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This paper examines contextual factors that affect the association between board gender diversity and firm performance.

The authors use a global sample of listed firms in the tourism industry in 30 countries from 2015 to 2020.

First, firm performance is positively associated with the proportion of female directors on a board. Second, the positive association between firm performance and the proportion of female directors on the board is higher in (1) countries with stronger shareholder rights, (2) countries with stronger securities law regulation stipulating disclosure of board diversity, (3) countries with stronger economic empowerment of women, and (4) during the COVID-19 crisis. Third, corporate financial distress risk is lower in firms with higher proportion of female directors on the board. Fourth, the negative association between corporate financial distress risk and the proportion of female directors on the board is more pronounced in (1) countries with stronger securities law regulations stipulating disclosure of board gender diversity, (2) countries with stronger economic empowerment of women, and (3) during the COVID-19 crisis.

The results indicate that contextual factors (comprising country-level corporate governance structures, economic empowerment of women and economic crisis) can affect the association between board gender diversity and firm performance.

The paper aims to craft a non-parametric composite value for the board quality of Indian banks where the weights can be assigned endogenously.

The study employed a non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA)-based novel extension known as the benefit of doubt approach. To measure the strength of the Indian bank corporate board in terms of board efficiency (BEF), the study used a mixed approach, i.e. first, the study calculates the percentile ranks of the five attributes that the study assumes are the characteristics of the strong board including board size, number of outside directors, frequency of meetings, non-duality leadership and board gender diversity. Thereafter, the study performs the benefit-to-doubt approach to finally measure the efficiency of the board.

The findings of the study establish that the methodological framework present in the study to measure the strength of the board in terms of BEF has been a much superior method over the other weighted and non-weighted linear average methods.

This methodology aids the shareholders, investors and regulatory bodies in rating the Indian banks based on their strength in terms of better monitoring boards and ensuring a smooth agent–owner relationship.

The benefit of doubt approach has been a unique and novel methodology to craft the composite value for any multidimensional phenomenon. One of the major benefits of using this approach is that it assigns the weights endogenously to each dimension and thereafter collectively determines the efficiency of such a phenomenon.

Theory suggests that the market for corporate control, which constitutes an important external governance mechanism, may substitute for internal governance. Consistent with this notion, using a novel measure of takeover vulnerability primarily based on state legislation, this paper aims to investigate the effect of the takeover market on board characteristics with special emphasis on board gender diversity.

This paper exploits a novel measure of takeover vulnerability based on state legislation. This novel measure is likely exogenous as the legislation was imposed from outside the firm. By using an exogenous measure, the analysis is less vulnerable to endogeneity and is thus more likely to show a causal effect.

The results show that a more active takeover market leads to lower board gender diversity. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation results in a decline in board gender diversity by 10.01%. Moreover, stronger takeover market susceptibility also brings about larger board size and less board independence, corroborating the substitution effect. Additional analysis confirms the results, including propensity score matching, generalized method of moments dynamic panel data analysis and instrumental variable analysis.

The study is the first to explore the effect of the takeover market on board gender diversity. Unlike most of the previous research in this area, which suffers from endogeneity, this paper uses a novel measure of takeover vulnerability that is probably exogenous. The results are thus much more likely to demonstrate causality.

In this paper the authors aim to argue that the existence of a strong corporate governance mechanism (a formal credibility-enhancing mechanism) and the presence of a more trustworthy-looking CEO (an informal credibility-enhancing mechanism) are substitutes.

By using machine-learning-based facial-feature-point detection technique, the authors construct a proprietary facial-trustworthiness database for a large-scale of CEOs in the US listed companies. First, the authors manually search for qualifying CEO image from websites and annual reports. Second, by following the neuroscience and psychology literature, the authors use the machine-learning-based face detector to identify the facial features in the CEO photos to calculate a rich and reliable set of facial-trustworthiness measures. The authors then construct a composite facial-trustworthiness index for each CEO. After obtaining accounting data, the authors’ final sample comprises 16,201 firm-year observations for 3,186 CEOs in the sample period of 2000-2018.

The results of the authors’ regression analyses show a negative association between board monitoring intensity and CEOs' facial trustworthiness, indicating that board directors may factor CEOs' facial trustworthiness into their monitoring decisions. Moreover, the authors find that these results are mainly driven by CEOs whose tenure is below the third quartile (i.e. eight years). The authors further find stronger results for externally hired CEOs than internally promoted CEOs. Finally, the authors’ results remain robust when using change models or subsample of CEO photos in recent years.

First, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that adopts a large sample to provide systematic evidence on the directors' use of facial trustworthiness. This study extends the literature by documenting the impacts of CEOs' individual characteristics on the board monitoring intensity. Second, the results of this study emphasized the important role of perceptions based on executives' facial appearance in firm valuation, executive compensation and audit fee, and by presenting empirical evidence that CEOs' facial trustworthiness affects board monitoring intensity. Third, this study responds to the call for research on personalized trust by Hsieh et al. (2020).

Corporate governance is a crucial factor when considering excessive corporate risk-taking. Since corporate boards play such an important role in corporate governance, the purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the impact of board composition and further board characteristics on excessive corporate risk-taking.

This study investigates listed firms from Germany and the USA from 2004 to 2015 based on data from Thomson Reuters Data Stream. The authors apply the fixed effect and random effect estimation method to demonstrate the impact of board composition on corporate risk-taking.

