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The British industrial relations system has, on the whole, tended to serve the country well, but it has failed to adapt to new conditions in the postwar period and has faltered. More importantly the study of industrial relations has provided a great deal of analysis and a minimum of synthesis of new ideas. The lack of change and adaptation in collective bargaining has increasingly resulted in the failure of the system to cope effectively with the ever changing, and increasingly complex, social, technical and economic forces in our society. Thus collective bargaining has too often been seen to fail in the achievement of orderly settlements to claims, grievances and disputes. One result has been legislation in the shape of the Industrial Relations Act which merely served to inflame collective bargaining. After working for several years in Canada, in the field of labour relations, it is this writer's contention that industrial relations legislation is an unsuitable substitute for management and union jointly solving their problems in an open yet business‐like atmosphere. Legislation is too prickly for the sensitive ears around a bargaining table, and in the last analysis management and unions will do their utmost to avoid any chance of entanglement in the legal web.

Examines the roots of bargaining power in the nature of market structure, financial resources, sub‐situation possibilities and the innate skills of those doing the bargaining. Looks at the effects of these in pricing strategy. Concludes that, although highly “visible” bargaining is not the main determinant of price, but rather one of a series of factors.

Conventional wisdom is that decentralized bargaining, performance pay and individualized remuneration schemes enable managers to utilize human resources more effectively. Examines employers’ recent experiences of such arrangements by drawing on data on company pay policies. Argues that moves to fragment bargaining and individualize reward systems have created new difficulties and problems in the management of pay, and that such initiatives can have costly consequences for employers.

This study examines the views of a group of managers about the value of the collective bargaining process as a means of dealing with a variety of job‐related issues. The views reported indicate that collective bargaining is considered most effective in dealing with the traditional wages, hours, fringe benefit, grievances subjects of bargaining, which are in turn considered the job‐related issues of major concern to workers. The success of collective bargaining in dealing with these traditional matters did not seem to be related to the existence of clear cut differences between union and management goals on these matters. There was also found to be little management support for extending the subject matter of collective bargaining, except in the area of job security.

This paper aims to use the obsolescing bargaining power (OBP) Model (Vernon, 1977, 1998) to analyze the case of United Company Rusal, a Russian politically connected multinational companies (MNCs) that was one of the world’s largest aluminum companies between 2005 and 2014, having acquired and, ultimately, sold the Montenegrin aluminum smelter company Kombinat aluminijuma Podgorica.The authors did so with the aim of answering the following question: How do geopolitics affect the bargaining balance of power between a Russian MNC and a host country?

The authors used the discourse analysis methodology to identify the key players in the bargaining process and illustrate the evolving bargaining process.

The authors demonstrated that, over time, the shift in power from the Russian MNC to the host government had not merely been the result of the increase in committed MNC assets in the host country but, rather, of a geopolitical chess game involving the Russian Government, North Atlantic treaty organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). By extending the OBP model with geopolitics, the authors found that a political agenda can influence the outcome of a bargaining process.

The authors extended the OBP model to illustrate the complex interaction between an emerging market MNC and an emerging host country government, indirectly influenced by two supranational organizations – the EU and NATO.

The author develops a bilateral Nash bargaining model under value uncertainty and private/asymmetric information, combining ideas from axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory. The solution to the model leads organically to a two-tier stochastic frontier (2TSF) setup with intra-error dependence. The author presents two different statistical specifications to estimate the model, one that accounts for regressor endogeneity using copulas, the other able to identify separately the bargaining power from the private information effects at the individual level. An empirical application using a matched employer–employee data set (MEEDS) from Zambia and a second using another one from Ghana showcase the applied potential of the approach.

Certain features of collective bargaining have, over time, promoted uniformity and sometimes inflexibility in teacher policy and negotiated contracts. From the start, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) – passed in 1935 to regulate unionization and collective bargaining in the private, industrial sector – served as the template for state labor laws regulating education. The framers of the NLRA never had the needs of the public sector or schools in mind. Yet the 35 states that now require collective bargaining for teachers have drawn on the NLRA’s procedures and standards. For example, they have used the NLRA for defining how teachers organize and are represented; what constitutes an unfair labor practice; and how obligatory membership or dues provide union security (e.g. agency shop, union shop). They have also drawn on the NLRA to define what range of issues can be bargained; whether strikes are legal; and what processes are used to resolve an impasse (e.g. mediation, fact finding, binding arbitration, or all three).¹ Although the laws of the 35 states show some important variations, their similarity is more striking than their differences. Jessup (1985) concluded that the narrow scope of bargaining established by New York’s Taylor Law “severely restricted the range of concerns teachers could productively bring to the bargaining table” (p. 195).

Faculty unionization is growing, and library faculty members are included in many collective bargaining units. Yet there is a dearth of information on how well collective bargaining contracts address the sometimes unique nature of library faculty work. This article explores contracts in a number of Ohio universities and from selective institutions around the country to see how well they accommodate the professional and work-related needs of librarians. Major contractual issues addressed include governance, academic freedom, workload, salary, and the retention, tenure, and promotion (RTP) of faculty, among others.

Recent US federal court rulings have provided new guidance on the use of economic models of bargaining in estimating reasonable royalty damages in patent cases. After reviewing relevant case law and providing an overview of the bargaining range approach, we describe one analytic method (the Rubinstein Bargaining Model) for developing a quantitative starting point with which to divide a bargaining range and explain how it can be tied, at least in part, to the facts and circumstances of the parties around the time of the Hypothetical Negotiation. We also describe how this approach can be used in conjunction with an analysis of other quantitative and qualitative factors related to the bargaining power of the parties, to help estimate reasonable royalty damages.