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The paper aims to find out the information content of performance measures from accounting and value-based measures that best explain the total shareholder return.

To achieve this aim, static and dynamic panel data regression analysis is applied to the sample of 56 Indian companies taken from the Nifty Midcap 100 Index, between 2012 and 2019.

It is found that accounting-based measures have more relative information content in predicting total shareholder return as compared to value-based measures. Economic value added (EVA) and cash value added (CVA) do not add to the information content provided by accounting-based measures. A combination of accounting-based measures and value-added intellectual coefficient (VAIC) adds marginally to the information content provided by accounting-based measures in explaining the total shareholder return. Dynamic panel regression analysis shows that return on assets (ROA), return on capital employed (ROCE), return on equity (ROE) and EVA have a significant impact on total shareholder return.

In this study, along with EVA, other measures from value-based measures, i.e. CVA are empirically tested to explain the total shareholder return. Intellectual capital efficiency computed by VAIC is also empirically tested along with accounting-based measures, EVA, CVA and market value added (MVA). To bring robustness to findings, data are tested by using dynamic panel regression analysis.

The authors extend the recent research using the risk component of human resource’s (HR’s) compensation plans to examine the effects of risk components on two strategic outcomes: within-firm temporal change, or strategic variation, and firm strategic divergence from the industry, or strategic deviation. In addition, the authors examine the role of previous financial performance as a boundary moderator condition of the effects of risk components in the compensation plan and firm strategic outcomes.

To examine the effects of low- and high-risk components of executive compensation on strategic variation and deviation over time, the authors collected data from 2,510 companies listed in the Standard and Poor’s 500 index in a panel data format of a 12-year period. The authors gathered financial and other firm-level data from COMPUSTAT, and executive compensation and executive-level data from ExecuComp.

The findings support the main effects of risk components on strategic change, while both high- and low-risk components act on strategic deviation contingent on the moderating role of total shareholder return (TSR). In the theoretical framework, the authors test the moderating role of total shareholder return (TSR) as a boundary condition of the effects of risk components in the compensation plan. In doing so, the authors provide a fine-grained understanding of the influence of compensation plan risk components on outcomes proximal to executives, such as the maintenance of the status quo and the search for financial gains.

New studies can explore a three-way moderating effect on performance indicators, such as TSR, Tobin’s Q and return on asset. The authors addressed this limitation and did a comparative analysis, but the authors did not include additional moderating mechanisms in these interactive effects.

By disaggregating the executive’s compensation based on the risk components, boards of directors can mitigate any possible unwanted biases in the relationship between principal and agent.

By considering the influence of both low- and high-risk components of compensation plans on strategic outcomes –instead of firm performance – this study expands strategy literature supporting the influence of compensation schema on a firm’s outcomes. This path is new because it offers a moderating perspective to understand the strategic deviations and changes that chief executive officers imprint in their firms.

Los autores amplían la investigación reciente usando el componente de riesgo de los planes de compensación de RH para examinar los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en dos resultados estratégicos: cambio temporal dentro de la empresa, o variación estratégica, y divergencia estratégica de la empresa de la industria, o desviación estratégica. Además, examinamos el papel del desempeño financiero anterior como una condición moderadora límite de los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en el plan de compensación y los resultados estratégicos de la empresa.

Para examinar los efectos de los componentes de alto y bajo riesgo de la compensación ejecutiva en la variación y desviación estratégica a lo largo del tiempo, recopilamos datos de 2510 empresas que figuran en el índice Standard & Poor's 500 en un formato de datos de panel de un período de 12 años. Los autores recopilaron datos financieros y de otro tipo a nivel de empresa de COMPUSTAT, y compensación de ejecutivos, y datos a nivel ejecutivo de EXECUCOMP.

