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The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of the social welfare concepts of Takaful and Tabarru’ (donations) as tools to guarantee deposits in the Islamic banking industry, and the effect of such practice on the concept of risk sharing in Islamic finance.

The study critically analyzes the Mudaraba contract used by Islamic banks to mobilize funds, the use of Profit Equalization Reserves and Investment Risk Reserves, the use of other income smoothing techniques and the insurance of Islamic banks’ by regulatory agencies in some countries based on the Takaful and Tabarru’ concepts.

This paper shows that Islamic banks are increasingly using the concepts of Takaful and Tabarru’, which are intended originally for social welfare, as tools to justify the move to more guaranteed-in-substance type of deposits, and hence, more risk shifting rather than risk sharing in the Mudaraba contract. This use, is argued, moves Islamic banking towards more market-oriented, but less Shariaa-compliant in substance.

This papers examined the behaviour of Islamic financial institutions and Islamic scholars based on the available literature. No empirical analysis was conducted.

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the substance of Islamic banking transactions and the risk shifting inherent in such transactions. Furthermore, it is the first study that examines the extent of utilizing different social welfare concepts to legalize – from Shariaa perspective – Islamic banking transactions.

The aims of this paper are: first, to draw attention to the issues of displaced commercial risk (DCR) which arise as a result of the risk characteristics of profit‐sharing investment accounts (PSIA), the main source of funding of Islamic banks in most jurisdictions; and, second, to present a value‐at‐risk approach to the estimation of DCR and the associated adjustments in capital requirements.

The paper is based on empirical research into the characteristics of PSIA in practice, which vary to a greater or lesser extent from what one would expect them to be in principle, on an analysis of the capital adequacy and risk management implications that flow from this, and on an econometric formulation whereby the extent of DCR in Islamic banks may be estimated.

The findings are, first, that the characteristics of PSIA can vary from being a deposit like product (fixed return, capital certain, all risks borne by shareholders) to an investment product (variable return, bearing the risk of losses in underlying investments), depending upon the extent to which the balance sheet risks get shifted (“displaced”) from investment account holders to shareholders through various techniques available to Islamic banks' management. Second, the paper finds that this DCR has a major impact on Islamic bank's economic and regulatory capital requirements, asset‐liability management, and product pricing. Finally, it proposes an econometric approach to estimating DCR but report that individual Islamic banks generally lack the data needed to apply this approach, in the absence of which panel data for a population of Islamic banks may be used to estimate DCR for that population.

Empirically, the paper is thus limited by the lack of data just mentioned. Furthermore, the application of the proposed panel data approach has been left for future research.

The analysis of the issues and the development of the econometric model represent in themselves an original research contribution of some significance.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the practices of Islamic banks in managing the so-called profit sharing investment accounts (PSIA) which they offer as a Shari’ah-compliant alternative to interest-bearing deposit accounts using an unrestricted Mudarabah contract. In particular, the paper aims to examine the risk-return characteristics of such accounts and to compare these to the returns and risks of shareholders in the same banks. It is relevant that PSIA holders (unrestricted investment account holders – UIAH) are exposed to losses on the assets in which their deposits are invested, while the bank as asset manager (Mudarib) does not bear these losses and as Mudarib typically receives more than 50 per cent of the profits earned on the PSIA. The issue is whether the UIAH are being treated equitably. The influence of a set of corporate governance variables on this issue was also analyzed.

A sample of 28 Islamic banks was selected from five countries for the period 2002-2013, with data being obtained from Bankscope and Bloomberg and, where necessary, from the banks’ annual reports. First, the risk-return characteristics of the UIAHs’ rates of return and shareholders’ rates of return on equity (ROE) were compared by calculating for each bank the coefficients of variation (CV) of the two series of rates of return. Second, a panel data approach was used to evaluate the effectiveness of corporate governance by examining the extent to which the size of the difference between the rates of return for shareholders and for UIAH was associated with a set of corporate governance variables. Third, a comparison was made between the risk-return characteristics of UIAH’s rates of return and shareholders’ dividend yield rate for a sub-sample of 20 banks for which the information was available.

For a significant proportion of the banks (9 out of 28), the CVs of the PSIA returns were higher than those of the shareholders’ ROEs, which suggested that in these cases the PSIA holders were receiving inequitable treatment. Likewise, for 7 out of the 20 banks in the sub-sample, the CVs of the PSIA holders’ rates of return were higher than those of the shareholders’ dividend yield rate. In explaining the size of the differences between the rates of return on PSIA and the shareholders’ ROEs, the variable with the greatest explanatory power was the return on assets, implying that when this was high the bank took a maximum Mudarib share of profits. Some other corporate governance variables had the expected signs, as did a country dummy representing the maturity of the market for Islamic banking, but there was little evidence of the effectiveness of corporate governance in protecting the interests of the UIAH.

