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In this chapter, we focus on the social integration of young immigrants in Sweden who themselves and/or one or both of their parents came from Iran or former Yugoslavia. In particular, we look at the share of alters in their core networks who are of the same parental national origin and how this has changed within a period of four years. To explain network changes, we consider the parental national origin similarity among them, changes in opportunities to meet network members, and important life events.

We analyzed two waves of survey data collected in 2010 and 2014 from 1,537 individuals who live in Sweden and who were all born in 1990, including 325 immigrants from Iran, 447 immigrants from former Yugoslavia, and 805 native Swedes. The results indicate that: (a) the share of parental national origin similar alters in the core networks of immigrants significantly increases over time, (b) first-generation immigrants in particular increasingly associate with others who are of the same parental national origin, (c) important life events hardly result in network changes, and (d) schools and work places are social contexts that enhance the social integration of immigrants, because in these contexts immigrants meet and engage in personal relationships with individuals who do not share their parental national origin.

The purpose of this paper is to describe and assess the sustainability of an emergent West African business quarter in Manchester, UK. Comparisons are drawn with developments among other ethnic groups. The research is placed in the context of international literature on ethnic entrepreneurship.

The research is primarily qualitative, using semi‐structured interviews and conversational life histories with a sample of West African retail businesses and a comparative group of other local businesses. Some use is made of quantitative information from census and other public data sources.

New West African enterprises appear, over the last few years, to have stabilised the declining retail district of Moston Lane in north Manchester. These new businesses are however confined to few sectors: food stores, hair and beauty salons, cafes, Internet cafes and clothing shops. These developments may parallel the success of longer established retail quarters in Manchester and elsewhere. However, most of the businesses may not survive long, having provided a temporary living, and some entrepreneurial experience, for their owners.

Limited sample size and short time frame make results exploratory rather than definitive. The research provides however a base for future investigations.

The businesses studied provide economic opportunities for some immigrants with limited labour market opportunities.

Immigrants are helped to maintain the integrity of their culture through the purchase of appropriate goods and services.

This paper provides the first consideration of a specifically African retail quarter in Britain, adding an additional ethnicity to the roster of identifiable geographic business locations.

To explore the way in which responses to urban disorder have become part of the anti-social behaviour (ASB herein) toolkit following the 2011 disorders in England. In particular, the purpose of this paper is to unpack the government’s response to the riots through the use of eviction. It is argued that the boundaries of what constitutes ASB, and the geographical scope of the new powers, are being expanded resulting in a more pronounced unevenness of behaviour-control mechanisms being deployed across the housing tenures.

Using a qualitative research design, 30 in-depth interviews were undertaken with housing, ASB, and local police officers alongside a number of other practitioners working in related fields. These practitioners were based in communities across east London, the West Midlands and Greater Manchester. This was augmented with a desk-based analysis of key responses and reports from significant official bodies, third sector and housing organisations.

Findings from the research show that responses to the 2011 riots through housing and ASB-related mechanisms were disproportionate, resulting in a rarely occurring phenomenon being unnecessarily overinflated. This paper demonstrates, through the lens of the 2011 riots specifically, how the definition of ASB continues to be expanded, rather than concentrated, causing noticeable conflicts within governmental approaches to ASB post-2011.

This research was undertaken as part of a PhD study and therefore constrained by financial and time implications. Another limitation is that the “riot-clause” being considered here has not yet been adopted in practice. Despite an element of supposition, understanding how the relevant authorities may use this power in the future is important nonetheless.

Much effort was expended by scholars to analyse the causes of the 2011 riots in an attempt to understand why people rioted and what this says about today’s society more broadly. Yet very little attention has been focused on particular legislative responses, such as the additional riot clause enacted through the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. This paper focuses on this particular response to explore more recent ways in which people face being criminalised through an expansion of behaviour defined as ASB.

