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The purpose of this paper is to design a contract to coordinate the biomass molding fuel supply chain consisting of a supplier with uncertain supply and a producer with cyclical demand as well as improve the profit of this supply chain.

In this paper, the supply chain model was build and all the variables and assumptions are set. Stackelberg game model was used to analyze and solve the problem. Furthermore, the authors give numerical examples and result analysis on the basis of data coming from field study and online information about a real biomass fuel supply chain.

The wholesale price with shortage penalty contract the authors proposed can coordinate the supply chain. And as the dominator of the supply chain, the producer can realize the redistribution of profits within the supply chain by determine the contract parameters.

This one-to-one supply chain is a basic of complex supply chain system. Multi-to-one, one-to-multi and multi-to-multi supply chain can be studied in the future.

The results obtained in this paper can be used as a reference for enterprises in biomass energy supply chain to make contracts and realize the long-term co-operations among supply chain members.

This paper aims to develop a coordination mechanism that can be applied to achieve the channel coordination and information sharing simultaneously in the fresh agri-food supply chain with uncertain demand. It seeks to elucidate how the producer can use an option contract to transfer the risk caused by uncertain demand, impel the retailer to share demand information and improve the performance of supply chain.

An option contract model based on the basic model of fresh agri-food supply chain is introduced to compare the production, profit, risk and information sharing condition of the supply chain in different cases. In addition, a case study focusing on the sale of autumn peaches produced by a local producer is investigated, which provides evidence of the applicability of the authors’ approach.

The optimal option contract can help the supply chain achieve channel coordination and reach Pareto improvement. In the meantime, such a contract will encourage the retailer to share market demand information with producer spontaneously and help maintain the strategic cooperation between two parties.

This paper considers a single-producer, single-retailer system and both of them are risk neutral.

Presented results can be used as suggestions for improving the contract design of fresh agri-food supply chain in China and can also provide references for other countries with similar experiences as China in fresh agri-food production.

This research introduces the option contract into fresh agri-food supply chain and takes information sharing and the risk caused by uncertain demand into consideration.

In the hybrid electricity market consisting of renewable and conventional energy, the generation output of renewable power is uncertain because of its intermittency, and the power market demand is also fluctuant. Meanwhile, there is fierce competition among power producers in the power supply market and retailers in the demand market after deregulation, which increases the difficulty of renewable energy power grid-connection. To promote grid-connection of renewable energy power in the hybrid electricity market, the authors construct different contract decision-making models in the “many-to-many” hybrid power supply chain to explore the pricing strategy of renewable energy power grid-connecting.

Considering the dual-uncertainty of renewable energy power output and electricity market demand, the authors construct different decision-making models of wholesale price contract and revenue-sharing contract to compare and optimize grid-connecting pricing, respectively, to maximize the profits of different participants in the hybrid power supply chain. Besides, the authors set different parameters in the models to explore the influence of competition intensity, government subsidies, etc. on power pricing. Then, a numerical simulation is carried out, they verify the existence of the equilibrium solutions satisfying the supply chain coordination, compare the differences of pricing contracts and further analyze the variation characteristics of optimal contract parameters and their interaction relations.

Revenue-sharing contract can increase the quantity of green power grid-connection and realize benefits Pareto improvement of all parties in hybrid power supply chain. The competition intensity both of power supply and demand market will have an impact on the sharing ratio, and the increase of competition intensity results in a reduction of power supply chain coordination pressure. The power contract price, spot price and selling price have all been reduced with the increase of the sharing ratio, and the price of renewable power is more sensitive to the ratio change. The sharing ratio shows a downward trend with the increase of government green power subsidies.

On the basis of expanding the definition of hybrid power market and the theory of newsvendor model, considering the dual-uncertainty of green power generation output and electricity market demand, this paper builds and compares different contract decision-making models to study the grid-connection pricing strategy of renewable energy power. And as an extension of supply chain structure types and management, the authors build a “many-to-many” power supply chain structure model and analyze the impact of competition intensity among power enterprises and the government subsidy on the power grid-connecting pricing.

Integrated decision of pricing and inventory control for a deteriorating product is known as a good practice in revenue management discipline. The purpose of this paper is to formulate the problem of joint pricing and inventory decision in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain with deteriorating items and backlogging. Furthermore, the other purpose is to develop an efficient algorithm to obtain the equilibrium solution.

