Sarbanes‐Oxley compliance and violation: an empirical study

Elizabeth Webb (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA)

Review of Accounting and Finance

ISSN: 1475-7702

Publication date: 22 February 2008

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the corporate governance and financial characteristics of firms under the new Sarbanes‐Oxley (SOX) accounting regime.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper first compares a comprehensive set of characteristics across firms in two states of SOX Section 404 status–Compliance and Violation. It then tests for determinants of SOX compliance in a logistic regression setting.

Findings

Several differences between compliance groups in terms of equity ownership, board structure, and executive compensation schemes are reported. However, it appears that firms found to be in violation of SOX are not systematically worse when it comes to common measures of corporate governance. The financial structure and soundness of the groups of firms are very similar. The strongest determinant of Section 404 compliance is firm size.

Originality/value

This result supported anecdotal evidence that compliance with SOX is achieved primarily by firms that can afford it. Further, the paper highlights an important policy issue: Is SOX really differentiating firms in terms of corporate governance or in terms of size?

Keywords

Citation

Webb, E. (2008), "Sarbanes‐Oxley compliance and violation: an empirical study", Review of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 5-23. https://doi.org/10.1108/14757700810853824

Download as .RIS

Publisher

:

Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2008, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Please note you might not have access to this content

You may be able to access this content by login via Shibboleth, Open Athens or with your Emerald account.
If you would like to contact us about accessing this content, click the button and fill out the form.
To rent this content from Deepdyve, please click the button.