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The question is whether debt market investors see through managers' attempts to hide their pension obligations. The authors establish a robust relation between understated pension liabilities and corporate bond yield spreads after controlling for factors that have been previously identified as having a significant impact on firms' cost of borrowing. The results support the idea that bond market investors are not being misled by the use of high pension liability discount rates by some companies to lower their reported pension obligations. For a small fraction of debt issuers, the reported pension liabilities are larger than the pension liabilities valued at the stipulated interest rate benchmarks. For these issuers with overstated pension liabilities, bond investors adjust their borrowing costs downward.

The authors investigate the relation between corporate bond yield spreads and understated pension liabilities relative to long-term Treasury and high-grade corporate bond yields. They aim to answer two questions. First, what are the sizes of over or understated pension liabilities relative to guideline benchmarks? Second, do debt market investors see through the potential management manipulation of pension discount rates? The authors find that firms with large understated pension liabilities face higher marginal borrowing costs after taking into account issue-specific features, firm characteristics, macroeconomic conditions and other pension information such as funded status and mandatory contributions.

The average understated projected benefit obligations (PBOs) are understated by $394.3 and $335.6, equivalent to 3.5 and 3.0% of the beginning of the fiscal year market value, respectively. The average understated accumulated benefit obligations (ABOs) are understated by $359.3 and $305.3 million, equivalent to 3.1 and 2.6%, of the beginning of the fiscal year market value, respectively. Relative to AA-grade corporate bond yields, the average difference between firm pension discount rates and benchmark yields becomes much smaller; the percentage of firm pension discount rates higher than benchmark yields is also much smaller. As a result, understated pension liabilities become negligible. The authors establish a robust relation between corporate bond yield spreads and measures of understated pension liabilities after controlling for issue-specific features, firm characteristics, other pension information (funded status and mandatory contributions), macroeconomic conditions, calendar effects and industry effects.

S&P Rating Services recognizes the issue that there is considerably more variability in discount rate assumptions among companies than in workforce demographics or the interest rate environment in which firms operate (Standard and Poor's, 2006). S&P also indicates that it would be desirable to normalize different discount rate assumptions but acknowledges that it is difficult to do so. In practice, S&P Rating Services conducts periodic surveys to see whether firms' assumed discount rates conform to the normal standard. The paper makes an initial attempt to quantify the size of understated pension liabilities and their impact on corporate bond yield spreads. This approach can be extended to study firms' costs of equity capital, the pricing of seasoned equity offerings and the pricing of merger and acquisition transaction deals, among other questions.

We examine and compare funding status, actuarial assumptions and asset investment allocations of defined benefit pension plans in the public and private sectors across time, using information as reported under GASB and FASB. We find that pension plans in both sectors are underfunded and that inferences about pension funding in the public sector would be different if pension assets' fair values were required in the computation of funding status. Actuarial assumptions of public employee plans appear to be both more optimistic and less variable than those of private sector plans. Finally, we document that public sector plans allocate invested assets somewhat differently than in the private sector, although our findings do not confirm anecdotal reports of riskier pension investment strategies relative to the private sector.

This descriptive study shows how the government-wide financial statements can be used, with adjustments, to provide evidence on a state's fiscal sustainability. We compute “adjusted total net assets” (AdjTNA), which equals a state’s assets (not including its capital assets) minus the state's liabilities and obligations, including the UAAL for pension and OPEB not reported on the Statement of Net Assets. AdjTNA provides information about a state’s ability to sustain its current fiscal structure, given its current financial resources. Primary results suggest that 40 states have a negative AdjTNA value, with a median -$6.7 billion per state (-$5,230 per household). Sensitivity analysis suggests 48 states have a negative AdjTNA value, with a median -$20.7 billion per state (-$16,200 per household). The paper discusses the important policy implications of these results.

In this paper, the impact of stock-based compensation and further the joint effects of stock-based compensation and investor sentiment on pension discount rate choice is examined.

The hypotheses is tested using fixed effects models and instrumental variable analysis where pension discount rate is the dependent variable, and stock-based compensation and investor sentiment are our variables of interest.

It was found that pension discount rate is negatively associated with managers' stock-based compensation. Further analysis indicates that managers with larger stock-based compensation tend to adjust down their pension discount rates in higher (smaller) degree, responding to high (low) investor sentiment.

