the preferences of decision makers and exact characteristics of production process of the evaluated DMU. A further discussion is advanced to examine the existence of non-uniqueness of the weights and to differentiate various sets of the optimal weights by suggesting a unique feasible set of multipliers to best represent the alternative weights selection criterion. Moreover, we develop several models to reallocate the inputs and outputs of inefficient DMUs with minimum amelioration as well as consideration of the preference of decision makers. Finally, we apply our models to evaluate competitive advantages of Chinese cities.

My interest in public administration as a discipline was sparked by Dr Joseph P.L. Jiang, who was a student of the late Professor Fred W. Riggs at Indiana University, in 1968 when I took his course in public administration during my final year at the Department of Political Science, University of Singapore. I also remember fondly my first meeting with Professor Riggs during the same year when he gave a guest lecture in Dr Jiang's course (Quah, 2008d). I met Fred again many years later at various international conferences but I remember fondly our meetings in Chiangmai in June 1993 and in Honolulu in June 1996. I have also remained in touch with Dr Jiang after his return to Taipei.