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To summarize FinCEN’s new interpretive guidance on how its regulations apply to business models involving convertible virtual currencies (“CVCs”).

Highlights the most significant aspects of FinCEN’s CVC guidance, including several of the CVC business models discussed in the guidance.

FinCEN’s latest guidance does not create any new legal requirements but clarifies how existing regulations apply to business models involving CVCs.

Practitioners advising on CVC issues should be familiar with FinCEN’s latest guidance and how FinCEN regulations may impact their clients.

Highlights the most important takeaways from FinCEN’s guidance based on our firm’s experience in the CVC space. Lawyers representing clients on CVC issues will find this article valuable.

To provide an overview of the legal entity customer due diligence rule recently adopted by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the US Department of the Treasury.

This paper provides an overview of the requirements of the legal entity customer due diligence rule as well as some observations regarding the scope of the rule, its interplay with other regulatory requirements, and some of the rule’s ambiguities.

While the preamble to the new rule suggests that FinCEN was attempting to accommodate industry concerns, the literal terms of the rule may have the opposite effect.

Although financial institutions will have until May 2018 to come into compliance with the rule’s requirements, they should begin developing the infrastructure to support compliance with the rule as soon as possible.

Practical insights into issues that financial institutions may encounter when implementing the rule’s requirements from experienced financial services lawyers.

To analyze FinCEN’s settlement with Thomas Haider and examine regulatory agencies’ emphasis on individual accountability and the implications of this emphasis for anti-money laundering (AML) compliance personnel, and to provide practical guidance for personnel who have involvement with or oversight of corporate AML programs.

This article analyzes the Thomas Haider settlement and its importance for individuals involved in AML compliance functions. This analysis includes an examination of several recent corporate and individual enforcement actions to contextualize the Thomas Haider settlement and its usefulness in the prediction of trends in the financial regulatory space.

This article concludes that FinCEN’s May 2017 settlement with Thomas Haider, which resolved the first occurrence of FinCEN’s filing suit to enforce a civil penalty against an individual, illustrates the importance of effective AML programs and highlights the potential consequences for individuals who fail to ensure effective programs. The article also makes specific practical suggestions for AML compliance personnel, and finds that such personnel should be particularly conscientious in light of regulatory agencies’ focus on individual accountability in resolving corporate enforcement actions.

This article contains valuable information about recent regulatory enforcement activity and practical guidance for AML compliance personnel from experienced lawyers with specialties in financial services and white collar regulatory enforcement.

To provide a summary and analysis of the Proposed Rulemaking published by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) on September 1, 2015, which proposes to subject investment advisers to certain requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.

The article discusses the proposed expansion of Bank Secrecy Act regulations to include investment advisers, including the history behind the rulemaking, proposed definition of “investment adviser” under the Act, the comments received in response to the proposed rulemaking, and the potential implications of the rule, should it be finalized.

This article concludes that FinCEN, in cooperation with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and other agencies, is nearing completion of the proposed rule. Investment advisers that fall under the proposed definition of those subject to Bank Secrecy Act should prepare to implement anti-money laundering compliance programs.

This article contains valuable information about proposed regulations impacting investment advisers registered or required to be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The purpose of the paper is to explain FinCEN's money services business rule (MSB Rule) revising the regulations that apply to MSBs.

The paper details the principal revisions in the new MSB Rule, including an amended definition of an MSB, an activity threshold, and applicability of the rule to foreign‐located MSBs, money transmitters, dealers in foreign exchange, check cashiers, and issuers of travelers' checks as defined in the rule.

The final rule clarifies which activities subject a person to the Bank Secrecy Act's rules pertaining to MSBs and subjects certain foreign‐located MSBs with a US presence to US rules.

The paper provides practical guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.

The purpose of this article is to inform stakeholders about the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 (AMLA), explain its impact on the U.S. anti-money laundering (AML) regime, and highlight critical updates for financial institutions.

