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The purpose of this paper is to design a contract to coordinate the biomass molding fuel supply chain consisting of a supplier with uncertain supply and a producer with cyclical demand as well as improve the profit of this supply chain.

In this paper, the supply chain model was build and all the variables and assumptions are set. Stackelberg game model was used to analyze and solve the problem. Furthermore, the authors give numerical examples and result analysis on the basis of data coming from field study and online information about a real biomass fuel supply chain.

The wholesale price with shortage penalty contract the authors proposed can coordinate the supply chain. And as the dominator of the supply chain, the producer can realize the redistribution of profits within the supply chain by determine the contract parameters.

This one-to-one supply chain is a basic of complex supply chain system. Multi-to-one, one-to-multi and multi-to-multi supply chain can be studied in the future.

The results obtained in this paper can be used as a reference for enterprises in biomass energy supply chain to make contracts and realize the long-term co-operations among supply chain members.

The Internet of Things (IoT) is used in the fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain, which can be coordinated through a revenue-sharing contract. The purpose of this paper is to make the three-level supply chain coordinate in IoT by considering the influence of FAP on market demand and costs of controlling freshness on the road.

A three-level FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT is regarded as the research object. This study improves the revenue-sharing contract, determines the optimal solution when the supply chain achieves maximum profit in three types of decision-making situations, and develops the profit distribution model based on the improved revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain.

The improved revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT, as well as benefit all enterprises in the supply chain.

Resource utilization rate can be improved after coordinating the entire supply chain. Moreover, loss in the circulation process is reduced, and the circulation efficiency of FAPs is improved because of the application of IoT. The validity of the model is verified through a case analysis.

This study is different from other research in terms of the combination of supply chain coordination, FAPs, and radio frequency identification application in IoT.

The authors investigate the manufacturer's choice of discount schemes in a supply chain with competing retailers.

Using a game-theoretic model, the authors build two discount frameworks and compare and analyze the effects of different discount schemes on the performance of supply chain members.

The authors find that the retail price (market demand) in the quantity discount scheme is always higher (lower) than that in the market share discount scheme. The authors also find that the retailers' preference for discount schemes is antithetical to the manufacturer's preference in most cases. However, under certain conditions, there will be a win-win situation where Pareto-optimization occurs between the manufacturer and retailers when they choose the same discount scheme.

On the one hand, the authors assume that the two retailers are symmetrical in market size and operation efficiency. It would be interesting to study the effect of different discount schemes on retailers when the retailers have different market sizes or operating efficiency. On the other hand, the authors study the manufacturer's choice of discount schemes in a supply chain with one common manufacturer and two competing retailers. However, in practice, there exist other supply chain structures. Future research can examine the problem of choices of discount schemes in other different supply chain structures.

This paper help retailers and manufacturers to choose the best discount schemes.

This paper suggests that a high discount scale is not always beneficial (detrimental) to retailers (the manufacture).

The authors build two discount schemes (the quantity and the market share) in a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers, and the authors focus on the effects of different discount schemes on the competition between two retailers. By comparing the two discount schemes, the authors study which discount scheme is the better choice for the manufacturer when facing competing retailers.

The managerial questions of this paper are as follows, and the authors are trying to solve them: How revenue sharing contract (CSR) degree and government subsidy affect the agri-food quality? What kind of model (WPC, revenue-sharing contract [RSC] and cooperative) would be more effective in motivating manufacturers and retailer to increase effort and improve agri-food quality? What kind of model (WPC, RSC and cooperative) would make manufacturer and retailer better off?

Considering the jointing quality effort and contract decision in green agri-food supply chain, this paper proposes six models that consider CSR of manufacturer and retailer, and then the obtained optimal solutions are compared and analyzed. At the same time, the impact of government subsidies is analyzed, and corresponding conclusions are drawn.

The results show that, first of all, whether the increasing CSR of the manufacturer or the retailer can motivate both parties to improve the agri-food quality effort investment. Second, the WPC and RSC contract may play different role in different cases. Finally, under the model with government subsidies, regarding positive influence of government subsidies on efforts of manufacturer and retailer, quality and profits of members is investigated. Based on these conclusions, this study puts forward the following policy suggestions. Firstly, governments should formulate reasonable subsidy policies to support manufacturer and retailer to improve the agri-food quality, thereby promoting green industries' development. Secondly, manufacturer and retailer should actively improve CSR and strengthen the effort of agri-food so as to advance quality. Finally, manufacturer and retailer can choose cooperative model or WPC contract.

