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In this chapter, I suggest three conceptual tools developed by William R. Freudenburg and colleagues that characterize the failure of institutions to carry out their duties – recreancy, atrophy of vigilance, and bureaucratic slippage – are of use beyond environmental sociology in the framing of the September 11, 2001 disaster. Using testimony and findings from primary materials such as the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry hearings and report (2002, 2004a, 2004b) and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) alongside insider accounts, I discuss how Freudenburg’s tools have the potential to theorize institutional failures that occur in national security decision making. I also suggest these tools may be of particular interest to the U.S. intelligence community in its own investigation of various types of risk and failures.

This paper aims to explore complexities of compliance with international and customary law when faced with terrorist threats. The paper's thesis asserts that terrorism cannot be successfully repelled unless the legitimacy of international and domestic law is adhered to by states out of a sense of reciprocal obligation in accordance with the principle of pacta sunt servanda (pacts shall be respected).

This paper examines US pronouncements in order to assess strategic validity.

While the Middle East, particularly Iraq, has been the focus of the US “War on terrorism,” the paper suggests two questions: what has been the US response to terrorist threats in the Americas? Have US national security priorities post‐9/11 been unnecessarily diverted from the Americas where much needed support is promised but lacking, and instead have resources been concentrated far beyond domestic and international norms?

The paper examines the US national security priorities, concluding that they have been unproductively diverted from the Americas to the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. The US fixation upon Middle East “regime‐change”, while neglecting to recognize the dangerous nexus and presence of organized crime and terrorist organizations in the Americas, is illustrative of how the present administration has diverted its post.

This paper aims to analyze provisions in the existing US laws and government directives for deployment, vigilance and persistence in managing homeland security.

Within about a year after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the US Congress passed various new laws and the executive branch of the government issued a series of directives to maintain domestic security. The approach of the study is to analyze the provisions of the laws and the directives with an aim of seeing how these will enable risk management considering that the resources are not unlimited.

The existing laws and directives enhance the ability of the USA to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system. However, the major impediment to risk management is currently the lack of ability to share critical information among federal, state, local, tribal, public and private sector organizations. The government and private sectors should work together to form partnerships and to improve the flow of information. To make risk management processes truly effective, people need to be educated on their advantages and disadvantages so that they can use such tools appropriately to help them prioritize and allocate resources.

The paper advances research and strategies to manage homeland security and eliminate or at least reduce the risk of terrorist attacks.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the analysis of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks provided by the US National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the USA from the points of view of behavior analysis and systems analysis. The 9/11 Commission provides a detailed and provocative account of the structural flaws in the US security systems that enabled the 9/11 terrorists to completely subvert efforts to detect and prevent their attack. This paper considers the role of private‐sector organizations in prevention of future attacks.

This conceptual/theoretical paper explores how understanding verbal networks and the nature of verbal rules might contribute to understanding the issues involved in re‐engineering work cultures in the face of continued terrorist threats.

An understanding of verbal networks and ambiguous communications aids the re‐design of management systems and emergency response processes so that adaptive organizational responses to terrorist threats are enabled.

Private‐sector leaders might conduct behavioral systems analyses and probe the limitations of their operations and seek to detect weak points and create contingencies that sustain more effective security and emergency response repertoires.

If aeroplanes and passengers, as well as property and people on the ground are to be protected, potential perpetrators of aviation terrorism must be prevented from breaching security checkpoints and gaining access to ‘secure’ airport areas and to aircrafts. Given the interconnectedness of the air transportation system, a sufficiently high level of security must be provided throughout the entire system. In this chapter we examine terrorism issues relevant to airline and airport security internationally, a topic that has received much attention since 9/11. Understanding the key issues is crucial in evaluating the various methods of regulating and providing aviation safety and security. The purpose of this chapter is to review the key features of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act and the characteristics of the resulting security policy. Then we examine terrorism, previous terrorists' acts against aviation as well as current and future aviation threats. A summary of our major points completes the chapter.

This chapter on terrorism prevention provides the reader with an overview of the various terrorist prevention organizations within the United States at the federal, state, and local levels. It is divided into two different sections, the first providing a detailed description of various federal agencies involved in terrorism prevention and an overview of how state and local agencies fit within the federal framework. The second section of this chapter describes various efforts to integrate these disparate organizations into a cohesive effort to prevent terrorism activities. This chapter concludes with some suggestions for future consideration to help with the overall terrorism prevention effort.

The “war on terror” has nothing to do with protecting the U.S. and world's people from “terrorists”, and everything to do with securing the American empire abroad and muzzling democracy and human rights at home. The 9-11 attacks were the pretext which sold the myth of evil Muslim terrorists imminently threatening Americans. That tale allowed the Cheney-led members of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) to implement their 1990 DPG plan for world control. The “war on terror” is modelled on Islamophobic stereotypes, policies, and political structures developed by the Israeli Likkud and Bush Sr. in 1979. It is designed to inspire popular support for U.S. wars of world conquest. To defeat this plan, we must overcome our Islamophobic fear of “terrorists” and stand in solidarity with Muslims.

Pyrotechnic effects and spectacular death belong to the symbolism of terror and political assassination – bizarre techniques of miscommunication through fear practiced on the innocent and designed to effect social change. While focusing on the use of terror in 9-11, this article deals with both terror and political assassination as closely related communicative practices of death. It outlines a theory of terrorism that suggests September 11 may be an example of expedient terrorist destruction ordered from within the state, a macabre instance of a state protection racket. Commentators on the left tend to see terrorism as a blow extended by the oppressed against exploiters. However, terrorism is much less likely to be a manifestation of a revolt by – or on behalf of – the underprivileged than a demonstration of brute force by the state or its agents. Machiavellian state terrorism is terror/assassination performed for reasons different from the publicized ones; often initiated by persons or groups other than those suspected of the act; and – most important – secretly perpetrated by, or on behalf, of the violated state itself. Machiavellian state terror advances the ruling agenda, while disguising itself as the work of individuals or groups opposed to the state's fundamental principles. As an example, the article reviews a mysterious 1971 assassination in Paris that obliquely foreshadows some critical elements of the official story of 9-11. The article underlines the importance of oppositional theorizing: questioning government and looking for connections between events are critical features of what it means to be vitally active in the political universe.

Despite its stated intention to be independent, impartial and thorough, the 9-11 Commission was none of the three. The Commission was structurally compromised by bias-inducing connections to subjects of the investigation, and procedurally compromised, among other reasons, by (1) its failure to take up promising lines of inquiry and its failure to try to force the release of key documents that were closely guarded by the Bush administration, the FBI and various intelligence agencies; (2) its distortion of information about pre-9-11 military preparedness, foreknowledge of the attacks or attacks of like-kind; and (3) omissions of information related to the funding of the plot and the specific whereabouts of key officials on the morning of September 11, 2001.

These structural compromises and procedural failings converged to assure that the Commission would not challenge core elements of the “official story” of the 9-11 attacks. This failure was compounded by the Commission's desire to produce a final report that would read as a “historical narrative” rather than as an exhaustive set of findings on the critical unanswered questions that arose after the attacks. The Commission's unquestioning acceptance of the official narrative also meant that it missed a perhaps larger opportunity to challenge key myths associated with American exceptionalism. Thus, the 9-11 Commission ultimately functioned as an instrument of cultural hegemony, extending and deepening the official version of events under the guise of independence and impartiality.