The article provides an overview of the AMLA, and specifically addresses three key components: (1) the development of uniform beneficial ownership requirements and the creation of a beneficial ownership registry at the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN); (2) the expansion of FinCEN’s powers and the Bank Secrecy Act/AML program requirements; and (3) new subpoena powers with potential extraterritorial effect granted to the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and the U.S. Attorney General for documents located at foreign banks that have a correspondent banking account in the U.S. The article also notes the purpose and goals of the AMLA.

The AMLA is the first major overhaul of the U.S. AML regime since the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act, and is designed to strengthen national security, protect the financial system, and simplify compliance obligations. The beneficial ownership reporting requirements represent an effort to combat illicit financial activity conducted by shell companies formed and registered in the U.S.

The article provides financial institutions with a brief overview of a lengthy new law that will impact their AML compliance obligations. Financial institutions should be on alert for forthcoming regulations.

Riggs Bank N.A. of Washington, DC entered into a consent order with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in July 2003, received a cease and desist order from the Federal Reserve Board later that year, and was assessed a $25 million penalty by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) in May 2004, all for Bank Secrecy Act violations. In general, Riggs was deficient (i) in designing a program tailored to the risks of its business that would ensure appropriate reporting, (ii) in implementing the procedures it did have, and (iii) in responding to classic “red flags” of suspicious conduct. As a result, Riggs failed to file a number of timely and complete suspicious activity reports (SARs) and late and complete currency transaction reports (CTRs) for high‐risk accounts. In discussing the violations that occurred, FinCEN articulated internal control, customer due diligence, compliance monitoring, and independent testing standards that Riggs did not meet, and that other institutions should regard as rules of general applicability.

To educate on AML legal requirements and issues relative to foreign correspondent accounts, and give practical advice on relatively low-burdensome measures firms can take to help them achieve compliance in this challenging area.

Summarizes AML requirements relevant to foreign correspondent accounts, discusses two related FINRA settlements involving the alleged failure to obtain and verify beneficial ownership information, reviews ongoing regulatory and legislative initiatives (including a FinCEN initiative to require firms to identify beneficial owners and verify their identities), and suggests certain due diligence procedures firms can use to screen foreign correspondent accounts.

One of the fundamental risks that firms face when dealing with foreign correspondent accounts is not knowing their customers' customers. While the current regulatory framework does not, in most cases, explicitly require firms to obtain beneficial ownership information, the practical reality seems to be that obtaining and verifying such information, where possible, could pay substantial dividends in terms of risk assessment and avoidance.

In some cases, a variety of cost-effective screening measures can be sufficient for a firm to identify concrete risks so that it may take steps to reduce its own regulatory exposure. Firms should not discount the simple for the elaborate, and should take advantage of the several, cost-effective AML tools and resources that are readily available.

Practical guidance for AML officers and other compliance and legal professionals by an experienced financial institutions lawyer.

The paper seeks to focus on the causes of the recent subprime lending crisis in the US residential property market.

The paper reviews the present situation.

A number of causes for the crisis are shown, including the fragmented structure of the real estate settlement process, and the various people involved in real estate closings who operate under different regulatory and supervisory regimes with varying intensities of enforcement effort. This fragmentation makes it difficult to regulate the conduct of real estate industry insiders. Fragmented regulation also provides opportunities for swindlers, con‐artists, and fraudsters.

The paper makes a case for a meaningful regulatory reform, namely mandatory fraud reporting by all those involved in residential real estate closings and settlements.

This paper (written in August 2015) aims to discuss the regulatory approach to detecting and preventing trade-based money laundering (TBML) by using the example of Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and its use of geographic targeting orders.

The paper uses both theoretical and empirical reports on TBML to explore whether increased regulation will ultimately achieve the ends it claims to offer.

The main findings from the analysis are that increased regulation has been found to have a negative impact on improving TBML detection. There is evidence that it causes an over-defensive response from banks that leads to a decrease in useful information to financial intelligence units.

The research topic is very new and an emerging topic; therefore, analysis papers and other academic writing on this topic are limited.

This paper has implications for both the regulatory and the banking/financial service sectors.

The originality of this paper is the deeper analysis of a specific TBML case, and the focus is on both the theoretical and empirical implications of the approach being used.