Search results

This study aims to investigate how the presence of female CEOs (FCEOs) affects investment efficiency in emerging economy, where female participation in business activities is limited.

This paper investigates the impact of CEO gender on investment efficiency by using investment efficiency measures proposed by Biddle et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2013).

The findings suggest that FCEOs are associated with high level of investment efficiency. FCEOs improve corporate governance, streamline management and reduce inefficient investment decisions. In addition, FCEOs focus more on curbing underinvestment than overinvestment when making investment decisions. Furthermore, high financial reporting quality (FRQ) strengthens the effect of FCEOs on investment efficiency. The results suggest that FCEOs do not ameliorate the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises.

This study enhances our understanding of the effects of FCEOs on corporate investment decisions in a male-dominated society. Efficient use of resources is vital from corporate and societal perspectives. Emerging economies are characterized by the unstable political and economic environment and low participation of females in decision-making. Hence, these economies require efficient utilization of resources. This study also sheds light on the role of FCEOs in curtailing underinvestment in emerging economies. It proves that FRQ is important in emerging economies because it strengthens the governance role of FCEOs.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of investment efficiency on cost of equity capital.

Prior research indicated that any governance mechanism which reduces the agency conflict reduces the cost of equity capital. This study provides empirical evidence that investment efficiency represents such governance mechanism which reduces agency conflict and hence cost of equity. The authors use price earning growth ratio (Easton, 2004) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model for the measurement of cost of equity while investment efficiency measure of Biddle et al. (2009) have been employed to examine the association. We also use Chen et al. (2013) measure of investment efficiency for robustness.

The results show that investment efficiency is negatively associated with cost of equity. It was also found that there is a strong relationship of investment efficiency with cost of equity for non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), while no significant relationship is found for state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, overinvestment is significantly associated with cost of equity capital. However, no significant relationship was found between underinvestment and cost of equity.

The results provide empirical support to the argument that investment efficiency acts as a mechanism which represents lower agency conflict. Moreover, the findings provide evidence that government act as “deep pocket” while NSOEs are punished by investors for inefficient resource allocation. This study also proposes that there is a positive relationship between overinvestment and cost of equity.

The authors show that there is a negative relationship between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and firm overinvestment using Korean data from 2007 to 2016. Since Jensen (1986) shows that a firm's free cash flow is an important factor of overinvestment, the authors examine how free cash flow influences the sensitivity of overinvestment to EPU. The authors find that a high level of free cash flow attenuates the negative effect of EPU on overinvestment. The authors find that there is no significant difference in the effect of EPU on overinvestment between Chaebol (Korean family-run conglomerates) and non-Chaebol firms, which is consistent with the literature that the features of Chaebol are weakening.