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The study focuses on drug safety regulation capture, reveals the inner mechanism and evolutionary characteristics of drug safety regulation capture and provides suggestions for effective regulation by pharmacovigilance.

The article introduces prospect theory into the game strategy analysis of drug safety events, constructs a benefit perception matrix based on psychological perception and analyzes the risk selection strategies and constraints on stable outcomes for both drug companies and drug regulatory authorities. Moreover, simulation was used to analyze the choice of results of different parameters on the game strategy.

The results found that the system does not have a stable equilibrium strategy under the role of cognitive psychology. The risk transfer coefficient, penalty cost, risk loss, regulatory benefit, regulatory success probability and risk discount coefficient directly acted in the direction of system evolution toward the system stable strategy. There is a critical effect on the behavioral strategies of drug manufacturers and drug supervisors, which exceeds a certain intensity before the behavioral strategies in repeated games tend to stabilize.

In this article, the authors constructed the perceived benefit matrix through the prospect value function to analyze the behavioral evolution game strategies of drug companies and FDA in the regulatory process, and to evaluate the evolution law of each factor.

Intelligent new energy vehicles (INEVs) are becoming the competitive hotspot for the automobile industry. The major purpose of this study is to determine how to increase innovation efficiency through knowledge sharing and technology spill between new energy vehicle (NEV) enterprises and technology enterprises. This will help to improve the core competence of the automobile industry in China. Also, it serves as a guide for the growth of other strategic.

The authors construct a tripartite evolutionary game model to study the cross-border cooperative innovation problem. Firstly, the payment matrix of NEV enterprise, technology enterprise and government is established, and the expected revenue of each participant is determined. Then, the replication dynamic equations and evolutionary stability strategies are analyzed. Finally, the theoretical research is validated through numerical simulation.

Results showed that: (1) An optimal range of revenue distribution coefficient exists in the cross-border cooperation. (2) Factors like research and development (R&D) success rate, subsidies, resource and technology complementarity, and vehicles intelligence positively influence the evolution towards cooperative strategies. (3) Factors like technology spillover risk cost inhibit the evolution towards cooperative strategies. To be specific, when the technology spillover risk cost is greater than 2.5, two enterprises are inclined to choose independent R&D, and the government chooses to provide subsidy.

The research perspective and theoretical analysis are helpful to further explore the cross-border cooperation of the intelligent automobile industry. The findings suggest that the government can optimize the subsidy policy according to the R&D capability and resource allocation of automobile industry. Moreover, measures are needed to reduce the risk of technology spillovers to encourage enterprise to collaborate and innovate. The results can provide reference for enterprises’ strategic choice and government’s policy making.

The INEV industry has become an important development direction of the global automobile industry. However, there is limited research on cross-border cooperation of INEV industry. Hence, authors construct a tripartite evolutionary game model involving NEV enterprise, technology enterprise and the government, and explore the relationship of cooperation and competition among players in the INEV industry, which provides a new perspective for the development of the INEV industry.

As the cost of completing a transaction, the green merger and acquisition (M&A) premium paid on mergers can influence whether the acquisition creates value or not. However, studies linking M&A premiums to firm value have had mixed results, even fewer studies have examined the effect of green M&A premiums on bidders’ firm value. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether and how green M&A premiums affect firm value in the context of China’s heavy polluters.

Using 323 deals between 2008 and 2019 among China’s heavy polluters, this paper estimates with correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis.

Green M&A premiums are negatively associated with firm value. The results are more significant when firms adopt symbolic rather than substantive corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies. Robustness and endogeneity tests corroborate the findings. The negative relation is stronger when acquiring firms have low governmental subsidy and environmental regulation, when firms have overconfident management, when firms are state-owned and when green M&A occurs locally or among provinces in the same region. This study also analyzes agency cost as an intermediary in the relationship between green M&A premium and firm value, which lends support to the agency-view hypothesis.

This study provides systemic evidence that green M&A premiums damage firm value through agency cost channel and the choice of CSR strategies from the perspective of acquirers. These findings enrich the literature on both the economic consequences of green M&A premiums and the determinants of firm value and provide a plausible explanation for mixed findings on the relationship between green M&A premiums and firm value.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

This paper explores how the manufacturer’s strategic choice (acquisition or investment) impacts product quality in a supply chain comprising two complementary suppliers and a common manufacturer.