In this paper, one manufacturer and one retailer are considered. Since the agri-food supply chain structure in reality is more complicated, the future research direction can consider the supply chain structure with one manufacturer and multiple retailers. In addition, this paper only considers the subsidy, and future research can classify the subsidy into different types.

The study makes two substantive contributions to the body of knowledge in the field of sustainable operations:(1) incorporating quality-based demand function in supply chain and dynamic process of agri-food quality; (2) exploring the impact of CSR awareness of members and subsidy of government on agri-food quality, and comparing the influence in different models.

This study aims to focus on the optimal green R&D of a capital-constrained supply chain under different channel power structures as well as the impact of capital constraint, financing cost, channel power structure and cost-reducing efficiency on green R&D and supply chain profitability.

A two-echelon supply chain is considered. The upstream firm engages in green R&D but has capital constraints that can be overcome by external financing. Green R&D is beneficial to reduce production costs and increase consumer demand. Based on whether or not the upstream firm is capital constrained and dominates the supply chain, four models are developed.

Capital constraints significantly lower green R&D and supply chain profitability. Transferring leadership from the upstream to the downstream firms leads to higher green R&D levels and downstream firm profitability, whereas the upstream firm's profitability is increased (decreased) if green R&D investment efficiency is high (low) enough. Greater financing costs reduce green R&D and downstream firm profitability; however, the upstream firm's profitability under the model in which it functions as the follower increases if the initial capital is sufficient. More importantly, empirical analysis based on practice data is used to verify the theoretical results reported above.

This study reveals how upstream firms in supply chains decide green R&D decisions in situations with capital constraints, providing managers and governments with an understanding of the impact of capital constraint, channel power structure, financing cost and cost-reducing efficiency on supply chain green R&D and profitability.

The major contributions are the exploration of supply chain green R&D by taking into consideration channel power structures and cost-reducing efficiency and the validation of theoretical results using practice data.

The purpose of this paper is to develop propositions explaining the influence of individual goals and social preferences on human decision making in transport planning. The aim is to understand which individual goals and social preferences planners pursue and how these influence planners’ decisions.

Propositions are developed based on investigation of decision making of transport planners in a Dutch logistics service provider using multiple data collection methods.

The study shows how decision making of transport planners is motivated by individual goals as well as social preferences for reciprocity and group identity.

Further research including transaction data analysis is needed to triangulate findings and to strengthen conclusions. Propositions are developed to be tested in future research.

Results suggest that efforts to guide planners in their decision making should go beyond traditional (monetary) incentives and consider their individual goals and social preferences. Moreover, this study provides insight into why transport planners deviate from desired behaviour.

While individual decision making plays an essential role in operational planning, the factors influencing how individuals make operational planning decisions are not fully understood.

With the growing economic impact of e-commerce and the increasing trend of omnichannel mode, more considerate services can be provided to customers. This paper aims to explore the optimal practice of business strategies and enrich the research content of marine tourism omnichannel.

This paper studies the optimal practice of bundling pricing and service effort strategies between two tourism suppliers (TSs) and a travel agent (TA) who distributes complementary products in marine tourism omnichannel considering joint efforts of both sides. This study develops five models by Stackelberg and Nash game and introduces the revenue-sharing contract. All outcomes/results are analyzed and the corresponding numerical and sensitivity analyses are conducted to derive more managerial implications and business insights.

The main findings show that bundling price is directly proportional to inter-channel integration coefficient and service effort level coefficient, and inversely proportional to the price elasticity coefficient. TA tends to provide a higher level of service effort than TSs when TA plays a dominant role. Improving the service effort level unduly leads to a decline in profits. Moreover, TSs and TA can reach a win-win situation under the coordination mechanism and the marine tourism omnichannel can achieve the best performance.

A novel and useful approach towards joint equilibrium decisions of bundle pricing and service efforts in marine tourism omnichannel with complementary tourism products under different operational strategies is proposed.