A limitation of the research was that the inefficiency of the stock markets in the relevant countries and the fact that a few of the banks were not listed made it impossible to use shareholders’ stock market returns. ROE is not a very good proxy, as it is unclear how much value should be placed on retained earnings. Dividend yield rates provide a better comparison with UIAH rates of return, but the data were available for only 20 of the banks. Nevertheless, the results of the analysis strongly suggest that in a significant proportion of cases, UIAH are not being treated equitably.

The implication is that the regulation of Islamic banks needs to be improved to provide better protection to UIAH.

Islamic banks operate mainly in emerging markets where the effectiveness of regulation is limited. The ethical basis of Islamic finance provides some mitigation of this problem but apparently fails to do so in a significant proportion of cases. This should be borne in mind when assertions are made about the ethical basis of Islamic finance.

There is a dearth of empirical studies of the practices of Islamic banks and in particular of their treatment of their customers. This is because of various factors: the relative novelty of Islamic finance, the paucity of data and the relatively small size of the body of researchers in the field. This paper aims to contribute to filling this gap.

Islamic banks use Mudarabah contract to replace the interest-bearing deposits with profit-sharing investment accounts. The purpose of this paper is to explore the challenges and problems associated with the employment of Mudarabah contract by Islamic banks.

The study critically analyzes the Mudarabah contract used by Islamic banks. It reviews the evolution of the contract from its traditional type to more complicated types such as compound, unrestricted, commingled and continuous Mudarabah. The paper investigates the problems that have emerged from implementing such types in current business settings.

The paper proves that implementing the Mudarabah contract by banks imposes several problems among which are the following: difficulty in the determination of total profit resulting from Mudarabah and in allocating this profit to the multiple parties involved in Mudarabah; usage of reserves to cater against future losses may undermine the concept of Mudarabah profit-loss sharing and lead to earnings management; corporate governance is also a major problem in Mudarabah contract, as the depositors are exposed to risks but have no governance rights; and Mudarabah may also lessen the fair presentation of financial reporting.

The paper examines the evolving Mudarabah contract and its implementation challenges, based on available literature (no empirical analysis was conducted).

The implications are significant for the future development of Islamic contracts and Islamic accounting treatments.

Many studies explored the Mudarabah contract from a Shariah or law perspective. However, this paper investigates the Mudarabah contract with a focus on the implication on accounting and financial reporting because of the lack of studies in this area. Furthermore, it demonstrates the persistent flaws in the Mudarabah contract, and it proposes a new model for mobilizing funds, i.e. mutual fund.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the income structure of Islamic banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and to explore the effect of the diversification of banks' earning on risks that may harm these latter.

Using data from 2002‐2008 for 42 Islamic banks, this article provides descriptive and analytical analysis and multiple regression equations.

This article reveals that greater reliance on the income share of the profit‐loss‐sharing products is associated with higher risk and higher insolvency risk for both listed Islamic banks and non‐listed Islamic banks. However, no effect has been observed between the operation income of non‐profit‐losses‐sharing products and risk levels. That is why listed banks prefer to invest less in non‐profit‐loss‐sharing products than in profit‐loss‐sharing products.

Financial regulators in emerging Islamic financial market should help Islamic banks to find equilibrium between the expansion of the Islamic financial market and respect for the raison d'être of Islamic finance: the profit and loss sharing mechanisms.

To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first article that empirically tests why Islamic banks prefer to invest less in profit‐loss‐sharing products. Also, this article contributes to studying the relationship between Islamic finance and risk.

The purpose of this study is to understand the profit-sharing structure at equilibrium of the two-tier mudharaba contract in a pure Islamic banking system and then in a dual banking system.

This paper aims to better understand the profit-sharing structure at the equilibrium of the two-tier mudharaba. It first assumes a purely Islamic banking system and then introduces a risk-free asset to simulate trade-off opportunities in a dual banking system.

First, by using a model inspired from a neoclassical framework and assuming that the Islamic banks are the only channel for financing the economy, the results suggest that the profit-sharing structure built up by the three parties, the bank, the depositor and the entrepreneur, at the time of signing the Mudharaba contract has to be drawn up in the way that, at the ex post, the remuneration of each necessary production factor, capital and labor, should equal its marginal productivity. Second, the authors relax the hypothesis of a purely Islamic financial system and introduced a risk-free asset in favor of the depositor. Thereby, the authors are able to apprehend the financial balance of the two-tier mudharaba contract by simulating the trade-offs that can occur in a dual banking system. The findings suggest that the profit-sharing structure is not the same whether we are at the level of bank assets (bank–entrepreneur relationship) or liabilities (bank–depositor relationship). For the asset side, an increase (respectively decrease) in the expected profit of the mudharaba implies a decrease (respectively increase) in the share of the bank, whereas an increase (respectively decrease) in the return of the risk-free asset and/or the risk underlying the project implies an increase (respectively decrease) of the bank’s share in the expected profit.