A common tactic in the analysis of the racial civil disorders of the 1960s has been to eliminate from data sets those events that occurred on university and college campuses. This procedure assumed a disjuncture between urban and campus collective violence, specifically in that the former would be related to local economic and social conditions and the latter would not. As a result, campus racial riots have not been well represented in the research on the rioting of the 1960s and their place in, and contribution to, the riot wave are not well understood. Contrary to earlier assumptions, our analysis shows a strong connection between campuses and their local context. First, campuses having stronger ties to local communities had higher rates of racial disorder during 1967–1969. Second, economic competition indicators for the local community influenced campus rioting, just as they influenced inner-city rioting. We conclude by discussing the implications of omitting campus events from past riot research.

This paper reviews the socioeconomic reform policies employed by the China’s party-state between the early 1980s and mid-2000s. Unlike conventional frameworks viewing the reform as an economic development project designed for “national interests” or “ruling elites” personal interests’, this paper interprets the reform as a political attempt of the state made in response to the crisis of dominance over the working class. In the face of the crisis of class dominance expressed as economic and political unrests related to low growth of labor productivity, the state managers of the post-Mao era embarked on the reform as a way of restoring the state’s ability to impose work upon the workers. As is well known, the reform was “market-oriented” with the state relinquishing some of the control over economic managements, and this paper sees it as the state’s strategy of reducing political risks arising from a highly politicized form of class confrontation. By making pressures upon producers look like a purely economic matter arising from private relations, that is, by depoliticizing exploitative social relations of production, the market-oriented reform helped the party-state effectively repress workers without a serious damage to political legitimacy. From this perspective, this paper examines the reform policies in management of labor, firms, and money, and how those policies contributed to the state’s ability to discipline class relations of production in China. This paper, however, does not conclude that the reform as a depoliticization strategy of class dominance was successful and nonproblematic. It is argued that beneath the success of the reform was a growing necessity of crisis; faced with re-burgeoning workers’ struggles, growing problems of overproduction/overaccumulation, and the resultant looming banking system crisis, the party-state came to find it more and more necessary to bring the economic managements back into political ambit with the related political risks also growing.

In this article, the aim is to explore the rise of the role of the social enterprise as a “force for good” in the context of social and economic regeneration. Building on the growing importance of the third sector to central government as part of its agenda to diversify the delivery of public services, the paper seeks to question the veracity of the view that social enterprises invariably enable the communities in which they operate.

The authors have developed this conceptual paper by building on the application of Amartya Sen's capabilities approach.

It is concluded that where social enterprises are contracted to provide services to communities, including those that would previously have been provided by the public sector (within a carefully crafted statutory framework), should have a demonstrable remit for community wide action, as this, it is argued, is more likely to facilitate community wide benefits. Part of any assessment should include, first, the sustainability of the contribution; and second, the extent to which they enable community members to exercise the choice to participate in the mainstream economy and society.

This theoretical account would benefit from empirical assessment.

The article is of potential value to policy makers and researchers of social enterprise in urban, multicultural environments.

The article has attempted to use the capabilities approach to reconcile some of the tensions between the rhetoric and reality of social enterprise activity and its value in the context of the regeneration of communities.

Fast growth in China has led to significant improvement in people's living standards and average income. However, it has also brought about a huge rise in inequality. The purpose of this paper is to analyse regional and rural‐urban inequality using a few income and consumption indicators.

Data are collected from official statistical sources for all the Chinese provinces over 1978‐1995. Both parametric and non‐parametric methods are used to study the inequality between regions and between the rural and urban sub‐populations. The parametric approach is to test whether per capita incomes among provinces converged over time. The non‐parametric approach is the calculation and decomposition of the Gini coefficient by population sub‐group and income source.

The results show no evidence of growth convergence in per capita GDP, income and expenditure across provinces, but clear evidence of divergence in per capita rural (and urban) incomes and total expenditures. Three‐quarters of inter‐provincial income inequality are explained by inter‐rural/urban inequality. Inter‐provincial inequality explains more than half of rural inequality and less than half of urban inequality in most years.

This paper uses one of the most complicated datasets for the Chinese regions. It studies inequality using different economic indicators. It considers the different dimensions of inequality in China using two different approaches. The results are important for regional development policies.