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This paper provides a detailed analysis of the various means available to US authorities for obtaining foreign evidence and other types of international assistance in money laundering cases. The means analysed here include mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) and similar processes; multilateral treaties; tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) and tax treaties (for a narrow range of money laundering offences); court‐sponsored procedures for taking foreign depositions, including letters rogatory; the use of unilateral compulsory measures, such as subpoenas, for obtaining foreign evidence, and the use of FinCEN and Interpol resources. The initiatives of the G7, the Financial Action Task Force and the OECD regarding international cooperation in money laundering matters are also briefly treated.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the place of kleptocracy and foreign corruption within the broader framework of financial crime. This facilitates understanding the importance of kleptocracy and foreign corruption as social problems. Two other aims are to better understand the most problematic components of a kleptocratic network and the most effective combatants of that network. A subsequent goal is to offer solutions from a broad range of interventions, including policy, technology, education, research and collaborative efforts.

Theoretical economic concepts are used to analyze the importance of kleptocracy and foreign corruption. A small in-depth survey of 15 experts is conducted to identify the most problematic components of kleptocratic networks and the most effective combatants of those networks. The proposed solutions are based on a combination of argumentation, econometric developments, application of trends in related fields and material from in-depth surveys.

This paper identifies kleptocracy and foreign corruption as one of the most, if not the most, devastating financial crime according to its impact on the total marginal utility of wealth. Experts identify foreign kleptocrats or corrupt foreign government officials as the most problematic entities in kleptocratic networks and the most effective combatant is identified as the US Department of Justice. By adding up fines and asset forfeiture related to corruption, penalties are found to be a small fraction of the problem in terms of monetary magnitude.

The paper does not attempt to make causal claims because of the nature of the paper’s purpose and methodology.

The paper offers suggestions and methods for academic researchers who may wish to pursue a research agenda that is empirical and forensic with the aim of combatting kleptocracy and foreign corruption. The paper describes how information on kleptocracy and foreign corruption can be implemented into business and economics curriculum.

Kleptocracy and foreign corruption are important problems, and creative solutions are desperately needed.

The paper shows how understanding and combatting kleptocracy and foreign corruption can be considered an interdisciplinary activity, touching on fields including technology, economics, business, ethics, education, law, policy, statistics and research methods.

The purpose of this analysis is to present the history of anti‐money laundering efforts in the United States as it applies both domestically and internationally, and demonstrate how this new legislation, if enacted, will mark a dramatic change in the customary treatment of international financial transactions and to international long‐arm jurisdiction and law enforcement. If enacted as proposed, this legislation may provide the tools necessary to achieve substantial progress in this effort.

To provide an overview of the legal entity customer due diligence rule recently adopted by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the US Department of the Treasury.

This paper provides an overview of the requirements of the legal entity customer due diligence rule as well as some observations regarding the scope of the rule, its interplay with other regulatory requirements, and some of the rule’s ambiguities.

While the preamble to the new rule suggests that FinCEN was attempting to accommodate industry concerns, the literal terms of the rule may have the opposite effect.

Although financial institutions will have until May 2018 to come into compliance with the rule’s requirements, they should begin developing the infrastructure to support compliance with the rule as soon as possible.

Practical insights into issues that financial institutions may encounter when implementing the rule’s requirements from experienced financial services lawyers.

This paper aims to analyze thoroughly all of the sources of research used to develop the money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) low-risk rating, a rating attained by Norway according to the Basel Institute of Governance, and determine the reasons why Norway is one of only two countries in the world according to the 2012 report, with the other being Estonia, to gain an overall low-risk ML and TF rating.

The differences between the USA and Norway which has obtained a low-risk ranking, were compared and contrasted.

Beginning with the Basel Institute Rating index as a legitimate source for use in assessing anti-money-laundering (AML)/TF risk, and the amount of documentation used in the index’s methodology, it has been proven that the low-risk rating Norway has received is well deserved, and that the US rating of medium risk is also deserved for the time the report was published. Achieving a low-risk rating is not as ambiguous as recently thought and neither is its application on a global scale.

The paper identifies practical areas of improvement and concerns in addressing the overall issue of ML and terrorist financing.

