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The purpose of the study is to analyze the risk of violent conflict with the global conflict risk factors in the Middle East economies by using an integrated fuzzy decision approach. For this purpose, five different dimensions and 24 different criteria are defined by analyzing similar studies in the literature. The dataset is borrowed from the European Commission, and experts appointed for the linguistic evaluation of each dimension and criterion. Additionally, fuzzy Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) methodology is used to weigh dimensions and criteria and Multi-objective Optimization on the basis of Ratio Analysis (MOORA) approach is considered to rank the countries with respect to the conflict risk. Social dimension was concluded to have the highest importance of the Global Conflict Risk Index. Moreover, Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia were identified as the countries that have high conflict risk. Because these countries have high risk of facing conflict in the future, it is strongly recommended that they should primarily focus on social factors in order to minimize this risk.

Did the expansion of democratic institutions play a role in determining central government spending behavior in the 19th and 20th centuries? The link between democracy and increased central government spending is well established for the post-Second World War period, but has never been explored during the first “wave of democracy” and its subsequent reversal, that is 1870–1938. The main contribution of this paper is the compilation of a dataset covering 24 countries over this period to begin to address this question. Utilizing various descriptive techniques, including panel data regressions, we explore correlations between central government spending and the institutional characteristics of regimes. We find that the data are consistent with the hypothesis that democracies have a broader need for legitimization than autocracies as various measures of democracy are associated with higher central government spending. Our results indicate that the extension of franchise had a slight positive impact on central government spending levels, as did a few of the other democracy variables. We also find that early liberal democracies spent less and monarchies more than other regimes; debt increases spending; and participation in the Gold Standard reduced government spending substantially.

While climatic conditions are believed to have some influence on triggering conflicts, the existing empirical results on the nature and statistical significance of their explanatory role are not conclusive. We construct a dataset for a sample of 139 countries which records the occurrence of an armed conflict, the annual average temperature and precipitation levels, as well as the relevant socioeconomic, demographic, and geographic measures over the 1961–2011 period. Using this dataset and controlling for the effect of relevant nonclimate variables, our comprehensive econometric analyses support the influencing role of climatic factors. Our results are robust and consistent with the hypothesis that climate warming is instrumental in raising the probability of onset of internal armed conflicts and suggests that, along with regulating population size and promoting political stability, controlling climate change is an effective factor for inducing peace by way of curtailing the onset of armed conflicts.

Post-conflict economies are characterized by high, and often growing, levels of debt. At the same time, peace is particularly fragile in the aftermath of a conflict. This chapter studies how debt affects the risk of war in the 10 years that follow the end of a previous conflict. After controlling for per-capita income and other economic, political, and geographical factors, external debt is found to increase the risk of war. Conversely, the effect of domestic debt is negligible. The policy implication for the international community is clear: debt relief helps stabilize peace in war-torn economies.

This chapter falls into line with the study about the possible incentives of interventions and their impact on democratic institutions to emphasize the need to differentiate between different military interventions and their effects on democratic institutions in the target states. The chapter theoretically builds on the Selectorate Theory (Mesquita et al. 2003) and also dialogues with liberal (Hoffmann 1997) and realist perspectives (Choi 2016) on foreign policy related to the liberal world order, human rights, economic and security interests.