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This paper examines the gap between reporting and managers’ behaviour to challenge the current theoretical underpinnings of intellectual capital (IC) disclosure practice and research. The authors explore how the key features from IC and integrated reporting can be combined to develop an extended model for companies to comply with EU Directive 2014/95/EU and increase trust in corporate disclosures and reports.

This essay relies on academic literature and examples from practice to critique the theories that explain corporate disclosure and reporting but do not change management behaviour. Based on this critique, the authors argue for a change in the fundamental theories of stewardship to frame a new concept for corporate disclosure incorporating using a multi-capitals framework.

We argue that, while the inconsistency between organisations’ reporting and behaviour persists, increasing, renewing or extending the information disclosed is not enough to instil trust in corporations. Stewardship over a company’s resources is necessary for increasing trust. The unanticipated consequences of dishonest behaviour by managers and shareholders compels a new application of stewardship theory that works as an overarching guide for managerial behaviour and disclosure. Emanating from this new model is a realisation that managers must abandon agency theory in practice, and specifically the bonus contract.

We call for future empirical research to explore the role of stewardship theory within the dynamics of corporate disclosure using the approach. The research implications of those studies should incorporate the potential impacts on management behaviours within a stewardship framework and how those actions, and their outcomes, are disclosed for rebuilding public trust in business.

The implications for integrated reporting and reports complying with the new EU Directive are profound. Both instruments rely on agency theory to coax managers into reducing information asymmetry by disclosing more. However, agency theory only re-affirms the power managers have over corporate information. It does not change their behaviour, nor to act in the interest of all stakeholders as the stewards of an organisation’s resources.

We advocate that, in business education, greater emphasis is needed on how stewardship has a more positive impact on management behaviour than agency, legitimacy and stakeholder theories.

We reflect on the current and compelling issues permeating the international landscape of corporate reporting and disclosure and explain why current theories which explain corporate disclosures do not change behaviour or engender trust in business and offer an alternative disclosure model based on stewardship theory.

The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate that notwithstanding the fact that stewardship theory embraces things like trust of directors, their professionalism, loyalty and willingness to be concerned for the interests of others, as well as rejecting the foundations of classic agency problems that are asserted by agency theory, board accountability is as relevant to stewardship theory as it is to agency theory.

The paper applies the theory underlying board accountability in corporate governance, which is so often applied both in the corporate governance literature and in practice with agency theory in mind, to stewardship theory.

While the idea of accountability of boards is generally associated with an explanation and conceptualisation of the role and behaviour of directors as agents within classic agency theory, the paper demonstrates that board accountability is a necessary part of board life even if the role of directors is explained and conceptualised in terms of stewardship theory.

The paper suggests some accountability mechanisms that might be employed in a stewardship approach.

While many authors have talked in general terms about board accountability and its importance, this is the first paper that has engaged in a substantial study that links board accountability directly with stewardship theory, and to establish that accountability is necessary.

This research aims to analyzes how megaproject top managers engaged in stewardship behaviors. Studying megaprojects from the micro-foundations rooted in individual action and interaction, this research examines the gaps between literature and top managers' positive behavior to challenge the current theoretical underpinnings of megaproject governance research and practice.

An extensive literature review was performed in the initial phase. Then, a case study of South-to-North Water Diversion project was conducted based on following this project and on access to its top executives. Data was collected from multiple sources and analyzed by Nvivo (version 12). Further analysis was then carried out in two stages to identify megaproject stewardship behavior and related governance patterns.

Results show that stewardship behavior is prevalently existing and is possibly to be identified through psychological, situational, relational dimensions. Also, 16 factors have been found to describe the precise nature of megaproject stewardship behavior. Further explorative findings were discussed from three perspectives: possible theoretical development, self-actualization motivation and temporalities of megaprojects.

Building upon the ideas on how to extend steward theory towards project field, this research conducts a first exploration of stewardship behavior in megaprojects. This study contributes to complement the research into top-level organizational behavior in megaprojects, and it provides helpful implications for how to govern top managers in the following megaprojects with the cooperative spirit that can be valued by megaproject stakeholders.

This paper aims to explore the differing attitudes of salaried chief financial officers (CFOs) that can be associated with agency theory and stewardship theory. CFO attitudes are investigated because CFOs typically face additional agency conflict in their roles as overseers of the financial and accounting functions that are responsible for the production of numerical information used as a basis for incentive compensation.

A qualitative field study of 14 large privately held Austrian manufacturing companies was conducted. The findings rely on information retrieved from 18 semi-structured interviews conducted with individuals from these companies.

The findings reveal a number of contextual factors that influence stewardship and agency attitudes of salaried CFOs. CFOs, who mainly report formally to owners, perceive more control in the hands of the owners. Short-term management appointments appear to facilitate agency-like behavior, whereas the existence of owner–managers and the typical CFO's maturity in terms of age and wealth seem to nurture stewardship behavior.

Further (quantitative) research is needed to corroborate the findings in this study, which are derived from a qualitative research approach. Further research on agency and stewardship behavior should also include the view of principal with respect to agent actions, as this paper shows that principal opinion strongly affects the way agents perceive control.

The findings suggest that the behavior of company owners can influence and change a manager's agency or stewardship attitude. Owners who desire a culture of stewardship should set long-term goals and facilitate long-term management appointments. Moreover, owners can lower a manager's perceived level of owner control by adopting an active role in management.

