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Although the threat of terrorist attacks is not a new phenomenon for hotels, limited literature exists on measures that hotels can take to prevent them or limit their damage. The purpose of this paper is to propose a baseline strategy to address this threat.

Using the terrorist attack cycle and the security function models introduced in this paper, 19 hotel security experts, members of an international working group on terrorism, were tasked to reach consensus on a baseline anti‐terrorist strategy for a hotel. To reach this consensus, the study employed the Nominal Group Technique.

The study presents a six‐step baseline anti‐terrorism strategy and a series of measures and actions under each step. In the centre of this strategy lies the disruption of the terrorist attack cycle.

There are limitations inherent to the Nominal Group Technique which may not allow the generalizability of the findings. However, every effort was made to ensure the reliability and validity of the study.

The study suggests a shift from physical protection alone to a more intelligence‐led approach. Counter‐surveillance, terrorist behavioral analysis, higher visibility of security measures, stronger relationships with local community leaders, collaborative relationships with emergency response agencies and strategic use of risk intelligence providers will have to take a higher place in the agendas of hotel security departments.

The paper presents, for the first time, two models that industry practitioners will find useful when designing security policies: the terrorist attack cycle and the security function model. Each component of the proposed strategy provides a starting point for the design of security strategies tailored on the security needs and budget of any hotel property.

The purpose of this study is to present a holistic literature review on crime research in the hospitality and tourism field.

This literature review included 109 crime-related academic papers in seven primary sources, namely, ScienceDirect, EBSCOhost’s hospitality and tourism complete, Emerald Management eJournals, Sage Journals, Google Scholar, Scopus and Web of Science.

From the exploration and synthesis of 109 articles, the following categories of crime research in the hospitality and tourism field emerged as follows: classification of crime research in the hospitality and tourism field; diversity of tourists, crime and risk perceptions; the impacts of crime on the hospitality and tourism industry; and crime control from stakeholders’ papers. In addition, this study advances crime research by proposing six research priorities for future investigation.

Tourism stakeholders are advised to achieve better cooperation in crime control under the guidance of the crime prevention model. High-technology tools are encouraged to be applied to detect and track criminal activities. Meanwhile, diverse applications of the media should be used as useful tools to control criminal activities in the hospitality and tourism industry.

This paper fills a gap by presenting the first comprehensive overview of crime research in the hospitality and tourism field in the past few decades and proposing six priorities for this research stream.

In this chapter, we examine several attributes of lone wolf terrorists and how their activities are temporally and geospatially patterned. In particular, we demonstrate how precursor behaviors and attack characteristics of lone wolves are similar and different compared to those of group-based terrorists.

Based on data drawn from the American Terrorism Study (ATS), we examine 268 federal terrorism “indictees” linked to 264 incidents. Three types of loners are identified based on group affiliations and levels of assistance in preparing for and executing terrorist attacks. A series of analyses comparatively examine loners who had no assistance and those actors that did.

The results of this study suggest that lone wolf terrorists are more educated and socially isolated than group-based actors. Lone wolves also engage in less precursor activities than group actors, but are willing to travel greater distances to prepare for and execute attacks. Explanations for why lone wolves are able to “survive” longer than terrorist groups by avoiding arrest may in part stem from their ability to temporally and geospatially position their planning and preparatory activities.

Studies on lone wolf terrorism remain few and many are plagued by methodological and conceptual limitations. The current study adds to this growing literature by relying on lone wolf terrorism data recently made available by the American Terrorism Study (ATS). Our findings are valuable for members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities responsible for the early detection and prevention of lone wolf terrorism in the United States.

The fundamental idea that we seek to establish in this chapter is that the establishment of regional or local, peace calls forth global peace. In other words, our argument is that local and regional conflicts are partly driven by global factors, especially what is commonly known as international tension. In order to achieve meaningful and sustained peace, there is a reason to believe that it is mandatory to manage and contain international tensions. The main thesis of this chapter is to explain or posit, conflicts as a product of continuing international chasms, splits and differences of political and social ideologies in our modern world. Thus, we argue that conflicts are, to some extent, driven by international tension or global, ideological and geo-political factors. Notwithstanding the global influence, local factors – such as income inequality, income growth or lack of it, political institutions – can and do exacerbate conflicts and a peaceful resolution of conflicts becomes a difficult phenomenon.

An investigation of parallels between homegrown, international, and domestic terrorism.

A comparative method is used to analyze data from two main sources, ITERATE data on international and the TWEED data on domestic terrorism. The similarities are tested in various dimensions – target types, severity, and the method of the attacks.

Homegrown terrorism is inherently motivated by domestic issues. Moreover, variables of ethnic heterogeneity, political inclusiveness of fringe groups, and problems in the democratization process are good predictors of the occurrence of other forms of domestic and homegrown terrorism alike.

Number of observable cases of homegrown terrorism are low. The two main datasets have potentially overlapping incidents.

Provides and operational definition of homegrown terrorism and test empirically the similarity between homegrown and other types of terrorisms.

The paper seeks to draw lessons for effective policy and regulatory responses to protect financial systems in the face of terrorist attacks.

The paper presents data on the reaction of financial markets to the terrorist attacks in New York (2001) and Madrid (2004). It describes the authorities' crisis management responses and analyses their effectiveness. The paper describes the subsequent regulatory responses to protect the financial systems from abuse by terrorists.

Diversified, liquid, and sound financial markets were efficient in absorbing the shocks of terrorist attacks when supported by well organized crisis management responses.

The paper is limited in its coverage to the reaction of the financial markets to the 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks in New York, and 11 March 2004, attacks in Madrid.

The paper highlights the importance of effective contingency planning by the authorities and financial firms in mitigating the risks of disruption from terrorist attacks.

This paper provides an overview of the issues, challenges and responses in dealing with the risks posed by terrorism to financial systems. It combines empirical evidence with an institutional perspective, and notes some of the regulatory challenges in combating terrorist finance.

In this chapter, I suggest three conceptual tools developed by William R. Freudenburg and colleagues that characterize the failure of institutions to carry out their duties – recreancy, atrophy of vigilance, and bureaucratic slippage – are of use beyond environmental sociology in the framing of the September 11, 2001 disaster. Using testimony and findings from primary materials such as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry hearings and report (2002, 2004a, 2004b) and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) alongside insider accounts, I discuss how Freudenburg’s tools have the potential to theorize institutional failures that occur in national security decision making. I also suggest these tools may be of particular interest to the U.S. intelligence community in its own investigation of various types of risk and failures.

The purpose of this paper is to challenge the “myth” that terrorism is cheap and that terrorists are extremely efficient in how they use their money.

This paper makes a critical assessment of the “costs” involved in terrorist attacks and addresses the debate about how this affects the overall strategy against terrorist financing.

This paper argues that costs of terrorism are many and not limited to what is spent on an actual attack. Owing to military and financial counter‐measures, terrorists appear to have lost overall operational efficiency; they are no longer capable of carrying out large‐scale and complex operations like the September 2001 attacks.

Small amounts involved in carrying out a terrorist attack have led to the perception that terrorism is cheap and terrorist attacks can be inexpensively implemented. This has undermined the global and national efforts to counter the financing of terrorism (CFT). This paper is an attempt to persuade the stakeholders in the CFT community that targeting terrorist financing has been and must remain one of the most important fronts in the war against terrorism.