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This article focuses on whether there is a chance to win a World Trade Organization (WTO) trade dispute at the consultation stage. The study suggests an approach to resolving trade disputes on a bilateral level before involving formal WTO resolution procedures.

The model describes the determinants of the probability of winning a trade dispute. The econometric model estimates two different groups of factors available during the consultation period – macroeconomic factors and the institutional features of the trade dispute, such as the number of third parties. The data includes WTO trade disputes from 1995 to 2014.

The suggested model predicts the result of trade disputes with a probability of 76.64%. The research proves that institutional factors such as the number of third parties and the subject of the trade dispute influence the probability of winning.

The results of the study help predict the probability of winning a trade dispute at the consultation stage so that countries can decide whether to pursue a trade dispute.

The research presents several new hypotheses on the results of trade disputes. The authors show that the higher the number of countries involved, the higher the chance of the complainant winning and that if major parties such as the US or the European Union (EU) are involved as third parties, the chance of the complainant winning increases.

This article examines the framework of the Agreement for Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) and assesses its impacts on domestic autonomy and authority in matters of food and environmental safety. The direct impact of the SPS Agreement appears quite limited, as only a few cases have arisen. The Agreement has not proven to be a pervasive tool for the purpose of overturning domestic policies on food or environmental safety, despite the fact that the WTO Panel or Appellate Body decisions have found that domestic measures violate the terms of the SPS Agreement. Limited enforcement mechanisms provide protection for domestic policies, though perhaps at the price of trade sanctions. Moreover, theoretical literature suggests that the SPS Agreement may indeed enhance democratic values by discounting the influence of special interests and retaining ultimate authority for enforcement within the discretion of domestic government. Important issues nevertheless remain, including the role of the precautionary principle in policymaking and the means to address normative values, such as developing moral consensus on animal welfare, in trade matters. Trade has proven to be a catalyst for change and cooperative development in this context.

Although officially ended in July 2020, China’s dispute about its non-market economy (NME) status at the World Trade Organization (WTO) is far from being resolved. The NME status enables China’s counterparts to disregard Chinese prices in antidumping proceedings and instead use the so-called surrogate country methodology. This paper aims to structure and analyze the complex debate, which emerged with the disputes China has filed against the European Union and the USA at the WTO, and therefore provide a point of reference for future analysis of and debates about China’s NME status.

The analysis is based on the existing academic literature on the topic and on the legal WTO-related documents (e.g. multilateral agreements, China’s Accession Protocol, legal findings of the WTO dispute panels).

Four different interpretations of the respective legal documents about China’s NME status are discussed and strong and weak aspects of these interpretations are pointed out. Also, several misunderstandings and mistakes appearing in the debate are clarified.

As the question of China’s position at the WTO and its NME status has not been resolved yet and some authors believe that China will pursue its case again once the WTO Appellate Body revives its functionality, the analysis of the debate can serve as a point of reference for the academic debate and the future research on this topic. Moreover, it offers an introduction to China’s NME position at the WTO for the newcomers to this topic.

Although China’s NME status has been much discussed, there is no literature review that would structure the debate and point out some of the (dis)advantages of the respective arguments and interpretations. Rather than adding to the large corpus of literature about the NME status, this study takes this corpus as the object of its analysis.

The paper frames modern slavery as a global wicked problem and aims to provide a set of international business (IB) policy recommendations for taming it. The outlined approach can also guide IB policymaking to address other kinds of wicked problems.

This is a conceptual paper that reviews existing literature on wicked problems and integrates it with an IB policy double helix framework. The paper focuseses on the role multinational enterprises (MNEs) play in moderl slavery globally, either through global value chains or within global factory modes of operation.

As a global wicked problem, modern slavery will never be solved, but it can be re-solved time and time over. Understanding the social reproduction of modern slavery can help shift the focus from labor governance and a narrow supply chain focus toward the role of transnational governance and the need to address institutional, market and organizational failures.

The paper contributes to the gap in an overarching theory of modern slavery and systematically applies the concept of wicked problems and wickedness theory to modern slavery. Drawing on an IB policy double helix framework, the paper addresses the governance nexus between modern slavery, IB and policymaking which can in turn advance IB policy research and theory.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

The purpose of this paper is to show that, instead of replacing trade retaliation with alternatives that are equally problematic, such as monetary damages, mandatory trade compensation, or formal membership sanctions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) might gain from relying exclusively on informal remedies.

The paper critically reviews the main proposals brought forward in the literature and by WTO members on how to reform WTO remedies. It takes a fresh look at whether any viable, both economically and legally sensitive, alternatives exist.

First, the fact that WTO dispute settlement does not rely on monetary damages and on reparation for past losses is economically justified. Second, switching to an alternative remedy of mandatory trade compensation is not a viable alternative to proportional countermeasures. Third, introducing formal membership sanctions into the WTO would either remain ineffective or turn out to be counterproductive for progressive trade liberalization. Fourth, in order not to provoke an excessive increase of the total cost for WTO members to breach their obligations, any strengthening of the WTO's informal remedies should not be undertaken on top of existing remedies, but as part of a major paradigm shift built on the abrogation of trade retaliation.

The article contributes to the ongoing debate on how to reform the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism.

This article joins an already vast body of literature dealing with potential reforms of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. It provides a holistic review of the main existing reform proposals under both legal and economic aspects and adds original insights in discussing the replacement of trade remedies by strengthened informal remedies.

A somewhat underappreciated aspect of the burgeoning rush to regional trade agreements (RTAs) is a discrepancy between the dispute settlement procedure (DSP) embodied in the original World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and that found in the language of many RTAs. This chapter explores the issue in the context of a dynamic repeated game of trade agreements. As is well known, the institutional alternatives available in negotiating multilateral freer trade agreements – regional agreements, side agreements, trade dispute settlement punishments, and so on – can proscribe the limits and shape the nature of self-enforcing trade agreements. Here, we suggest the extent to which deviations from the WTO DSP embodied in RTAs – for example, “private interest access,” “third party procedures,” and “choice of forum” – can not only work against the interests of “weaker parties” but furthermore undermine multilateral agreements closer to free trade.

One of the major strategic challenges facing the transatlantic trade relationship is the ability to regulate such risk areas as the environment whilst maintaining important trade flows. Much scholarship has emphasised formal United States (US)‐European Union (EU) trade disputes when considering the treatment of risk. However, these cases represent a minority of the trade conflict at the World Trade Organisation (WTO). A majority of trade conflict gets raised, debated and resolved informally in the WTO committee structure. The Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement is the WTO institutional arrangement that seeks to reconcile environmental, health and food safety regulations with trade objectives. The SPS embodies “in‐house” dispute resolution mechanisms that are based on the notion of constructive engagement. Mechanisms like ad hoc consultations, registering official protests, use of the chair's good offices and coordination with international standard setting organisations have been effective in promoting harmonisation between states. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The paper traces the process that is embedded within the SPS Committee for resolving trade conflict over risk‐based regulations, highlighting a recent case in point of wood‐packing materials.

The paper elucidates a good news story about how American and EU policy makers utilize SPS Committee mechanisms to resolve differences over environmental regulations at the SPS Committee. Specific recommendations are offered on how to strengthen those mechanisms.

If the recommendations offered are followed, trade conflict resolution over risk‐based issues in the SPS context will be strengthened.

The paper is the first utilizing a case study to assess the effectiveness of WTO/SPS mechanisms for trade conflict resolution.