Nuestros hallazgos respaldan los efectos principales de los componentes de riesgo en el cambio estratégico, mientras que los componentes de alto y bajo riesgo actúan sobre la desviación estratégica dependiendo del papel moderador del rendimiento total del accionista. En el marco teórico, los autores prueban el papel moderador del Retorno Total del Accionista como condición límite de los efectos de los componentes de riesgo en el plan de compensación. Al hacerlo, brindamos una comprensión detallada de la influencia de los componentes de riesgo del plan de compensación en los resultados próximos a los ejecutivos, como el mantenimiento del statu quo y la búsqueda de ganancias financieras.

al considerar la influencia de los componentes de bajo y alto riesgo de los planes de compensación en los resultados estratégicos, en lugar del desempeño de la empresa, este estudio amplía la literatura de estrategia que respalda la influencia del esquema de compensación en los resultados de una empresa. Este camino es nuevo porque ofrece una perspectiva moderadora para entender las desviaciones y cambios estratégicos que los CEOs imprimen en sus firmas.

los nuevos estudios pueden explorar un efecto moderador de tres vías en los indicadores de rendimiento, como TSR, Tobin's Q y ROA. Abordamos esta limitación e hicimos un análisis comparativo, pero no incluimos mecanismos moderadores adicionales en estos efectos interactivos.

al desagregar la compensación del ejecutivo en función de los componentes de riesgo, las juntas directivas pueden mitigar cualquier posible sesgo no deseado en la relación entre el principal y el agente.

Os autores estendem a pesquisa recente usando o componente de risco dos planos de remuneração de RH para examinar os efeitos dos componentes de risco em dois resultados estratégicos: mudança temporal dentro da empresa, ou variação estratégica, e divergência estratégica da empresa do setor, ou desvio estratégico. Além disso, examinamos o papel do desempenho financeiro anterior como uma condição moderadora dos efeitos dos componentes de risco no plano de remuneração e nos resultados estratégicos da empresa.

Para examinar os efeitos dos componentes de baixo e alto risco da remuneração executiva na variação e desvio estratégico ao longo do tempo, coletamos dados de 2.510 empresas listadas no índice Standard & Poor's 500 em um formato de dados de painel de um período de 12 anos. Os autores coletaram dados financeiros e de outros níveis da empresa da COMPUSTAT, remuneração executiva e dados de nível executivo da EXECUCOMP.

Nossos resultados suportam os principais efeitos dos componentes de risco na mudança estratégica, enquanto os componentes de alto e baixo risco atuam no desvio estratégico contingente ao papel moderador do Retorno Total ao Acionista. No referencial teórico, os autores testam o papel moderador do Total Shareholder Return como condição limite dos efeitos dos componentes de risco no plano de remuneração. Ao fazer isso, fornecemos uma compreensão refinada da influência dos componentes de risco do plano de remuneração nos resultados próximos aos executivos, como a manutenção do status quo e a busca por ganhos financeiros.

ao considerar a influência dos componentes de baixo e alto risco dos planos de remuneração nos resultados estratégicos -em vez do desempenho da empresa- este estudo expande a literatura de estratégia que apoia a influência do esquema de remuneração nos resultados de uma empresa. Esse caminho é novo porque oferece uma perspectiva moderadora para entender os desvios e mudanças estratégicas que os CEOs imprimem em suas empresas.

Novos estudos podem explorar um efeito moderador de três vias em indicadores de desempenho, como TSR, Q de Tobin e ROA. Abordamos essa limitação e fizemos uma análise comparativa, mas não incluímos mecanismos moderadores adicionais nesses efeitos interativos.

Ao desagregar a remuneração do executivo com base nos componentes de risco, os conselhos de administração podem mitigar possíveis vieses indesejados na relação entre principal e agente.

Considering corporate governance (CG hereinafter) practices' variety across Anglo-American and European countries, this study relies on contingency and complexity theories to investigate the effect of environmental sustainability performance (ESP hereinafter) on shareholder value under various configurations of board of directors (BoD hereinafter), firm and country characteristics.