Theoretical work that has studied the determinants of the ratio of profit sharing between capitalists and entrepreneurs in the context of mudharaba has omitted that this contract should be assessed at both asset and liability sides of the bank. To overcome this theoretical gap, this paper aims to better understand the structure of profit sharing at the equilibrium of the two-tier mudharaba, while taking into account the contractual specificities between the different stakeholders.

Reports that, unlike Western commercial banks, Islamic banks are prohibited by Islamic precepts to receive or pay interest, inter alia, in all their transactions. Argues that the Basle capital adequacy ratio (CAR), which was implemented in 1992 by regulatory authorities in many countries, is irrelevant to Islamic banks because it does not accommodate, among other things, one of the major instruments ‐ investment accounts ‐ through which Islamic banks mobilize funds on the basis of profit sharing. Develops four possible scenarios for the treatment of these accounts in the calculation of CAR and examines their impact on the financial and marketing strategies of Islamic banks in the light of the risk‐return relationship between the funds contributors of these banks.

The purposes of this study are twofold. First, to theoretically examine the profit-sharing (mudarabah) contract that produces an optimal distribution of return in the presence of social learning (shuratic process) within the environment of asymmetric information. Second, to empirically investigate the optimal condition of profit-sharing ratio (PSR) and social learning for profit-sharing (mudarabah) contract in Islamic banking.

Data from one of the biggest and earliest Islamic banks in Malaysia were taken as a proxy of an Islamic bank. The data are collected from the period of 2009 to 2013, and these will be used for the simulation process by using the genetic algorithm (GA) technique.

The empirical results discovered that Islamic banks had used social learning in their daily activities, especially in the asset side. The results also showed that the trend of social learning has a positive relationship with the trend of Islamic banks’ net profit. Additionally, the results also indicated that the Islamic banks’ net profit has a positive relationship with its PSR from the profit-sharing (mudarabah) financing and securities investment.

This study is the first of its kind that investigates the implementation of the social learning process in Islamic banking operation. This study also used the latest technique from artificial intelligence system, i.e. a GA, to attain an optimal value for PSR and social learning process.

This paper attempts to construct Islamic gracious monetary instruments namely Qardh hassan, Waqf and Gift central bank certificates. The certificates do not only function as monetary instruments per se, but also give economic and social benefit for the public such as the needy. However, the central bank and its counterparts still need to manage the funds professionally to produce profit, maintain the values of the funds and prevent business losses. As such, this theoretical study aims to offer alternative Islamic monetary instruments for the central bank to manage liquidity and especially to improve the welfare of the people.

The paper exercises three Islamic gracious monetary instruments (Qardh hassan, Waqf and Gift central bank certificates) for both investment based (Mudarabah and Musharakah) financing and trading based (Ijarah and Murabahah) financing. Every instrument is elaborated mathematically to analyze its economic impact, treatment of profit and loss coming from the business and status of the funds. Finally, the paper compares every gracious certificate and explains the terms and conditions to use them optimally.

The exercises find unique characteristics, operations and contribution of every Islamic gracious monetary instrument to the economy. Based on economic impact, nature of the contracts and management of the funds, the central bank can now have alternative Islamic monetary instruments to be offered to the generous depositors to improve the welfare of the people particularly the needy.

The paper only assesses the feasibility of three Islamic gracious monetary instruments. There might be more alternatives of Islamic gracious monetary instruments to be considered and elaborated.

To the best of author's knowledge, this is the first paper to try to exercise the alternative of the Islamic gracious monetary instruments.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an insight of Islamic securitization based on sukuk structures.

Descriptive, analytical, and comparative analyses are used to discuss the risk‐sharing behaviour in Islamic securitization through different structures of mudharabah and musharakah sukuk derived from asset securitization.

The paper reveals that although sukuk are structured in a similar way to conventional asset‐backed securities, they can have significantly different underlying structures, provisions and shariah‐compliant. In particular, it prohibits the receipt and payment of interest and stipulates that income must be derived from an underlying real business risk rather than as a guaranteed return from interest. With regards to sukuk securitization, an asset is one of the vital elements that should exist as an evidence to support the process and make it permissible in Islam. In terms of Islamic securitization mechanism, it can be divided into two principles, namely, debt based and partnership. This paper further emphasizes that sukuk structures based on partnership principle is regarded as risk sharing rather than risk shifting, where it works by combining risk‐exposures in such a way that they offset one another to some degree. Accordingly, overall risk will be less than total risks on individual basis.

This paper has important implication for the understanding of risk management practices particularly in structuring sukuk. Banks as originators and special purpose vehicles (SPV) as issuers, might consider more sukuk on partnership principles since it directed towards risk‐sharing concept that could lead to increase mobilization of savings and investment. As for the investors or sukuk holders, the partnership principle could generate the wealth creation, which to be shared between both investors (fund providers) and issuers (fund users), while both bear the risks involved and the resulting loss.

The paper will fill the gap in the existing literature of Islamic finance by showing that Islamic securitization via sukuk is a viable source of funds that could help stabilize the securities market, and as solution to the current subprime mortgages financial crisis.