This study provides empirical evidence that an increase in the proportion of independent directors is associated with less corporate risk-taking. These effects are stronger among German firms. Lastly, the effects of board size and audit committee effectiveness (AUCE) on risk-taking have mixed results.

The results favor continued efforts to strengthen the composition of corporate boards and improve the effectiveness of audit committees to curb unhealthy corporate risk-taking. The recommendations from the research will provide regulators and corporate management with the necessary information needed to design an appropriate independent board structure, and board size (BOSI). The research will, furthermore, fortify the indispensability of financial experts on audit committees.

This study contributes to the agency theory debate with these findings. Stronger board independence enables a better monitoring of the CEO, which leads to decision making based on a more appropriate level of risk.

The size, characteristics and structure of boards of directors have been claimed to be an important influence on the performance of large firms, but have been less examined in small firms. For larger firms the role of boards acts more as a substitute for the development of internal staff and management skills, indicating that for large firms directors chiefly support the control role of CEOs. The importance of seeing boards, external consultants and internal management skills as substitutes is demonstrated, and is shown to have a non‐linear relation with firm size. However, a key finding of the paper is that there is little evidence of a strong association of board size, board qualifications, or board structure with firm performance, measured by profitability, employment growth or propensity to innovate.

This paper aims to investigate the association among trustee board diversity (TBD), corporate governance (CG), capital structure (CS) and financial performance (FP) by using a sample of UK charities. Specifically, the authors investigate the effect of TBD on CS and ascertain whether CG quality moderates the TBD–CS nexus. Additionally, the authors examine the impact of CS on FP and ascertain whether the CS–FP nexus is moderated by TBD and CG quality.

The authors use a number of multivariate regression techniques, including ordinary least squares, fixed-effects, lagged-effects and two-stage least squares, to rigorously analyse the data and test the hypotheses.

First, the authors find that trustee board gender diversity has a negative effect on CS, but this relationship holds only up to the point of having three women trustees. The authors find similar, but relatively weak, results for the presence of black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) trustees. Second, the authors find that the TBD–CS nexus depends on the quality of CG, with the relationship being stronger in charities with higher frequency of meetings, independent CG committee and larger trustee and audit firm size. Third, the authors find that CS structure has a positive effect on FP, but this is moderated by TBD and CG quality. The evidence is robust to different econometric models that adjust for alternative measures and endogeneities. The authors interpret the findings within explanations of a theoretical perspective that captures insights from different CG and CS theories.

Existing studies that explore TBD, CG, CS and FP in charities are rare. This study distinctively attempts to address this empirical lacuna within the extant literature by providing four new insights with specific focus on UK charities. First, the authors provide new evidence on the relationship between TBD and CS. Second, the authors offer new evidence on the moderating effect of CG on the TBD-CS nexus. Third, the authors provide new evidence on the effect of CS on FP. Finally, the authors offer new evidence on the moderating effect of TBD and CG on the CS–FP nexus.

Drawing from social capital, social network theory of stakeholder influence and stakeholder management, the purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between board network centrality and firms’ environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance.

Using social network analysis, the authors construct five board network centrality, namely, degree centrality (the number of connections), closeness centrality (distance among firms), eigenvector centrality (the quality of connections), betweenness centrality (how often a firm sits between two other firms) and the information centrality (the speed and reliability of information), as measures of board access for social capital and timely information.

Using a sample of non-financial firms listed in the UK FTSE 350 index from 2007 to 2018, the authors find that board networks, measured by degree, closeness, eigenvector, betweenness and information centrality, has positive influence on firms’ ESG performance. Furthermore, the findings show that there is a non-linear relationship between board networks and ESG performance, and this relationship is stronger in the sectors where firms that have high product market concentration and high percentage of women board members.

This study unveils that strong board network centrality brings higher social (reputational) capital and information advantages to the firm to effectively, timely and accurately deal with the pressures from stakeholders (stakeholder management), which leads to better ESG performance.

Demographic faultlines are associated with negative group processes and low performance. Little is known about the formation of faultlines in boards and how they can be weakened to capitalize on the positive effects of diversity.

This study draws on social identity theory and faultlines theory to provide insights into how gender and age faultlines are formed in a board. Subsequently, it proposes and tests a U-shaped board size–faultlines strength relationship. Archival data were collected on 288 organizations listed on the Australian Securities Exchange.

Hierarchical regression analyses indicate that small- and large-sized boards experience stronger faultlines than medium-sized boards.

This study provides pioneering evidence for a U-shaped relationship between board size and demographic faultlines strength. These findings inform practice by suggesting an optimal board size.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the corporate governance and financial characteristics of firms under the new Sarbanes‐Oxley (SOX) accounting regime.

The paper first compares a comprehensive set of characteristics across firms in two states of SOX Section 404 status–Compliance and Violation. It then tests for determinants of SOX compliance in a logistic regression setting.

Several differences between compliance groups in terms of equity ownership, board structure, and executive compensation schemes are reported. However, it appears that firms found to be in violation of SOX are not systematically worse when it comes to common measures of corporate governance. The financial structure and soundness of the groups of firms are very similar. The strongest determinant of Section 404 compliance is firm size.

This result supported anecdotal evidence that compliance with SOX is achieved primarily by firms that can afford it. Further, the paper highlights an important policy issue: Is SOX really differentiating firms in terms of corporate governance or in terms of size?