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We study five exogenous shocks: climate, violence, price hikes, spoilage and the COVID-19 lockdown. We analyze the association between these shocks and trader characteristics, reflecting trader vulnerability.

Using primary survey data on 1,100 Nigerian maize traders for 2021 (controlling for shocks in 2017), we use probit models to estimate the probabilities of experiencing climate, violence, disease and cost shocks associated with trader characteristics (gender, size and region) and to estimate the probability of vulnerability (experiencing severe impacts).

Traders are prone to experiencing more than one shock, which increases the intensity of the shocks. Price shocks are often accompanied by violence, climate and COVID-19 shocks. The poorer northern region is disproportionately affected by shocks. Northern traders experience more price shocks while Southern traders are more affected by violence shocks given their dependence on long supply chains from the north for their maize. Female traders are more likely to experience violent events than men who tend to be more exposed to climate shocks.

The data only permit analysis of the general degree of impact of a shock rather than quantifying lost income.

This paper is the first to analyze the incidence of multiple shocks on grain traders and the unequal distribution of negative impacts. It is the first such in Africa based on a large sample of grain traders from a primary survey.

The purpose of the paper is to describe the temporary and permanent exemptions issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the large trader identification requirements under Rule 13h‐1.

Specifically, the paper provides: an explanation of the definition of a “large trader” as defined under Rule 13h‐1; an overview of the recordkeeping, reporting, and monitoring requirements under Rule 13h‐1; an explanation of the two‐tiered temporary exemption issued by the SEC; and an overview of the permanent exemption adopted by the SEC for certain capital market transactions in connection with determining whether a person is a large trader.

The SEC extended the April 30, 2012 compliance date under Rule 13h‐1 for registered broker‐dealers by 12 months to May 1, 2013; however, broker‐dealers that are either large traders, or have large trader customers that are either broker‐dealers or trade through a “sponsored access” arrangement, must be in compliance by November 30, 2012. The extension affords broker‐dealers additional time to develop, test, and implement recordkeeping and reporting systems required for compliance. Additionally, the SEC issued a permanent exemption for “dribble out” programs or offerings “crossed” on a national securities exchange, which were not originally exempted under the rule. The SEC determined that these transactions should not be counted for the purpose of determining whether a person meets the identifying activity level for a large trader given that the vast majority of primary offerings are excluded under the rule.

The paper provides practical guidance from experienced regulatory lawyers regarding an important proposed change.

The purpose of this article is to inform the various securities market participants about new Exchange Act Rule 13h‐1, its specifics and the requirements it may impose.

The paper outlines the various requirements of the Rule and additional background information and some clarifications based on the SEC adopting release.

The Rule requires “large traders”, as defined in the Rule, to self‐identify to the SEC and to obtain from the SEC a large trader identification number (“LTID”) and provide the LTID to each US‐registered broker‐dealer through which it effects transactions in NMS securities. The Rule also requires US‐registered broker‐dealers to provide to the SEC, on request, data on large traders' transactions in NMS securities by the morning after the transactions are effected; and it requires US‐registered broker‐dealers to maintain books and records, and perform certain monitoring functions, with respect to these transactions. The SEC has also adopted Form 13H under Exchange Act Section 13(h). A large trader must submit to the SEC Form 13H as an “Initial Filing” to receive its LTID and file various periodic amendments thereafter.

The paper provides practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers. The authors hope the discussion in the paper will enable affected market participants, which include US‐ registered broker‐dealers as well as other persons within the Rule's definition of large trader, to be informed about and to prepare for compliance with the Rule.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the long-run survival of earnings fixated traders.

This paper builds a theoretical model of a competitive securities market where both rational traders and earnings fixated traders receive an informational signal about the asset payoff before any trade occurs. Since earnings fixated traders underestimate the mean and variance of the risky asset payoff, earnings fixated traders is shown to make less expected profits than rational traders.

If traders’ types replicate according to the relative profitability of their trading strategies, then earnings fixated traders will disappear in the long run. The results of this paper provide analytical support to Tinic’s (1990) intuition about the eventual disappearance of earnings fixated traders.

In the literature, the underestimation of risk is popularly viewed as the cause of irrational traders being better able to exploit the misvaluations (created by noise traders) than rational traders. Hence, it favors the survival of irrational traders over rational traders. However, this paper disapproves this intuition in the informational environment of the competitive securities market.

The market environment plays a crucial role in determining the long-run survival of irrational traders.

This paper is the first to present a theoretical result showing that in this informational environment of the competitive securities market, the underestimation of risk by irrational traders does not give them advantage over rational traders in exploiting the misvaluations (created by noise traders) as it does in Callen and Luo (2011) and Hirshleifer and Luo (2001).

The purpose of this paper is to describe the Securities and Exchange Commission's recently proposed new rules to establish a large trading reporting system.