To analyze FinCEN’s settlement with Thomas Haider and examine regulatory agencies’ emphasis on individual accountability and the implications of this emphasis for anti-money laundering (AML) compliance personnel, and to provide practical guidance for personnel who have involvement with or oversight of corporate AML programs.

This article analyzes the Thomas Haider settlement and its importance for individuals involved in AML compliance functions. This analysis includes an examination of several recent corporate and individual enforcement actions to contextualize the Thomas Haider settlement and its usefulness in the prediction of trends in the financial regulatory space.

This article concludes that FinCEN’s May 2017 settlement with Thomas Haider, which resolved the first occurrence of FinCEN’s filing suit to enforce a civil penalty against an individual, illustrates the importance of effective AML programs and highlights the potential consequences for individuals who fail to ensure effective programs. The article also makes specific practical suggestions for AML compliance personnel, and finds that such personnel should be particularly conscientious in light of regulatory agencies’ focus on individual accountability in resolving corporate enforcement actions.

This article contains valuable information about recent regulatory enforcement activity and practical guidance for AML compliance personnel from experienced lawyers with specialties in financial services and white collar regulatory enforcement.

Since, at least 9/11 financial institutions and financial intermediaries are considered to be at the forefront in the international attempt to halt illicit money transfer. Most financial institutions if involved at all play an unknowing or lax, but major role in dictating money laundering schemes. The purpose of this paper is to argue that to avoid sanctions including criminal liability, financial institutions and financial intermediaries must be better prepared and willing to assess prototypical money laundering typologies. To do otherwise will invite civil and criminal liability.

This paper examines legislative pronouncements in general and US caselaw in particular in order to assess compliance and liability: real or imagined.

There appears to be considerable agreement concerning at least one goal of terrorists attacks and that is to disrupt directly and indirectly economic global stability. Further, those charged with the task of identifying terrorist assets in a financial system and developing a profile of terrorist financial transactions has, at least according to unclassified documents, proved to be futile. Closer international investigation and co‐operation appears to be more a slogan than a reality.

Reviews examples of blatant illegal acts of money laundering within the banking community and examines the exploding real estate market and its transmigration into the world of laundering illicit money.

To highlight pertinent points in the frequently-asked questions (FAQs) issued on April 3, 2018 by the US Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network concerning its Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions (“CDD Rule”), which were published on May 11, 2016 and became effective on May 11, 2018.

Discusses clarification and guidance in the FAQs concerning beneficial ownership requirements for administrative and internal accounts, claims for exclusion from the definition of legal entity customer, information requirements for pooled investment vehicles, the requirement for beneficial ownership information from foreign publicly-traded companies, information requirements for existing customers, certification of beneficial ownership information when existing accounts are renewed, requirements for refreshing existing beneficial ownership information, retention of beneficial ownership records, aggregation for currency transaction reporting, and requirements to understand the nature and purpose of a customer relationship.

Covered financial institutions and industry associations have sought clarification and guidance on a range of topics, several of which have been addressed in the FAQs.

Expert guidance from lawyers focused on regulatory, compliance and transactional issues for financial institutions.

To summarize three implementing rules issued over the past year under the USA Patriot Act by the US Treasury Department Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) and to make some basic recommendations designed to help firms improve their overall anti‐money laundering compliance efforts.

Summarizes three rules issued in the past year that are of particular significance to the securities industry: the final 312 rule for foreign correspondent and private banking accounts; the insurance company AML program and Suspicious Activity Reporting (“SAR”) rules; and the mutual fund SAR rule.

Makes the following recommendations for firms to improve their anti‐money laundering efforts: suspicious activity monitoring should fit your firm; information sharing may help fact gathering; anti‐money laundering programs should be applied across the firm; invest in training; and audit is an invaluable tool.

The Patriot Act, in a short amount of time, has had a major impact on the way securities firms and all financial institutions conduct business. Notwithstanding the achievements of the public and private sectors in implementing the USA Patriot Act, more can be done. While the USA Patriot Act provides significant tools to combat illicit activity, to be successful law enforcement and industry must continue to coordinate their efforts, and work hand‐in‐hand.

The purpose of this paper is to present an alternate view regarding enforcement of currency control laws to the real estate market.

Historical research and comparison of similar although not parallel systems.

Based on historical data, present approaches are not working.

Suggests new approach by incentivizing those to the potential crime.

The paper will be of value to law‐enforcement policy makers.