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The purpose of this paper is to propose a game-theoretical model for commercial bank foreign direct investment strategy, government policy and domestic banking industry interactions in emerging market economies and demonstrate the application of this strategy to the banking system. Government policy and domestic banking industry interactions in emerging market economies and demonstrate the application of this strategy to the banking system.

The paper develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the optimality of the limiting entry strategy followed by a given domestic institutional sector when considering the entry applications of foreign banks in the domestic financial system. The model analyzes the strategic options available to an emerging market country with a relatively underdeveloped banking system when deciding whether or not and to what extent allow for the entrance of better reputed and more technologically advanced foreign banks in its domestic financial system.

The paper shows that the progressive liberalization of entry restrictions would define the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the subsequent set of continuation games and the respective payoffs derived from this liberalization as the domestic economy integrates and competes within the global financial system.

Banks operating in the international financial market have incentives to invest directly in emerging market economies and governments have incentives in allowing foreign banks entry to their market. As banking systems in these economies are generally underdeveloped, opening the financial system to foreign competitors could lead to a decrease in the market share of local banks. Eventually foreign banks could control the banking system and could de facto control the money supply.

A large literature studies why firms self-regulate and “signal green.” However, it has ignored that regulators have enforcement discretion, and may act strategically. We fill this gap. We build a game theoretic model of whether a firm should signal its type through substantial self-regulation. We find self-regulation is a double-edged sword: it can potentially preempt legislation, but it can also lead regulators to demand higher levels of compliance from greener firms if preemption fails. We show how self-regulatory decisions depend upon industry characteristics and political responsiveness to corporate environmental leadership. We have made a number of simplifying assumptions. We assume activist groups cannot challenge regulatory flexibility in court, and that regulatory penalties are fixed and are not collected by the regulator. Firms with low compliance costs confront a tradeoff regarding self-regulation. They can blend in with the rest of the industry, and take few self-regulatory steps. This reduces the risk of regulation somewhat, and preserves their ability to obtain regulatory flexibility should regulation be imposed. Alternatively, they can step up with substantial self-regulation. This better mitigates the risk of regulation, but at the risk of signaling low costs and becoming a target for stringent enforcement should regulation pass. Recent work has found negative market reactions to corporate claims of voluntary emissions reductions, despite the conventional wisdom that it “pays to be green.” We offer a new explanation to scholars and managers: regulatory discretion may undermine the ability of industry self-regulation to profitably preempt mandatory regulatory requirements.

This study aims to understand how quickly Japanese banks readjust their capital ratios (leverage, regulatory capital, tier-I capital and common equity) following an economic shock.

This study uses a two-step system GMM framework to test the study's hypotheses using the annual data of Japanese commercial and cooperative banks ranging from 2005 to 2020.

The findings show that banks adjust their leverage ratio faster than regulatory capital, tier-I capital and common equity ratios. In addition to that, the results reveal that the speed of capital adjustment is higher for commercial banks than for cooperative banks, suggesting higher economic costs and implications for commercial banks. Furthermore, it is worth noting that well-capitalised (under-capitalised) banks tend to prioritise the adjustments to common equity (leverage) before considering the adjustments to leverage (common equity). According to the results, high-liquid (low-liquid) banks alter their regulatory capital and tier-I capital ratios (leverage) more quickly (more slowly) than low-liquid (high-liquid) banks.

The findings suggest that when formulating and implementing new banking regulations, particularly in assessing and adjusting specific capital requirements under Pillar II of Basel III, management (including bankers, regulators and policymakers) should consider the heterogeneity observed in the rate of capital adjustment across various bank characteristics. Additionally, bank managers should also consider the speed of adjustment when determining optimal half-life and target capital structures.

To the author's knowledge, this study represents a pioneering investigation into the rate of adjustment of capital ratios (leverage, regulatory, tier-I and common equity) within Japan's banking sector. The study employs a comprehensive dataset encompassing both commercial and cooperative banks to facilitate this analysis. A notable contribution to the existing body of literature, this study offers a detailed analysis and emphasises the varying degrees of adjustment in capital ratios. The study also highlights the heterogeneous nature of the adjustment rate in these ratios by categorising the data into well-capitalised, under-capitalised, highly liquid and low-liquid banks.