The paper provides an overview of the new Rule 13h‐1, which, if adopted, would require large traders to identify themselves to the SEC and to be issued a “Large Trader Identification Number”. It outlines the proposed definition of a large trader and describes how a large trader would report itself to the SEC and the broker‐dealers it uses to effect trades using a new Form 13H. The paper also provides detailed guidance to broker‐dealers regarding their books and records obligations under the proposed rule.

The proposed new rule and form are intended to provide the SEC with data to facilitate its ability to assess the impact of the trading activity, to reconstruct trading activity following periods of unusual market volatility, and to analyze significant market events for regulatory purposes. Registered broker‐dealers would also be under an obligation to maintain records of transactions effected in accounts identified to it as large trader accounts; electronically report large trader transaction information to the SEC upon request; and monitor compliance with the new rule.

The paper provides practical guidance from experienced securities lawyers regarding an important proposed change.

We propose a novel method of forecasting the level of informed trading at merger announcements. Informed traders typically take advantage of their knowledge of the forthcoming merger by trading heavily at announcement. They trade on positive volume or informed buys for cash mergers and negative volume or informed sells for stock mergers. In response, market makers set wider spreads and raise prices for informed buys and lower prices for informed sells. As liquidity traders trade on these prices, our vector autoregressive framework establishes the link between informed trading and liquidity trading through price changes. As long as the link holds, informed trading may be detected by measuring levels of liquidity trading. We observe the link during the −1 to +1 period for cash mergers and −1 to +5 period for stock mergers.

This chapter concentrates on sales negotiation and reveals that negotiating agreements on goods and services among the Igbo traders involves demystifying many complexities – such as nature of persuasion, trust and communication patterns between traders, among other concerns. To aid our understanding, the authors surveyed three Igbo-dominated markets including Computer Village, Ikeja – dealing in the sales of phone accessories; Tejuosho Market – dealing in the sales of clothing materials; and Ojuelegba Market – dealing in the sales of vehicle spare parts. The authors concluded that the negotiation pattern and approach adopted by the Igbo trader often depends on several variables, including the product, the market, the buyer, the individual trader and other invisible circumstances surrounding the bargaining process. When negotiation breakdown arises, the Igbo traders have a well thought-out strategy that can be adopted to address the situation and persuade future bargains.

Why, despite clear economic incentives, did eighteenth-century slave traders fail to defend their business interests against the abolition campaign? We focus on the outport of Bristol as a case in point. Our main argument is that slave traders lacked an organizational basis to translate their economic interests into political influence. Supporting evidence from merchant networks over the 1698–1807 period shows that the Society of Merchant Venturers offered such an organizational site for collective political action. Members of this chartered company controlled much of Bristol’s seaborne commerce and held chief elective offices in the municipal government. However, the Society evolved into an organization that represented the interests of a closed elite. High barriers to entry prevented the slave traders from using the Society as a vehicle for political mobilization. Social cohesion among slave traders outside the chartered company hinged on centrally positioned brokers. Yet the broker positions were held by the few merchants who became members of the Society, and who eventually ceased their engagement in slave trading. The result was a fragmented network that undermined the slave traders’ concerted efforts to mobilize against the political pressure of the abolitionist movement.

This chapter suggests that the key to entrepreneurial success lies in the ability to maintain trust-based networks and respect social norms. In elaborating this proposition, this chapter draws on the results of an exploratory study of 30 Nigerian traders to demonstrate how using an ‘institutional’ lens provides new insights into the influence of trust and indigenous norms on entrepreneurial behaviour. The concept of morality which presupposes an understanding of entrepreneurial behaviour is introduced to offer a supple and adaptable explanation for how actors rely on social norms to build trade networks. At the centre, trust was found to be indispensable to networks relationships and necessary for enforcing sanctions. The results facilitate a rich understanding of how a range of trust-based networks relationships and hybrid indigenous norms underpin entrepreneurial behaviour in Nigeria. The study contributes by providing well founded insights into the entrepreneurship within an African context.

The existing literature on emotion regulation strategies provides important insights with regards to intrapersonal strategies for emotion regulation. However, in pointing out the limitations of intrapersonal emotion regulation models, it has been suggested that emotion regulation is not confined to intrapersonal processes and the complex social networks that humans form are intricately connected to their emotions. The previous work on financial traders has recognized the relevance of emotions in trading, focusing only on intrapersonal emotion regulation strategies. In this chapter, drawing on the author’s previous research on emotions in trading as well as existing research on social sharing of emotions and interpersonal emotion regulation, interpersonal emotion regulation strategies in the work of financial traders are identified. In doing so, an existing definition of interpersonal emotion regulation is extended and it is argued that while the pursuit of a regulatory goal is paramount, the benefits of interpersonal regulation may be achieved even in the absence of live social interaction, as long as labeling of the affective state takes place. The chapter concludes with a model summarizing intra–interpersonal emotion regulation processes.