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Title III of the USA Patriot Act obligated the private sector to take a more active role in deterring money laundering and disrupting terrorist financing. Complying with the new law has increased the cost of doing business dramatically for firms in the financial services industry. This study aims to apply a heterogeneous‐firm model of regulation to test whether the anti‐money laundering (AML) provisions of the Patriot Act redistributed wealth within the commercial banking and thrift sectors.

The paper analyzes a dataset comprising more than 150,000 observations.

The empirical evidence suggests that, owing to scale economies in regulatory compliance, the burden has fallen more heavily on smaller institutions. Moreover, the study does not find that the rules written to implement Title III have differentially impacted banks and thrifts at greater risk of being targeted by money launderers, as a public‐interest theory of regulation would predict.

The paper focuses on the AML provisions of the USA Patriot Act.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the current dilemmas facing foreign banks and countries in the pursuit of eradicating money laundering and international financial crimes.

The paper discusses the recently enacted Title III of the USA Patriot Act which regulates foreign banking institutions in order to curb international money laundering. The paper examines the recent decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals discussing foreign banks' liability when their depositors have deposited funds obtained as a result of money laundering.

The US Government can easily forfeit funds derived from or connected to a money laundering offence found in correspondent accounts of foreign banks.

Owing to the great risk of seizure in the US of money laundered funds, foreign banks must decide whether the difficulty of recovering any US seizure from their customers call for them to implement additional security measures or limit contact with American financial institutions. Foreign banks may be required to initiate anti‐money laundering programs which exceed what they would have been required to do according to the laws of their home country.

This paper is one of first to examine Title III's effect on innocent foreign banks, as it was written shortly after the interpretation of Title III and its applicability to foreign banks and it examines any defences foreign banks may have in asset forfeiture actions, and any recourse it has in recovering seized funds.

This article examines definitions of terrorism, racial profiling and the demonisation of Arabs and Muslims in the United States (US). Additionally, it explores the impact of the US Patriot Act 2001 in the war against terrorism.

It has become customary for states or regulatory domains to come together and evolve normative regimes to deal with overlapping exigencies such as money laundering. Over the past two decades, there has been a proliferation of global AML laws designed to foster international cooperation against money laundering and its predicate crimes. In this same vein, some states have adopted domestic AML laws designed with an ethos of extra-territorial dimension as a caution against the threats posed by money laundering crimes. The paper aims to critically examine CDD to tease out the possibility of harnessing it as a global AML paradigm.

The paper was written by critically examining primary and secondary data sources. In terms of primary data, the author has studied the relevant provision of different AML legislation such as BSA (1970), MLCA (1986), and PATRIOT (2001) Act in the USA; and FSMA (2000) and POCA (2002) in the UK. The author then evaluated these data in the context of the challenges of harnessing CDD across countries. In terms of secondary data sources, the author utilised data in academic text books, journal papers, electronic sources (web sites of AML agencies), and policy and research papers from specialist institutions such as FATF.

The findings corroborate the thesis that much as CDD is an important AML measure, it needs to be streamlined and implemented with care to apply across the board.

The paper was written largely by way of library-based research. The author did not carry out interviews to corroborate some of the secondary data sources used in writing it. Carrying out interviews would have helped to minimise the potential for bias secondary data sources used was generated.

It is anticipated that this paper can be utilised to foster desired strategic and policy changes at a multiple institutional levels.

The paper is one of its kind to be written in its context. It will therefore make a viable contribution to the study of money counter-measures and how they are harnessed globally. It is therefore a must read!

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the influence of Western Christian fundamentalist religious ideology has influenced the core thinking behind anti‐money laundering (AML) control, and how this polarized set of values makes it more difficult for Asian bankers to understand and empathise with a moral philosophy which does not necessarily come within their own social or cultural experience.

The paper is based upon both empirical research undertaken during travels in South East Asia (SE Asia), and from anecdotal evidence provided by practitioners in the region.

It was discovered that the long‐term implications of US attitudes towards AML control had an effect of putting SE Asian financial institutions at a financial disadvantage when they came to deal with US regulatory demands, and that the question thereby raised was whether the US underpinning philosophies had more to do with financial self‐interest, than any real attempt to harness a moral philosophy.

Greater time and effort will have to be found to create a level‐playing‐field in international standards of AML definition, in order to satisfactorily include the moral precepts of SE Asian practitioners.

The paper seeks to stimulate genuine debate and discussion, and to avoid the retreat into a vague acceptance of un‐proven hypotheses.

An exhaustive analysis of the current state of play of both the old and new law and the regulations promulgated thereunder. A one‐stop analysis of the state of the requirements under the USA Patriot Act and particularly how it affects broker‐dealers.

