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The purpose of this study is to understand the profit-sharing structure at equilibrium of the two-tier mudharaba contract in a pure Islamic banking system and then in a dual banking system.

This paper aims to better understand the profit-sharing structure at the equilibrium of the two-tier mudharaba. It first assumes a purely Islamic banking system and then introduces a risk-free asset to simulate trade-off opportunities in a dual banking system.

First, by using a model inspired from a neoclassical framework and assuming that the Islamic banks are the only channel for financing the economy, the results suggest that the profit-sharing structure built up by the three parties, the bank, the depositor and the entrepreneur, at the time of signing the Mudharaba contract has to be drawn up in the way that, at the ex post, the remuneration of each necessary production factor, capital and labor, should equal its marginal productivity. Second, the authors relax the hypothesis of a purely Islamic financial system and introduced a risk-free asset in favor of the depositor. Thereby, the authors are able to apprehend the financial balance of the two-tier mudharaba contract by simulating the trade-offs that can occur in a dual banking system. The findings suggest that the profit-sharing structure is not the same whether we are at the level of bank assets (bank–entrepreneur relationship) or liabilities (bank–depositor relationship). For the asset side, an increase (respectively decrease) in the expected profit of the mudharaba implies a decrease (respectively increase) in the share of the bank, whereas an increase (respectively decrease) in the return of the risk-free asset and/or the risk underlying the project implies an increase (respectively decrease) of the bank’s share in the expected profit.

Theoretical work that has studied the determinants of the ratio of profit sharing between capitalists and entrepreneurs in the context of mudharaba has omitted that this contract should be assessed at both asset and liability sides of the bank. To overcome this theoretical gap, this paper aims to better understand the structure of profit sharing at the equilibrium of the two-tier mudharaba, while taking into account the contractual specificities between the different stakeholders.

A hypothesis developed in this paper models the relationship between the borrower and the bank as a dynamic game based on incomplete information (business game) and seeks an equilibrium point at which the facilitated applicant can act according to the terms of the loan agreement once the contract is signed and meet the requirements of the contract.

The primary assumption in the formation of the Islamic bank in Islamic society is that the members of the society are Muslims and act according to religious orders. However, the non-fulfillment of divine principles and orders is always possible. In partnership agreements, the risk of infringement is reduced and corrupt contracts are prevented in some circumstances. Our basic model was constructed using the Beer-Quiche classic game, which has been modified dynamically along with a generalization of complexity terms. The information asymmetry led us to use a heterogeneous belief system to evaluate the probability of the customer transmitting a low credit risk signal to the bank and the probability of the customer transmitting a high credit risk signal to the bank. There are several assumptions of the basic model that are released in the extended model by the presence of a social inspector, by exploring credit risk signals in the generalized model and by considering various commitment levels in the comprehensive model.

As a result, it is observed that there is no Nash equilibrium in cases where the customer applies separation strategies. But if the pulling strategies are applied, the Nash equilibrium can be achieved under certain conditions, including inspection bodies in the banking system, the creation of necessary transparency and the proper treatment of criminals by government and regulatory bodies. So, by using alternative belief systems, applying different filters and paying attention to all sectors of the economy, new Nash equilibrium points can be achieved. Moreover, multi-stage facilities payment reduces the risk of corrupt contracts.

This paper sets out to analyze Nash Equilibrium and its possible encounter in Islamic Banking for the first time, utilizing a Bayesian Game-Theoretic framework. A major aspect of the research is the contribution to a better understanding of the role of transparency and government oversight in the implementation of Islamic banking regulatory standards.

This study aims to provide empirical evidence on the role of corporate governance mechanisms in reducing earnings-management practices in Islamic banks in Asia.

This study used 28 Islamic banks in Asia, which were listed on the stock exchange from 2013–2017. The research method used quantitative regression with data on the characteristics of Islamic banks taken from the websites of each bank. This study used discretionary loan loss provision as a proxy for measuring earnings management.

The results show that only the audit committee size has a significantly negative effect on earnings management. An independent audit committee has a negative, but not significant, effect. The difference expectation signs cannot be interpreted further.

Only a few components of corporate governance were tested in this study. Therefore, it is expected that future studies will include more components.

In general, the components of corporate governance that include the characteristics of the board of directors and the audit committee have a varied effect on reducing the earnings-management practices in Islamic banks, except audit committee size. In practice, audit committee size should have an important role in earning management reduces.

This may be the first paper that studies the effect of corporate governance on earnings management in Islamic banks in Asia.

This study aims to investigate the effect of the diversity of the board of directors (BOD) and the shariah supervisory board (SSB) on credit risk, insolvency, operations, reputation, rate of deposit return risk (RDRR) and equity-based financing risk (EBFR) of Islamic banks (IB).

The study uses 68 IBs from 19 countries covering 2009 to 2019. BOD and SSB diversity attributes data were hand-collected from the annual reports. Financial data were collected from the bankscope database. The robustness test and two-step system generalized method of moment estimation technique were used to address potential endogeneity issues.

This study provides evidence that diversity in the experience and cross-membership of board members decreases the risk. Gender diversity increases the risk, but the BOD’s education level diversity has no relationship with risk. More interestingly, influences in the experience and cross-membership of the SSB’s members positively influence risk. However, members’ education levels and gender diversity have not been proven to affect risk.

The paper recommends that Islamic banking authorities play a stronger role and make a greater effort in driving corporate governance reform. Also, determining individual characteristics of the board is a requirement to become a member of a BOD or an SSB.

This paper expands the commitment literature through the diversity of the BOD’s and the SSB’s members in terms of their education levels, experience, cross-membership and gender. This study expands the list of potential risks for IBs, by including the RDRR and EBFR.

Bank lending is the major source of monetary expansion. Bank-led money creation is a key issue in both conventional and Islamic financial systems. The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues related to Islamic banking money creation. In this conceptual paper, the authors investigate the involvement of profit and loss sharing (PLS) in money creation and especially how can PLS limit money creation “out of nothing.” In this regard, the authors examine the potential of the PLS principle in tackling the excessive money creation phenomenon.

This study uses a normative approach regarding Islamic bank money creation that fits Sharia directives. In fact, this study discusses “what ought to be,” that is, the values and norms of PLS money creation that impede excessive money creation.

Overall, Islamic banks create money differently compared to conventional ones. Especially, by avoiding a purely financial intermediary, money creation under the PLS principle sustains a strong relationship with the real economy and leads to a lower money multiplier. Therefore, PLS mechanisms allow financing through real assets and not credit assets “out of nothing.” This could prevent excessive money creation from causing harmful effects on indebtedness and financial instability.

PLS offers a valuable resolution for banking system money creation through the optimization of Islamic bank financing by facilitating the separation of the monetary function from the credit one. This reform thought reinforces the stability value of money allowing it to fully perform its functions with reference to the directives of Sharia. This especially allows the integrity and purchasing power of money, the reduction of the gap between the evolution of both real and financial economies and, consequently, the indebtedness and crisis. It is recommended to promote PLS financing by reforming institutional and regulatory constraints.

This study addresses the contemporary issue of money creation by Islamic banks through the PLS approach. The conceptual framework of this paper highlights the reformist role of PLS in limiting money creation through Mudarabah approach within fractional reserve banking.