In this study, a manufacturer–retailer supply chain of a deteriorating product is considered. The retailer aims to maximize his profit, for which he jointly determines the retail price and replenishment cycle. In addition, the manufacturer should decide on the wholesale price to maximize her profit. Considering the problem as a manufacturer-Stackelberg game, the equilibrium solution is formulated and analyzed for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Moreover, two different procedures are developed to obtain the equilibrium solution. The first procedure is an exact procedure for the Taylor-approximated model and the second is a simulated annealing (SA)-embedded algorithm for the actual model.

It is found that Taylor-approximated procedure is more accurate than SA-embedded procedure. However, the latter is more time-efficient. Moreover, it is observed that the obtained solution is highly sensitive to demand parameters, while it is not the case for the cost parameters.

The paper models a real industrial problem, and its results could be used in analyzing any manufacturer–retailer supply chain with deteriorating items. Among others, the fruit and vegetable supply chains are more likely to have a similar setting, and this study’s results are applicable for such chains in food industry.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

This paper considers an option contract in a two-stage supplier-retailer supply chain (SC) when market demand is stochastic. The problem is a Stackelberg game with the supplier as a leader. This research assumes demand information sharing. The purpose of this study is to determine the optimal pricing strategy of the supplier along with the optimal order strategy of the retailer in three option contract cases.

The paper model the option contract pricing problem as a bilevel problem. The problem is then solved using bilevel programing methods. After computing, the generated outcomes are compared to a benchmark (wholesale price contract) to evaluate the contract.

The results reveal that only one of the contract cases can arbitrarily allocate the SC profit. In both other cases, the Stackelberg supplier manages to earn the total SC profit. Further analysis of the first contract, show that from the supplier’s perspective, the first stage forecast inaccuracy is beneficial, whereas the demand uncertainty in the second stage is detrimental. This contracting strategy guarantees both players better outcomes compared to the wholesale price contract.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this research is the first that links the option contract literature to the bilevel programing literature. It also the first to solve the pricing problem of the commitment option contract with demand update where the retailer exercises the option before knowing the exact demand.

Product counterfeiting has been ubiquitously observed in various segments of the supply chain. The intrinsic values of brands create more opportunities for counterfeiting. The damaging reputation of such brands leaves them to deal with the fallouts of counterfeits. Hence, such companies address them mainly through legal action, price and quality strategy. However, consumer characteristics and the random distribution of counterfeit products to the consumer types affect the effectiveness of a counter strategy. This paper aims to generate insights on how to leverage digital technology to curb counterfeit entities with consideration of consumer characteristics and the random distribution of counterfeits to them.

The authors used game theory and vertical differentiation model to understand and encounter deceptive counterfeiting of brand products. The study understands the economic relationship between a brand product manufacturer and consumer types based on their awareness. Further, the authors have considered different cases in the model to gain useful insights.

The results reveal that when the consumers are proactive, informed and value-conscious brand product manufacturers take digital technology counterstrategy to earn the maximum revenue. Hence, this analysis highlights that the effectiveness of a counterstrategy critically depends on the consumer characteristics, whether they are proactive, informed or unaware.

The study outlines that brand product manufacturers must emphasize on the digital supply chain, product redesign and product tracking facility to empower informed and value-conscious and proactive consumers. Moreover, the government should take steps to create awareness among uninformed consumers via information campaigns.

This paper incorporates the role of consumers and brand product manufacturers to understand and address the deceptive counterfeiting issue.

This study aims to examine the value of the call option contract in hedging the risks in the supply chain. The decentralized supply chain without call option contract is first studied as the criterion model for evaluations. This paper addresses several questions: What will be the optimal manufacturer’s production quantity, retailer’s ordering and pricing policies in the presence of random demand and random yield by applying the downconversion approach? How will the call option contract influence the optimal decisions for the members of the supply chain? Can the risk from randomness be divided among the members in the supply chain through the call option contract?

This paper considers a two-level decentralized supply chain under random yield and random demand in which the manufacturer takes advantage of the downconversion approach with two scenarios, with and without option contract. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no article or study uses the downconversion approach in a supply chain regarding random yield and random demand. Furthermore, the paper considers pricing with option contract in the supply chain, which makes this article stands out significantly from other articles in the literature.

