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This paper examines the formation of pension plans from a corporate finance perspective. The theoretical underpinnings for selecting a defined‐benefit or defined‐contribution plan are discussed and used to form empirically testable hypotheses. Linear probability and logit models are used to identify corporate financial characteristics that affect the likelihood of forming a defined‐benefit or defined‐contribution plan. The results strongly indicate that firms with high degrees of debt and intangible assets are least likely to form defined‐benefit plans in a post‐reversion situation, while firm size enhances the probability of forming defined‐benefit plans. The growth in private retirement plans over the past quarter century has made pension fund management a critical concern for many financial managers. The total amount of assets in private pension plans amounted to approximately $150 billion in 1970, while this figure was about $2 trillion in 1989. A corresponding trend to this growth has been an acceleration in the formation of defined‐contribution plans relative to defined‐benefit plans. In 1975 about 29 percent of all plans were defined‐contribution plans, and 71 percent were defined‐benefit plans. In contrast, defined‐contribution plans comprised 55 percent of all plans in 1988, while 45 percent were defined‐benefit plans.1 Gustman and Steinmeier (1987) suggest that the shift to defined‐contribution plans in recent years may be attributable to shifts in jobs in the economy away from the manufacturing sector and toward the service sector. Furthermore, the role of unions, firm size, and administrative costs have also been sighted as factors which partially explain the economy wide shift toward defined‐contribution plans (see Gustman and Steinmeier (1989), Clark and McDermed (1990), and Kruse (1991)). In this paper, we address the pension choice by examining the formation of individual plans from a corporate finance perspective. Specifically, we examine the pension choice issue when firms are faced with making this decision after the termination of an overfunded defined‐benefit plan. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the possible motives for selecting one plan over the other, and develops testable hypotheses. The data and methodology are discussed in section II, while section III presents the empirical results. Section IV summarizes and concludes the paper.

Employers offer pension plans for two main reasons: paternalism and skills market competitiveness. Recent changes in legislation and business practice have prompted the scrutiny of the underpinnings for such a management tradition. Identifies several relevant factors that derive from: field work undertaken by the authors; the Pensions Act 1995; and recent changes to corporations tax. It is argued that what has emerged is a sharply focused trade‐off, relating to the asset and liability characteristics of employer‐based pension schemes. This questions the sustainability of all types of pension plans, and thereby has a place in strategies affecting financial planning and business development.

Since the Second World War, public pension plans have played an increasingly important role in providing retirement income for older people in most industrial societies. The leading factor that led to the development of public pension systems is the failure of private inter‐generational and inter‐temporal transfers to make adequate provision for old age.

This paper seeks to evaluate the Pensions White Paper proposals against down to earth and relatively obvious objectives and criteria; and to suggest some options – no matter how politically difficult – which need to be considered.

The paper assesses eight objectives which the White Paper should meet, namely: increasing retirement saving and reducing the savings gap; adequate minimum income for all aged over 75; incentives for retirement saving; simpler retirement saving products; tidying up state saving schemes; public sector and private pension provisioning; retirement saving products and arrangements for changing times; and stability for the future.

The White Paper has the hallmarks of a compromise and politically crafted palliative, which is in danger of having unintended and contrarian effects towards reducing rather than increasing pension savings.

The paper offers a critical appraisal of the Pensions White Paper proposals.

Highlighting the likely development of substantial actuarial deficits in pension funds providing final salary‐linked retirement benefits, this paper draws attention to the very real dangers of unfunded pension liability. It identifies the drain on the corporate life blood of maintaining present levels of pension fund contributions, and argues for the return to the state scheme of contracted‐out pension schemes.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a new approach to curbing pension fraud in Nigeria. The approach involves the use of anti-money laundering tools, procedures and expertise to advance the fight against pension fraud in Nigeria. The guidance is non-binding and does not override the purview of the National Pension Commission. The intention is to build on the revised procedures on the processing of death benefits and to complement existing circulars and guidelines issued by the National Pension Commission, including in particular the guidelines for compliance officers.

The analysis took the form of a desk study, which analyzed various documents and reports, such as the Financial Action Task Force (2012-2018), International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation (the FATF Recommendations); the Financial Action Task Force Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: High Level Principles and Procedures; National Pension Commission Regulations for Compliance Officers; the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group Guidance for the United Kingdom Financial Sector Part I, June 2017 [Amended December 2017] and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual 2014.

This paper determined that a strong due diligence process where the owner of the pension account and the next-of-kin/legal beneficiary are duly identified before the establishment of a business relationship is capable of reducing the risks associated with pension fraud to the barest minimum. This paper also determined that anti-money laundering measures, such as record keeping, suspicious transactions reporting, training for anti-fraud/money laundering compliance and an independent audit of systems and controls can help curb pension fraud.

Pension fraud involves the use of deceit or misrepresentation in connection with a pension claim. There are many different kinds of pension fraud, but the type where the fraud is aimed at stealing a person’s pension funds is what this paper is concerned with.

Although most publications on pension fraud are focused on anti-fraud measures, this paper focuses on the anti-money laundering measures which can be used by Pension Fund Administrators to curb pension fraud.

THE GOVERNMENT'S White Paper, “Strategy for Pensions” and the consequent legislation, which will be implemented this year, aims to introduce the principle and practice of guaranteeing employees minimum standards of pension provision and minimum benefits for their dependants. The State will provide a flat basic pension which will be constantly revised in line with average earnings and — on top of this — a second tier pension related to pay. This second tier pension can be provided instead by means of contracted‐out private occupational schemes. The conditions for contracting out and the problems of introducing an occupational scheme confronts employers with challenging policy decisions and major administrative burdens. This survey by leading specialists in the pensions field identifies the alternatives and points the way to an effective scheme for your company.