Search results

To review the relationship between the nature of telecommunications sector reform and the commitments under the WTO, and determine the impact on sector performance.

A model is developed which links sector reforms and WTO commitments. Publicly available, data are then used to populate the model and explore the correlations between sector reform, WTO commitments and sector performance.

The empirical analysis suggests a strong and positive correlation between positive changes in sector performance and sector reform supported by WTO commitments.

The sequencing of the reform agenda and the use of WTO commitments as part within the political economy of a particular country are important issues which future research may consider. The lack of consistent cross‐sectional data prevented the adoption of more formal econometric analysis.

The paper highlights the close integration of a number of policy measures if sector reform within a country is to be successful. The role of the WTO commitments may be significant not only in shaping the details of internal policy measures, but also as a credibility signal to investors.

In light of the Doha round of negotiations within the WTO, in particular the “Singapore Agenda”, this paper makes a significant contribution to understanding the relationship between WTO commitments and reform of the telecommunications sector.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how to use structuration theory as a benchmarking tool to analyze the formulation of a national strategy.

The paper presents a longitudinal case study of the telecommunications industry of China.

The case study demonstrates structuration theory is a useful tool for the benchmarking analysis. It is found that China's telecommunications industry has transformed by stages and undergone several benchmarks. The specific social and technological elements of China have determined the formulation of its national telecommunications transformation strategy.

The paper extends benchmarking research to strategy formulation. It proposes structuration theory can be used in this aspect of benchmarking analysis.

Implications for how to use structuration theory in the benchmarking analysis, especially that of national strategy formulation are given.

For the first time in the literature, this paper applies structuration theory to benchmarking analysis.

Traditionally, telecommunications was one of the economic sectors with the highest level of state ownership and activity. However, overwhelming pressures for change in this field have rendered old institutional arrangements and practices increasingly obsolete. As such, various countries have opted for a mix of policies including institutional restructuring, liberalization, and privatization. In Lebanon, since the end of the civil war in 1990, the government has been trying to restructure and modernize its telecommunications sector. The goal of the government was not simply to fix what was damaged by the war but rather to restructure and reform the telecommunications landscape, allowing the country to leapfrog into the twenty‐first century and the information age. This paper assesses the Lebanese post‐war experience with telecom reform. An overview of global trends in telecom reform is first presented. The performance of the Lebanese telecom sector is then examined and the main reform constraints identified. A comparative assessment against international benchmarks is also conducted. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for improving this sector’s performance are outlined.

What are US policymakers, stakeholders, and analysts thinking about the state of US‐Japanese telecommunications policy relations? What are their top priorities for the years ahead? What steps could be taken to enhance the two countries’ ability to manage the unique “behind the borders” political challenges associated with deepening international economic integration? This paper considers these and related questions.

This paper aims to determine the most possible telecommunications regulatory system for the Palestinian Authority by investigating its institutional foundations. The paper highlights the problem of setting sophisticated institutions in fragile states that do not fully control their resources and investigates possible solution in terms of foreign investments.

The paper follows a qualitative research approach in two parts. The first part examines the institutional endowment framework set by Levy and Spiller and Levy and Spiller but considers critique of the framework. It also investigates institutional problems in fragile states in order to identify similar patters identified in Levy and Spiller framework. The second part focuses on the Palestinian Authority institutional foundations. Data are collected through interviews with key stakeholders of the Palestinian telecommunications sector.

The case of the Palestinian Authority shows a mix of political investment cycles and a genuine attempt of regulatory reforms. Endogenous fragility of the government magnified the effect of corruption and the maintenance of business‐politicians ties. Also, the Palestinian telecommunications sector suffers from exogenous fragility in terms of Israeli control of radio spectrum, international gateway, and importing of equipment. Inability of the Palestinian Authority to invoke GATS BTA conflict resolution mechanism and the crucial role foreign investors played to secure release of spectrum for the second mobile operator indicates the need for the Palestinian Authority to attempt attracting foreign investment. However, foreign investments require regulatory effectiveness that the Palestinian Authority lacks; thus eliminating endogenous fragility becomes a prerequisite to exogenous fragility.