This study shows that the downconversion approach would reduce the risk caused by the random yield, which appears to be the appropriate method for the environmental goal of the supply chains. Moreover, adopting a call option contract can increase flexibility and mitigate risks, resulting in more expected members’ profits.

To simplify the model, the authors assume one manufacturer and one retailer, so extending the model to consider multiple retailers instead of one retailer and inventory sharing between them would be interesting. Considering the option and exercise prices as decision variables would be important future research topics. Put option and bidirectional option contracts could be investigated in the future. Another extension is modeling asymmetry of information in supply chain.

This paper provides managerial insights on dealing with both demand and yield risks in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain. The manufacturer has a random yield production and produces two types of vertical products: low-end and high-end. To reduce waste caused by the random yield, the manufacturer uses a downconversion approach in which low-end products are made by converting the defective high-end products. The manufacturer purchased a shortage of high-end products from the secondary market (i.e. emergency sourcing). High-end products are sold through the retailer, and low-end products are sold directly by the manufacturer. The customer demand for high-end products in the end market is random and depends on the selling price, and the customer demand for the low-end products in the secondary market is independent and random. The retailer contracts the manufacturer with the call option to obtain high-end products to meet a random demand; in fact, by using the call option contract, the authors try to balance the risks between two members. Two scenarios of with and without call option contract are proposed. After the high-end product demand is observed, the retailer would exercise the option order quantity in the call option contract scenario and then place an instant order with the manufacturer if necessary. In each scenario, the manufacturer and the retailer make their decisions simultaneously (static game) to determine the retailer’s optimal ordering and pricing policies and the optimal production quantity of the manufacturer (Nash equilibrium) by maximizing their expected profits. Finally, the impact of the model parameters on the supply chain is expressed through numerical examples. The numerical analysis shows that the call option contract provides greater profit than the wholesale price contract.

This research formulated to obtain the optimum ordered quantity and optimum inventory range of fish products under the conditions: (1) fully back ordered (lockdown) and (2) partial back ordered (normal geographical market). In both the cases, due to the deterioration nature and in quarantine situation some vendors are not able to satisfy the customers (retailers). So in this model, the cost of penalty is introduced in quarantine time to obtain the optimal total cost.

To find the total cost, holding cost, shortage cost and deterioration cost have to be considered. There are so many disadvantages in holding the deteriorating food products. Due to the demand and deterioration, the holding cost of the fish products is determined. The supply chain of fish marketing process to find the optimum total cost and optimum back ordered quantity in the two situations, namely, (1) normal backordering and (2) Quarantine period is explained.

The conclusion of this research is exhibited for the uncertain lockdown situation and the normal geographical markets. But in both the cases, the demand function is dependent on the backorder quantity. The expected total cost of the retailers of fish products increased at the least possible range with the increase in the shortage parameter, cost of penalty and variance. But the change in mean value leads to decreasing in the back ordered quantity, inventory level and the annual total cost of the retailers. This analysis contributes to the service of supply chain from wholesaler to retailer in high level.

Fish products are very essential for nourishment and economic spread in India. This study has spotlight the efficient method for reducing the total cost of the retailers of fish marketing. The cost of deterioration of fish is high because of its perishable nature. Due to lockdown situation, the holding cost of the fish products depends upon the backordered quantity of geographical market of fish.

This research formulated to obtain the optimum ordered quantity and optimum inventory range of fish products under the conditions: (1) fully back ordered (lockdown) and (2) partial back ordered (normal geographical market).

Due to lockdown situation, the holding cost of the fish products depends upon the backordered quantity of geographical market of fish. This research formulated to obtain the optimum ordered quantity and optimum inventory range of fish products.

This research formulated to obtain the optimum ordered quantity and optimum inventory range of fish products under the conditions: (1) fully back ordered (lockdown) and (2) partial back ordered (normal geographical market). In both the cases, due to the deterioration nature and in quarantine situation some vendors are not able to satisfy the customers (retailers). So in this model, the cost of penalty is introduced in quarantine time to obtain the optimal total cost. A few number of sensitivity analysis are carried out for deterioration rate, shortage parameter and cost of penalty to indicate the existence of total cost in the least possible range.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.