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Soil is a non-renewable and increasingly deteriorating resource, yet it is barely protected by European Union (EU) legislation. This constitutes a puzzling gap within the otherwise encompassing and progressive environmental policy of the EU. To explain the integration resistance of soil protection, I draw on insights from rationalist and sociological institutionalist theory. The institutional rigidity of the community method of environmental decision-making limits policy change to favorable interest constellations, but this constraint is usually compensated by agenda competition among the national environmental pioneers. However, successful agenda-setting depends on the skillful combination of political venues and issue frames. Matters of land politics, such as soil protection, are difficult to frame in terms that make them suitable for European policy venues. The theoretical argument is illustrated using an in-depth case study of the agenda-setting, negotiation, and eventual withdrawal of the ill-fated proposal for an EU soil framework directive, with a focus on the changing role of Germany. Reframing of soil politics as locally bound and as essentially national affair, subnational actors extended the conflict to include the German federal chamber as policy venue. As a result, Germany turned from “pusher by example” and first mover to “defensive front-runner,” successfully pursuing a blocking strategy.

As testified by its secular history, Catholic Social Teaching is closely bound to the various attempts that have been made at putting it into practice. Today, one of the most interesting ones is that of the enterprises' association Compagnia delle Opere. Particularly in Italy, the Compagnia wants to become an important point of reference for Small and Medium Enterprises, the heart of Italian production system, through a new socioeconomic concept, based on the Subsidiarity Principle and the growth of the nonprofit sector. In many ways, it aims to create an alternative to classical capitalism, also supported by Benedict's XVI recent social encyclical; nevertheless, numerous ambiguities persist.

Despite being the dominant form of business globally, it is widely recognised that research focused on the governance of small family-owned entities has been largely overlooked. The benefits of sound governance practices are deemed salutary for small business prosperity; however, these enterprises are confronted with significant governance issues and unique concerns of their own. One particular issue concerns the compliance costs of governance for family-owned businesses and the extent to which the regulatory environment actually encourages an evolvement towards an improvement in governance practices in smaller businesses. Reconciling decision speed, flexibility and entrepreneurial innovation to necessary enhanced governance practices and procedures remains problematic. It is argued that a proper balance between the costs and benefits of proper governance codes and structures for smaller firms can only be achieved with a strong emphasis on flexibility to take account of myriad types of governance requirements of firms. This would entail the development of an evolutionary view of corporate governance implementation, one which mirrors the process of delegation of the entrepreneurial function to company boards and management. This would lend support to the view that there is no universal ‘best way’ for all firms at all stages of the business life cycle. In this respect, the application of the principles of subsidiarity and incentives plays an important role.

This chapter provides comments and suggestions to the lawmaker, and especially to economic policy-makers in the field of the optimal regulatory framework and implementation of sustainable practices. The main findings are as follows: (1) degradation of the rule of law in several European Union (EU) Member States and constant political undermining of the legal institutions represent the main threat for the implementation of sustainable practices and development; (2) the golden regulatory rule of thumb provides that regulatory intervention is suggested merely in cases of market failures under the condition that the costs of such intervention do not exceed the benefits; (3) over-regulation might impede implementation of sustainable practices, distort the operation of the market, undermine productivity, diminish growth and social wealth and consequently also sustainability; (4) efficiency and wealth maximization should be the lawmaker’s leading normative principle in designing the legal framework that will enable effective implementation of sustainable practices; (5) the efficient level of harmonization or subsidiarity of decision-making in the EU urges for a rigorous investigation of costs and benefits of the EU top-down harmonization policies which should lead to a better, efficient vertical allocation of sustainability agenda between EU and the Member States; and (6) The Reflection Paper on Sustainable Development Goals – “Towards a Sustainable Europe in 2030” – represents an effective institutional framework in pursue of the overall sustainability targets.

Economic activity is typically provided by three distinct sectors. For-profit entities seek to maximize owner profit by providing various goods and services. The not-for-profit sector consists of private or quasi-public entities that provide goods and services without regard to making an explicit profit. Government entities extract resources from the economy and redistribute them to achieve certain public goods.

Recently a fourth or gray sector has developed that combines elements of the other three. As a corporate form that explicitly sacrifices profit maximization to advance some predetermined social good, benefit corporations are one example of this gray sector. Owners are aware of this dual mission but still invest as the social objectives are consistent with their personal goals. Thus, the benefit corporation can be viewed as a for-profit entity subject to an explicit social welfare constraint.

Since the late 1960s governments have spent trillions of dollars on a wide variety of social welfare programs. Nevertheless, poverty persists and government altruism may have made poverty more intractable in some respects. Economic logic suggests that providing social welfare transfer payments with few work or training requirements can make recipients dependent and enable dysfunctional behavior. Over time this may rob recipients of opportunities for labor and self-sufficiency.

Benefit corporations are typically viewed as a form of socially responsible investment that leverages the economic advantages of market-based systems. To date, however, little has been written about the benefit corporation’s potential ethical dimensions. The purpose of this paper is to provide a moral argument based in Catholic Social Teaching to support the use of benefit corporations as a substitute for some government service programs. Our arguments are centered on the primary principle of Human Dignity and will include, but not be limited to: Work, Solidarity and there role social and economic society as well as the Role of Government or Subsidiarity (including the Welfare State).

A greater stress on individual responsibility is essential for a more effective protection of human dignity and, ultimately, for securing the future of the idea of human rights. However, this responsibility is an ethical concept and must be distinguished from its moral and legal counterparts. With responsibility comes authority, meaning that individuals have an area of discretion, which must be respected by others and the State, but with regard to which there exists also certain expectations towards the bearer. This idea of an ‘ethical space’ is already familiar to (European) human rights law, where the principle of ‘subsidiarity’ and the related concept of the ‘margin of appreciation’ define the relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and the States party to the European Convention on Human Rights. This relationship resembles, mutatis mutandis, the relationship between the State and the individual. The resulting inter-personal ethical diversity, which inevitably entails a certain level of ethical conflict, is thus both a logical consequence of individual responsibility, as well as an essential feature of a democratic society, which is based on the principle of human dignity.

One challenge to understanding identity within third-sector organizations is that of definition. Third sector is a broad covering term that enables inclusion of all organizations working within this arena; yet it does not capture the exact essence of or identity of the third sector. This dilemma raises the idea that there is a possibility of an identifiable characterization of the sector that can be attributed to a particular third-sector rationality and purpose. A commonly held view is that third-sector organizations are essentially caring and provide services or goods that support this object. The aim of working toward an improved society through the provision of these goods and services is also generally inspired by the common good and underpinned by values such as solidarity, responsibility, dignity, justice, cooperation, subsidiarity, democracy, inclusivity, sustainability, and accountability. Whilst superimposed onto issues of agreed definitions and understandings of third-sector actors identity, the space within which they operate is an additional layer. Civil society is often used as a cover-all term to define the blurred space where the complex and negotiated boundaries between state, civil society, family, and markets are played out. All the chapters within this section cover issues of identity from differing perspectives giving a broader view of the particular characteristics whether technological or cultural, which determine how and why there is no one specific third-sector identity that fits all organizations working within different institutional spaces and international contexts.