“We must have information superiority: the capability to collect process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same” (DoD, Joint Vision 2010). Since the end of the 1980s, the world economy has evolved, and there has been a rapid movement towards globalization. The end of the Cold War coincided with the end of “traditional” conflicts and a new dominant paradigm appeared. The terms of economic war and international competitiveness became inescapable issues dealt at the same moment by economists and the whole politico-administrative sphere. However, as Krugman (1996) noted this vision can turn out dangerous if it leans on erroneous diagnoses. Economic intelligence appears in this particular context. From a theoretical point of view, economic intelligence is presented in Michael Porter's works, for example in his article with V. E. Millar, “How information gives you competitive advantage”. Empirically, economic intelligence is not a new phenomenon. For example, it was practiced in the Middle Ages, when the Venetians passed information onto the Palace of the Doges through their ports and Mediterranean fleet during competition between the commercial cities of the North of Italy and Flanders.

Regulators have a duty to enforce anti-money laundering (AML) and countering financing of terrorism regulation. However, in doing so, they should not to be overzealous especially in carrying out investigations into suspicious money laundering transactions. This does not mean that oversight agencies should not carry out the required investigations with due diligence. This study aims to propose that banks cannot be allowed to operate in a lawless environment; however, there is a need ensure that businesses are able to operate with minimal regulatory interference.

Data was collected from primary and secondary sources such as Uganda’s Anti-Money laundering Act 2013 (amended 2017), Patriot Act 2001, Proceeds of Crime Act 2000 International legal instruments, case law, books, websites, journal papers, policy documents and scholarly debates and evaluated to foster the objectives of the paper accordingly. The paper has also been enriched by empirical experiences of countries in Europe, Africa and within countries on money-laundering regulation and its intricacies. There was a wealth of online data sources and in print, which were reviewed and internalised to foster the objectives for writing the book.

Regulation of businesses against money laundering and financing of terrorism imposes a heavy cost burden on poorer countries and should be funded by developed economies for some countries to easily operate desired International AML standards. It also needs to be noted that banks cannot be allowed to operate in a lawless business environment, which makes money laundering an international and national security issue.

The thesis of this paper was drawn from the author’s presentation to security agencies in Kampala in August 2019. In his presentation, the author opined that investigations into money-laundering offences should be triggered when a financial institution forms suspicions of potential money-laundering offences to have been committed. Some of the questions he sought to answer during the presentation was whether sharing information on “accountable persons or the regulated sector” in Uganda’s AML 2013 with newspapers before investigations are concluded does not amount to tipping off presumed money-laundering culprits? How should investigations be conducted?

Contributions describing the 15th Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy: Panopticon, covering selective highlights of papers, presentations and the overall context of this meeting.

Observations and descriptions of key themes and ideas that were presented in a conference framework.

Significant participation at this conference.

This is the primary forum for the exploration of issues and challenges relating to the internet and freedom today, focusing on the impact that emerging surveillance societies have on the net and individuals particularly in light of the data mining and data sharing of personal information, combined with and the close partnership between corporations and government.

How problems and issues are resolved by others and realizing that the power of sharing information is greatest when solutions are creative and openly shared.

Good to share information and network with colleagues on issues relating to privacy.

This study aims to measure the impact of the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and US PATRIOT Act Section 311 blacklists on external deposits from blacklisted jurisdictions into BIS reporting countries in 1996–2008, a period when anti-money laundering-related actions were consistently less stringent than post-2010, to see whether they had an effect even absent the threat of sizable financial fines.

The study uses descriptive statistics and bivariate and multivariate regressions to analyze the probable impact from blacklists on non-bank external deposits. The country sample is divided into offshore financial centers (OFCs) and non-OFCs and includes 158 non-listed countries. The impact of the blacklists is tested both jointly and individually for the respective blacklists.

The authors find mixed impact from jurisdictions being blacklisted on the growth rate of stocks of deposits into BIS reporting countries. Effects are often zero, negative in several cases and positive in some cases. This is consistent with the “stigma effect” and the “stigma paradox” in the literature. An overall impact from blacklisting is difficult to discern. Different blacklists had different effects, and the same blacklist impacted countries differently, illustrating the importance of disaggregating the analysis by individual countries.

Interpretation of these data is limited by the absence of comparable data on non-resident deposits in blacklisted jurisdictions.

The impact of a blacklist depends in part on the structure of the listed jurisdictions’ economies, implying that country-specific sanctions may be more effective than blacklists.

This is one of the very few papers to date to rigorously test the impact of blacklists on external deposits.