Recent research shows that because of money-laundering risks, there has been an increase in the off-boarding of certain types of corporate clients in the financial sector. This phenomenon known as “de-risking” has been argued to have a negative impact on society, because it increases the possible risk of money laundering. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the de-risking strategy of financial institutions results in an expansion of the regulatory framework concerning anti-money laundering focusing on off-boarding of clients and, if so, is there a way to avoid further regulation by changing present behavior.

This paper applies functional methods to law and economics to achieve higher efficiency in combating money laundering.

In this paper, it is found that the continuing of de-risking by financial institutions because of the avoidance strategy of money-laundering risks will inevitably result in further regulatory demands regarding the off-boarding process of clients. The legal basis for the introduction of further regulatory intervention is that some of the de-risking constitutes a direct contradiction to the aim of the present regulatory framework, making the behavior non-compliant to the regulation.

There has been very little research concerning de-risking related to money laundering. The present research has focused on the effect on society and not the relationship between the financial institutions and the regulator. This paper raises an important and present problem, as the behavior of the financial institutions constitute a response from the regulator that is contradicting the thoughts behind the behavior of the financial institutions. It is found that the paper is highly relevant if an expansion of regulation is to be hindered.

When agents first become active investors in financial markets, they are relatively inexperienced. Much of the literature focuses on the incentives of presumably sophisticated informed agents to produce information, and not on the nave agents. However, unsophisticated agents are important aspects of financial markets and worth analyzing further. In this paper, we provide a theoretical perspective that addresses the issue of how many nave traders would one expect in a financial market where policy makers try to educate the nave agents.We show that such policy balances the effects of nave trades on corporate investment and liquidity, as well as the monetary cost of increasing financial sophistication. The optimal proportion of nave agents varies with the value of information, the noise in private signals, and the inherent sensitivity of corporate investment to prices.We also show that the policy tool of encouraging insider trading can deter nave investors and thus improve corporate governance and the efficacy of corporate investment.

Recently, the concept of financial technology (FinTech) has attracted extensive attention from international organisations and regulators, in particular, how to achieve a “win–win” situation between financial institutions' FinTech innovation and effective regulation has become a hot topic. This study purposes to explore the evolutionary game relationship between FinTech innovation and regulation by constructing both static and dynamic earmarking game models.

A simulation experiment was conducted using primary data obtained from a commercial bank in China.

The results of the theoretical analysis of evolutionary game models were consistent with the corresponding simulation results, proving the validity of the proposed evolutionary game models. It was also found that the dynamic earmarking game model was more stable and effective than the static earmarking game model in promoting FinTech innovation and regulation. Furthermore, when the regulators utilised a dynamic earmarking mechanism, the evolutionary path of financial institutions and regulators' behaviour strategies took the shape of a spiral and eventually converged to a central point, indicating the existence of an evolutionary stable strategy and Nash equilibrium. Finally, because the behaviour strategies of financial institutions were mainly influenced by the regulators' policies, the regulators were inspired to adjust the corresponding regulation policies on FinTech innovation.

This study bridges the knowledge gap in the existing literature on financial innovation and regulation, in particular by establishing evolutionary game models from the perspective of financial earmarking policies. Also, the case study for simulation experiments can gain a more intuitive insight into FinTech innovation and financial earmarking policies.