The manufacturer faces six strategic choices to improve product quality: acquiring or investing in the high-capable supplier, the low-capable supplier, or both. As the Stackelberg leader, the manufacturer determines which strategy is adopted, while suppliers are separately responsible for components’ quality and wholesale prices. The authors use game theory and calculate the model with Mathematica.

The authors develop analytical models to analyze how acquisition costs, investment proportions, component importance and quality improvement coefficients influence decision-makers. The results show that the highest quality may not benefit the manufacturer. Investing in or acquiring a low-capable supplier is better than a high-capable supplier under certain conditions. If the gaps between two suppliers’ quality improvement coefficients and the importance of two components are dramatic, the manufacturer should choose an investment strategy.

This study contributes to the complementary supply chain management by comparing two kinds of strategies-acquisition and investment, with a high-capable supplier and a low-capable supplier.

The development of China's solar photovoltaic (PV) industry is in a transition period from pursuing scale and speed to focusing on efficiency and quality. “Smart PV projects” (SPVPs) were proposed by the ministries of the Chinese government in 2018 to encourage intelligent upgrading and to fill the gaps in traditional PV projects. However, only a small number of PV enterprises are in progress, and only a few SPVPs have been built. The intelligence level of China's PV projects needs to be improved. The purpose of this study is to analyze the willingness of the main participants to be involved in the intelligent upgrading of PV projects by establishing an evolutionary game model that includes three parties.

A tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed that considers PV enterprises, project owners and the government. The evolutionary stability strategies of each party and the corresponding stable conditions are obtained. The parameters that affect the decision behaviors are also analyzed.

The four stages of the intelligent upgrade of PV projects and the effects of the government subsidy strategies are examined. At different stages, adopting different measures to promote cooperation among the three parties involved is necessary. Government subsidies should be provided to PV enterprises during the initial stage and should be biased toward project owners during the intermediate stage. During the peak stage, PV enterprises constantly need to decrease project costs and improve quality and service, thus helping project owners reduce their initial investments and obtain additional gains. The government's reputation drives it to continually adopt incentive strategies.

This research focuses on the interactions among the three parties. Based on evolutionary game analysis, several conditions that facilitate the intelligent upgrading of PV projects are illustrated. Implications for different developing stages are proposed from the perspectives of each party for the decision-makers of SPVPs.

Different external supply scenarios faced by the retailers will affect their choice of strategy when supply is disrupted and becomes far less than demand, urgently. This study focuses on analyzing both demand and supply side response strategies to meet customer demand and reduce the impact of the shortage during supply disruptions.

According to the quantity of products that the external market can provide, the external supply scenarios were divided into sufficient-type external supply and learning-type external supply. A two-echelon perishable goods supply chain was analyzed, and three kinds of contingency strategy models for downstream retailers were investigated. First, in the sufficient external supply scenario, the optimal price and transshipment quantity to maximize retailer's profits is discussed. Second, in the scenario of learning-type external supply, this study analyzes the optimal decision in three mechanisms of the hybrid strategy and their application: price priority mechanism, quantity priority mechanism and price–quantity balance mechanism. Furthermore, the influence of penalty cost and supply on the priority orders of different mechanisms was studied.

Results show that comparing the two pure strategies (pricing strategy and transshipment strategy)it was noted that the hybrid strategy produces the best results in sufficient-type external supply scenario. In the learning-type external supply scenario, a numerical study has shown the existence of three areas in case of penalty cost and supplier's capacity, and each areas has different priority orders of the three mechanisms. Under the situation of learning external supply, the retailer's optimal strategy is affected by parameters such as penalty cost and supply volume.

The main innovation of the work lies in the following: First; the external supply situation was divided into sufficiency type and learning type, which improves the external situation faced by retailers after the outbreak of emergencies, helps retailers understand the external situation, conforms to the actual situation and has certain practical application value. Second; in the context of learning external supply, there are three coping strategies for retailers, including: Price priority mechanism, Quantity priority mechanism and Pricing and transshipment balance mechanism. This will help retailers make strategic choices, make more scientific management decisions and improve the supply chain emergency management theory. Third; the demand side response was managed through the change of external supply during supply side recovery period and supply disruption. The proposed model enables managing and analyzing supply disruption efficiently and effectively via handling uncertainty by considering all aspects of decision-making process. The proposed model can be applied in various fields such as vegetable and fruit, fresh food, etc.