The findings provide important insights into how managers use pension discount rates to engage in earnings management. Understanding these relationships has implications for interpreting pension numbers reported in the financial statements and designing pension accounting rules that minimize the possibility that managers take advantage of the complexity associated with pension accounting to influence the reported earnings and executive compensation. Moreover, the findings suggest the need for increased attention from boards of directors, auditors and regulators to reported pension liabilities and service costs, especially for firms paying higher proportion of stock-based compensation to managers and during periods of high investor sentiment.

The findings contribute to the extant literature by identifying the joint impacts of stock-based compensation and investor sentiment as incentives for pension discount rate manipulation. The empirical results of this study also have important implications for corporate governance and regulation.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how investor sentiment, proxied by Michigan consumer confidence index, affects the choice of defined benefit pension plan discount rates.

The authors use multivariate analysis to test our hypotheses. The dependent variable is defined pension plan discount rate and the testing variables are investor sentiment and a dummy variable representing underfunded status.

The authors find a negative and significant relation between investor sentiment and pension plan discount rate. During high (low) sentiment periods, pension discount rate tends to be adjusted downward (upward) discretionarily. Further analysis indicates the relationship between pension discount rate and investor sentiment is more pronounced for firms with underfunded pension plans. The results can be explained by limited attention effects, capital budgeting strategy and earning smoothing.

The empirical results of this study have important implications for corporate governance and regulation. Specifically, the results suggest the need for increased attention from boards of directors, auditors and regulators to reported pension liabilities, especially during periods of high investor sentiment when pension plan sponsors are more likely to adjust down pension discount rate and accordingly to increase pension liabilities.

The paper contributes to the extant literature by identifying investor sentiment as a new incentive of pension discount rate manipulation. The empirical results of this study also have important implications for corporate governance and regulation.

Looks at the role of property in pensions funds pre and post minimum funding requirement (MFR). Suggests that while property has a role as a matching asset in pension funds, this role has declined in recent years. This is partly because of poor performance but also because other asset categories can perform the role that property has played. The introduction of the MFR may make property still less attractive to pension funds because of the equity/gilt valuation benchmark. However, we expect any effect in the short term to be limited.

Although tax relief on pensions is a controversial area of government expenditure, this is the first study of the tax effects for a real-world defined benefit pension scheme. First, we estimate the tax and national insurance contribution (NIC) effects of the scheme's change from final salary to career average revalued earnings (CARE) in 2011 on the gross and net wealth of the sponsor, government, and 16 age cohorts of members, deferred pensioners, and pensioners. Second, we measure the size of the twelve income tax and NIC payments and reliefs for new members and the sponsor, before and after the rule changes. We find the total subsidy split is roughly 40% income tax subsidy and 60% NIC subsidy. If lower tax rates in retirement and the risk premium effect of the exempt-exempt-taxed (EET) system are not viewed as a tax subsidy, the tax subsidy to members largely disappears. Any remaining subsidy drops, as a proportion of pension benefits, for high earners, as does that for NICs.

This study aims to examine the unexpected portion of the pension discount rate to determine if the pension discount rate is being used to manage earnings for both financially healthy and financially unhealthy firms as categorized based upon their Altman z-score for bankruptcy.

Regression analysis is conducted with the unexpected portion of the pension discount rate as the dependent variable and various metrics indicating potential firm strengths and weaknesses as the independent variables.

This study finds evidence that suggests managers for both groups of firms are using their choice of discount rate to manage bottom-line earnings. These findings highlight the patterns of various firm choice differences found between the two groups and the magnitude of the differences between the groups.

Three streams of literature are considered in this research: earnings management, defined pension plans and z-score bankruptcy. This study extends prior research by examining the unexpected portion of the pension discount rate based on the z-score determination of whether a firm is considered financially healthy or financially unhealthy. Our findings highlight the impact of various firm choice differences found between the two groups of firms.

This paper analyzes the impact of economic downturns on the revenue and expense sides of city financing for the period 2003 to 2009 using a convenience sample of the audited end of year financial reports for thirty midsized US cities. The analysis focuses on whether and how quickly and how extensively revenue and spending directions from past years are altered by recessions. A seven year series of Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) data serves to explore whether citiesʼ revenues and spending, especially the traditional property tax and core functions such as public safety and infrastructure withstood the brief 2001 and the persistent 2007 recessions? The findings point to consumption (spending) over stability (revenue minus expense) for the recession of 2007, particularly in 2008 and 2009.