This chapter provides comments and suggestions to the lawmaker, and especially to economic policy-makers in the field of the optimal regulatory framework and implementation of sustainable practices. The main findings are as follows: (1) degradation of the rule of law in several European Union (EU) Member States and constant political undermining of the legal institutions represent the main threat for the implementation of sustainable practices and development; (2) the golden regulatory rule of thumb provides that regulatory intervention is suggested merely in cases of market failures under the condition that the costs of such intervention do not exceed the benefits; (3) over-regulation might impede implementation of sustainable practices, distort the operation of the market, undermine productivity, diminish growth and social wealth and consequently also sustainability; (4) efficiency and wealth maximization should be the lawmaker’s leading normative principle in designing the legal framework that will enable effective implementation of sustainable practices; (5) the efficient level of harmonization or subsidiarity of decision-making in the EU urges for a rigorous investigation of costs and benefits of the EU top-down harmonization policies which should lead to a better, efficient vertical allocation of sustainability agenda between EU and the Member States; and (6) The Reflection Paper on Sustainable Development Goals – “Towards a Sustainable Europe in 2030” – represents an effective institutional framework in pursue of the overall sustainability targets.

The aim of this study is to analyse the transformation of the Ecuadorian financial system using the regulatory dialectic approach (Kane, 1977). This research examines the initial conditions and motivating factors of the reform process, as well as the interplay between government and bankers during the period 2007-2012.

Kane’s regulatory dialectic suggests that regulation of financial institutions is a series of cyclical interactions between opposing political and economic forces. Three main stages are identified: thesis (measures and regulatory actions), antithesis (avoidance/lobby against those reforms) and synthesis (adaptive reregulation resulting from the interaction between interest groups).

Since 2007, the government focused on regulating interest rates, developing a liquidity fund for banking emergencies, increasing taxation and restricting international capital flows. These government initiatives took place against a background of conflicting interests. Private bankers opposed the majority regarding them as burdensome new rules, rather than enlightened reforms. Publicly, these reforms as intended by the government were seemingly supported. Finally through the political process, they were approved. To date, these reforms have strengthened the financial system, produced encouraging social policy results and placed the financial sector to serve the government’s development strategy.

Using Kane’s notion of regulatory dialectic, we explain the process of financial reform in Ecuador as part of a cyclical interaction between opposing forces. Drawing on this framework enabled insight into the nature of government intervention. Hence, we show how that intervention affected the growth, development and structure of the banking system.

This study seeks to evaluate, in a global context, the impact of Sarbanes Oxley Act on a particular risk measure of importance to investors (risk‐adjusted returns), and two measures of risk due to asymmetry (upside and downside risk). A unique dataset permits a dual evaluation of the law's impact on such measures in leading non‐US economies as well (i.e. “ripple effects”).

Hypotheses are empirically evaluated on a sample (n=712) of the largest US and European firms (control) using daily return data from 1993 through 2009 – one of the most extensive data sets employed in the literature on this topic to date. The reliability of the risk measures is carefully evaluated using multiple approaches, including Fama‐MacBeth regressions. A series of difference‐in‐difference analyses is then employed to empirically assess Sarbanes Oxley's impact on equity risk.

The findings suggest Sarbanes Oxley decreased both risk‐adjusted returns and upside risk, whereas downside risk fails to explain the cross section of returns for the largest US firms. From a global perspective, it is suggested that the enactment of Sarbanes Oxley's in the USA motivated leading non‐US economies to adopt similar regulatory measures, which caused “ripple effects” – e.g. effects similar to those documented in this paper – in leading non‐US economies.

The findings suggest that comprehensive financial regulations, such as Sarbanes Oxley Act, are properly envisaged at the global level, as their impact is not confined to the home country. In an increasingly globalized economy, investor welfare is likely to be influenced – directly as well as indirectly – by economic and financial regulation(s) enacted in foreign economies. Arguably, this suggests the pivotal importance of effective mechanisms of global governance, such that a purely domestic approach to regulation may be short‐sighted. In either case, the findings of this study are entirely relevant if regulators are to consider the broader, global impact of regulation on investor welfare.

This is the first study to empirically analyze, within a global framework, Sarbanes Oxley's risk implications without relying on a series of simple mean variance analyses. Substantive research documents that the methodological approach employed is more precise, reliable as well as “investor relevant”. Furthermore, the authors seek to assess the law's impact on leading non‐US equity markets, a first for the literature. Consequently, this study provides a robust evaluation of the law's (international) impact on firm (equity) risk, making an important contribution to the literature.