The author used the Thomson Reuters Environment Pillar Score (ASSET4) and the Total Shareholder Return to assess ESP and shareholder value respectively. The author applied a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA hereinafter) to an unbalanced panel of 2,284 observations from 486 European and Anglo-American non-financial listed firms over the period 2016–2020.

The author found a positive association between ESP and shareholder value and he displayed notable differences between Anglo-American and European economies regarding causal predictors of this positive association. Within European firms operating under civil law code where investor protection is low and family ownership is widespread, ESP creates shareholder value under configurations of causal predictors that significantly differ from those of their Anglo-American peers. The author's findings are robust to different identification strategies.

This study assists researchers, practitioners, shareholders and policymakers the significant roles that BoD diversity, organisational and institutional traits are jointly playing as determinants of the ESP-shareholder value relationship.

The author's study offers a more encompassing, complete and theoretically richer picture of the key drivers and outcomes of ESP.

Looks briefly at theories underlying the correlation between company performance and executive compensation, develops a mathematical model and applies it to results which show a significant positive link between the highest paid director’s compensation and total shareholder returns, but not with earnings per share. Considers consistency with other research, notes the influence of company size on executive pay and calls for further research on this important issue of corporate governance.

This chapter considers financial instability as a phenomenon endogenous to the functioning of capitalism. Consequently, it seeks to identify the main sources and different forms of the latter in financialised capitalism. According to Keynes, capital assets prices are conceived as the expression of financial conventions. It is, therefore, important to distinguish between the returns expected by company directors, bankers, holders of equity titles, risk-takers and, in contrast, risk-averse holders of debt securities. Minsky enriches the analysis by attributing a decisive role to the leverage effect, at the origin of an accumulation of financial weaknesses in the balance sheets of non-financial agents during the expansion phases preceding financial crises. Regulation theory leads to the introduction of a distinction between the financial accelerator and the leverage effect. The first establishes a procyclical relationship at the macroeconomic level between the price of capital assets and the debt ratio of non-financial agents; the second acts at the microeconomic level through shareholder corporate governance, which determines the institutional conditions inciting firm directors to integrate shareholder expectations into their return forecasts. The empirical analysis identifies three forms of financial instability in financialised capitalism: the long-term financial cycle governed by the debt ratio of non-financial agents; the business cycle governed by the impact of stock prices on investment; and the short-term or even very short-term expected return revisions of financial actors. Its originality is to show that these three forms of instability acquire different characteristics depending on the national economy considered.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of leverage on the total shareholder return of European publicly traded real estate vehicles in three periods: Crisis Period (2007-2009), Rebound Period (2009-2014) and the Whole Period.

Cross-sectional analysis is used and the leverage effect on the performance is controlled for seven other independent variables (local market risk premium, size, book-to-market, short-term debt, cash); moreover, regional differences are accounted for.

It is established that during the Crisis Period, leverage levels are negatively associated with performance: this relationship also holds throughout the Whole Period, implying that for real estate securities, the cost of financial distress is larger than the potential gain from taxation, although the economic significance of it is limited. The Fama and French (1992) three factors, including size, book-to-market and local market risk premium, are found to be relevant, which is consistent with the literature. In addition, the UK and Sweden regions are identified as significant.

Even if there is sizeable body of literature on determinants of leverage and determinants of asset returns, little work has been done on how leverage affects the returns of European real estate companies. In addition, this paper takes advantage of observations from a full economic cycle and the possible effects of the crisis period.

This study aims to examine whether chief executive officer (CEO) pay-performance sensitivity to shareholder wealth is related to the use of non-financial performance measures in incentive contracts.

Using hand-collected performance measure data in a sample of S&P 500 firms across the period 1994–2010, this study investigates the sensitivity of CEO bonus and cash pay to shareholder wealth of firms that use non-financial performance (NFPM) measures of varying types and contractual weights in their bonus contracts along with financial measures (NFPM firms) in comparison to that of firms using financial measures only (FPM firms).