This paper sheds light on problems regarding setting up an institution‐based regulatory system in unstable states. It contributes to the argument that “one size fit all” might not be the answer for some countries, especially fragile ones.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss literature and empirical evidence on regulatory independence especially in telecommunications and to suggest reforms of this institution.

The paper comprises a survey of the literature plus new empirical evidence on de facto independence.

The study finds that independence has a positive and significant, but modest, impact on network penetration, once de facto issues and endogeneity are taken into account.

De facto independence can only be superficially approached with quantitative methods and the instruments used to correct for endogeneity are far from perfect.

Regulatory agencies may find ways to improve their effectiveness.

The paper provides ideas on how to solve the dilemma between expertise and accountability in the particular field of telecommunications regulation.

The paper provides data about the vulnerability of independent regulation in telecommunications in Latin America until 2010.

Many developing countries are in the initial phases of adopting electronic government (e‐government) programs to improve public services and deliver them as efficiently and conveniently as possible. Our experience with a variety of governments throughout the developing world at different stages of implementing e‐government programs with citizens (G2C), businesses (G2B), and other entities of government (G2G) suggests that a major reason behind the success or failure of e‐government projects is the extent to which, first, the governments address technological infrastructure encouraged by appropriate telecommunications policies; and second, the legal and regulatory instruments required for e‐government. Information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure (the “I”) development is at the heart of successful deployment and sustainability of e‐government programs.

The European telecommunications sector is undergoing major structural change in the face of new technology, privatisation and European Commission directives requiring market liberalisation. This study considers the comparative performance of the major European telecommunications operators between 1978 and 1998. This period encompasses an era of state monopolies, market liberalisation initiatives and a number of privatisations. The objectives are to assess: the extent so far to which market liberalisation and privatisation have impacted on the efficiency with which telecommunications services are provided in Europe; and changes in the performance of the different telecommunications operators over time with a view to providing an insight into the comparative efficiency performance of the different telecommunications operators in Europe. Performance is measured in terms of profit margins and labour and total factor productivity.

The purpose of this paper is to review the ways in which the regulation of the telecommunications sector has contributed to the economic development of the Romanian economy (as an example of a transition economy).

The paper takes a case study approach, considering Romanias's transition to a market economy, a description of the telecommunications market, and demand characteristics of the mobile market.

The paper highlights the significant role that has been played by the mobile sector in terms of providing basic telephony services and in developing innovative services. The paper links the growth in the SME sector to the growth in the provision of mobile services. The paper also discusses the issue of a failed incumbent operator and how delays in embracing tariff reform in an increasing competitive environment have hindered the ability of the incumbent to compete and reform its activities.

The paper highlights the advantages that liberalization can deliver in a transition economy. The paper also suggests that allowing the incumbent to adopt a reform agenda ultimately is beneficial to the economy and the firm itself.

The paper suggests that liberalization measures produce significant economic benefits in transition economies.

The paper provides original material on the telecommunications reform process in Romania, as an example of a transition economy.

By 2016, Botswana aspires to triple its 1994 per capita income and to completely diversify its economic base. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) objectives, as spelt out in the SADC Policy document, emphasise the attainment of enhanced development and economic growth, poverty alleviation, and support of the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. Since telecommunications have long been recognised as the engine for economic growth, the aspirations of SADC and Botswana are consistent with the SADC Protocol on Transport, Communications, and Metrology, which aims at developing a reliable, efficient, vibrant, consumer‐driven telecommunications sector. We examine the focus of the World Bank and the International Telecommunications Union, in global telecommunications development. We then discuss the efforts of Botswana and other SADC states in ensuring that they take advantage of the private sector finances to build reliable, sophisticated public telecommunications networks for entry into the Global Information Infrastructure (GII).