The promotion of autonomous vehicles introduces privacy and security risks, underscoring the pressing need for responsible innovation implementation. To more effectively address the societal risks posed by autonomous vehicles, considering collaborative engagement of key stakeholders is essential. This study aims to provide insights into the governance of potential privacy and security issues in the innovation of autonomous driving technology by analyzing the micro-level decision-making processes of various stakeholders.

For this study, the authors use a nuanced approach, integrating key stakeholder theory, perceived value theory and prospect theory. The study constructs a model based on evolutionary game for the privacy and security governance mechanism of autonomous vehicles, involving enterprises, governments and consumers.

The governance of privacy and security in autonomous driving technology is influenced by key stakeholders’ decision-making behaviors and pivotal factors such as perceived value factors. The study finds that the governmental is influenced to a lesser extent by the decisions of other stakeholders, and factors such as risk preference coefficient, which contribute to perceived value, have a more significant influence than appearance factors like participation costs.

This study lacks an investigation into the risk sensitivity of various stakeholders in different scenarios.

The study delineates the roles and behaviors of key stakeholders and contributes valuable insights toward addressing pertinent risk concerns within the governance of autonomous vehicles. Through the study, the practical application of Responsible Innovation theory has been enriched, addressing the shortcomings in the analysis of micro-level processes within the framework of evolutionary game.

This study aims to assess the facilities management (FM) strategies used in multi-tenanted purpose-built office buildings (Mt-POBs) in Ghana and the drivers that influence the decision to use such strategies.

This study was conducted via a survey and key informant interviews. The survey was conducted using a questionnaire targeted at 65 multi-tenanted office building owners in the Greater Accra region. The data from the survey revealed the views of building owners on FM strategy and the extent to which 20 facility management decision drivers influenced their decisions to use a particular strategy and the responses were descriptively analysed. The key informant interviews were conducted among six leaders of the property owners’ association who use in-house FM to further understand their perspectives and decisions on using such strategy. The interviews were conducted over telephone using an interview guide and analysed using thematic analysis.

The results showed that 88% of Mt-POBs in Ghana are managed in-house. The results also showed that the decision to use the in-house strategy was driven by the innovative, strategic and cost-saving advantages associated with the in-house strategy.

This study shows the factors that drive the decision of multi-tenanted office building owners in Ghana to use the in-house strategy. The findings of this study will be useful for prospective owners of office buildings in Ghana.

The changing roles of the United Nations (UN) and national institutions have made addressing climate change a critical concern for many multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) survival and growth. This chapter discusses how such institutions, which vary in their nature and characteristics, shape firm strategies for climate change adaptation. Exploring different versions of institutional theory, the chapter demonstrates how and why institutional characteristics affect typical patterns of firm ownership, governance, and capabilities. These, in turn, influence companies’ internationalisation and climate-change strategies. Climate change poses challenges to how we understand firms’ strategic decisions from both an international business (IB) (HQ–subsidiary relations) and global value chains (GVC) (buyer–supplier relations) perspective. However, climate change also provides opportunities for companies to gain competitive advantages – if firms can reconfigure and adapt faster than their competitors. Existing IB and GVC research tends to downplay the importance of climate change strategies and the ways in which coherent or dysfunctional institutions affect firms’ reconfiguration and adaptation strategies in a globally dispersed network of value creation. This chapter presents a perspective on the institutional conditions that affect firms’ climate change strategies regarding ownership, location, and internalisation (OLI), and GVCs, with ‘investment’ and ‘emerging standards’ playing a significant role. The authors illustrate the discussion using several examples from the Global South (i.e. Bangladesh) and the Global North (i.e. Denmark, Sweden, and Germany) with a special emphasis on the garment industry. The aim is to encourage future research to examine how a ‘business systems’, or varieties of capitalism, institutional perspective can complement the analysis of sustainability and climate change strategies in IB and GVC studies.