This study finds evidence that the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in NFPM firms than in FPM firms. These results are driven by the use of CEO individual goals and operational efficiency. Furthermore, when using environmental, social and governance factors, the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in terms of accounting performance only. This study also finds that using NFPM enhances pay-performance sensitivity more as their contractual weights increase and as financial risk increases.

These findings are important to stakeholders, and especially regulators in understanding incentive effects of alternative performance measures. This study also sheds light on what types of non-financial measures are better in helping firms align CEOs’ incentives to shareholders’ interests.

This study contributes to prior research on benefits of non-financial information within the context of executive compensation. This study presents original results about the effects of contractual weights of non-financial measures and financial risk on CEO pay-performance sensitivity. This study also presents new insights regarding how different types of non-financial measures affect CEO pay-performance sensitivity.

The purpose of this research is to evaluate the impact of adopting the principles of corporate governance on the financial performance of companies listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE). To assess the implementation of corporate governance principles, the authors built an index based on the principles specified in the BSE Corporate Governance Code (CGC).

An econometric analysis was conducted to estimate the impact that the authors’ corporate governance indicator had on financial performance, measured successively through Tobin's Q, return on equity (ROE), economic value added (EVA) and total shareholder return (TSR).

Following the regression model, the authors noticed the absence of a significant impact of corporate governance practices on performance measured by ROE, EVA and TSR but instead, a significant and positive relationship for Tobin's Q rate was found.

Due to the lack of data before the implementation of the BSE Code of Corporate Governance, the research period is limited to 2010–2015, but the authors’ future studies will try to extend the research period.

Although numerous studies have been conducted to analyze the empirical relationship between corporate governance and financial performance, no conclusive results have been obtained. The diversity of these findings can refer to methods used in the construction of a corporate governance measure as well as to the accuracy of financial reporting.

The purpose of this paper is to examine which firm characteristics affect the usage of sustainability incentives in executive remuneration contracts, and whether these sustainability incentives have an impact on shareholders’ return.

The analysis is based on a sample of 212 firms from the FTSE 350 firms over the period of 2009-2011.

The results indicate that there is a significant relationship between the adoption of sustainability incentives in executive remuneration and firm size, compensation committee independence, the corporate social responsibility (CSR) sustainability committee, CSR sustainability index, and resource efficiency policy variables. Further, there is evidence to support a positive impact on the shareholders’ return.

The results of this study should be interpreted within two limitations. First, the limited numbers of the sample years due to the limited number of firms used sustainability incentives. Second, the use of a dummy variable in the measurement of the adoption of sustainability incentives in the analysis.

The paper includes implications for the development of sustainability incentives within the performance measurement system and compensation contracts that could be a solution for the agency problem.

This study provides empirical evidence on an increased use of sustainability incentives in UK firms, and identifies firm’s characteristics that explain such increase in the sustainability incentives, finally its positive impact on the shareholders’ return.

The Article seeks to identify the configuration of executive directors conditional option and LTIP arrangements used to align the interest of the company’s directors and shareholders.

The article presents an empirical study of the option and LTIP arrangements (current and previous) of 51 major UK companies. The article focuses on the configuration of option schemes and LTIPs in respect of three critical elements: the performance target selected, the comparator used to benchmark performance and the quantitative performance target level requirement to be achieved to trigger rewards. The period 1989‐2002, covered by the research indicates a substantial degree of “experimentation” with many companies amending their original option schemes and LTIPs and a larger number of other companies introducing new arrangements. A substantial number of schemes can be characterised as being “undemanding” rewarding average rather than excellent performance.

It is It is proposed (in a follow up paper) to econometrically test for associations between particular configurations (identified in this article) and actual corporate financial performance, i.e. which configurations have the most robust impact on performance.

The author makes a number of recommendations aimed at making option schemes and LTIP, more “stretching”, rewarding only excellent rather than average performance.

This is the first paper to explicitly look at the components of option schemes and LTIPs in a detailed way, questioning the merits/demerits of the targets and comparators commonly used to evaluate performance.