This paper is the first to analyze stewardship and agency attitude of salaried CFOs in privately held companies. It, therefore, adds to the current literature on the role of the CFO, as well as to the literature on governance issues in privately held firms.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an initial test of the validity of an intertemporal stewardship theory. This theory incorporates stewardship considerations, based on a foundation of spirituality, as well as financial considerations into financial decision‐making models.

Contends that successful contemporary companies incorporate both financial and stewardship considerations into their decision making. Fortune magazine's Global Most Admired Companies list was used to define company success. Using Fortune's reputational criteria, companies were differentiated in terms of level of success. Hypotheses were developed about the articulation of and emphasis on financial considerations and stewardship considerations as evidenced by the corporate mission for highly successful vs less successful companies. The hypotheses were tested using paired t‐tests on mission statement data developed for the top‐, middle‐, and bottom‐ranked companies in each of the global industry categories in the 2002 Fortune magazine list. The intent was to determine if hypothesis‐relevant features of the mission statements significantly differed for the companies that were ranked at the top, middle, and bottom of their industries.

The results of this analysis indicate that organizational success cannot be achieved by focusing primarily on financial or stewardship considerations, but rather company success depends upon emphasizing both financial and stewardship considerations within the context of a clearly articulated mission focus.

The research should be extended to cover more than a one‐year period. This will result not only in a test of validity over time but also a larger sample size.

The practical implications are threefold – for managers and for business professors and researchers. Managers should ensure that mission statements are sufficiently well articulated and focused, and that both financial and stewardship considerations are sufficiently emphasized. Business professors and researchers should use a new paradigm – incorporating both stewardship and financial considerations – for teaching and thinking about business and for conducting meaningful and realistic research.

The preeminence of financial considerations in business decision making is challenged in this article. We find that the most successful companies incorporate stewardship considerations as well as financial considerations into their decision making, at least as it is reflected in their missions. This article provides evidence that decision making can no longer be devoid of stewardship considerations if an organization is to survive and prosper over the long term.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a theory of intertemporal stewardship that incorporates stewardship, based on a foundation of spirituality, into financial decision‐making models.

Argues that stewardship, which shares some common ground with sustainable development, must become an integral component of financial decision‐making. Using agency theory as a point of departure, discusses the Anglo‐American and Continental European‐Japanese models of financial decision‐making, and how they can be reformulated to embrace stewardship and the spiritual foundation upon which stewardship is based. The key to linking spirituality and stewardship is our concept of self‐fullness – the simultaneous pursuit of reasonable self‐interest and reasonable concern for the common good of all human beings. The reformulated model of financial decision‐making is labeled intertemporal stewardship theory.

The merger of spirituality, stewardship, and financial decision‐making is crucial for the survival and prosperity of businesses and the people they serve. The failure of businesses in the new economy can be traced to the loss of values regarding spirituality and stewardship.

Empirical research must be conducted to test the validity of the proposed intertemporal stewardship theory.

It is essential that managers base their decisions on internalized spiritual and stewardship values that they do not “park at the door” when they arrive at work. Managers should never lose sight of these values, and their decisions should always be grounded in these values. Without such grounding, it is very possible that once again managers will be caught in a cycle of “irrational exuberance”. Therefore, it is critical that these values become not only an integral part of financial decision‐making but also an integral part of education for financial decision‐making.

The financial bottom line is that financial decision‐making can no longer be devoid of spiritual and stewardship considerations if an organization is to survive and prosper over the long term. Neither can business organizations deny spirituality and stewardship considerations if they are to be socially responsible members of society, contributing to and upholding a moral existence for all humanity. In this sense then, the conception of intertemporal stewardship theory that is offered in this paper takes a step toward realizing these greater goals.

This study aims to empirically investigate agency and stewardship theories in the US lodging market by examining the influence of fiscal and non-fiscal leadership structures on the debt financing decisions of lodging firms.

Secondary financial data have been collected for USA-based lodging firms. Subsequently, bivariate correlation, pooled ordinary least square) and endogeneity analyses have been performed on the data.

The findings support the significant influence of some corporate governance attributes on the capital structure of US lodging firms and show the limited applicability of agency and stewardship theories.

Theoretical and managerial implications are suggested in terms of balancing leadership structure attributes from the agency and stewardship theories, the capital structure of lodging firms and the future research.

Despite its importance considering the intensive capital and relatively high liabilities needed for success in the lodging industry, the influence of leadership structure on capital structure has not been examined either empirically or theoretically. Leadership structure attributes, both fiscal and non-fiscal, are included in the study to gain a richer understanding of their influence. The outcomes of the analysis suggest managerial implications for leadership structure as well as theoretical generalizability for agency and stewardship theories within the lodging industry.

Challenging the static view of family business governance, we propose a model of owner–manager relationships derived from the configurational analysis of managerial behavior and change in governance structure.

Stemming from social exchange theory and building on the 4C model proposed by Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2005), we consider the evolving owner–manager relationship in four main configurations. On the one hand, we account for family businesses shifting from a generalized to a restricted exchange system, and vice versa, according to whether a family manager misbehaves in a stewardship-oriented governance structure or a nonfamily manager succeeds in building a trusting relationship in an agency-oriented governance structure. On the other hand, we consider that family firms will strengthen a generalized exchange system, rather than a restricted one, according to whether a family manager contributes to the stewardship-oriented culture in the business or a nonfamily manager proves to be driven by extrinsic rewards. Four scenarios are analyzed in terms of the managerial behavior and governance structure that characterize the phases of the relationship between owners and managers.

Various factors trigger managerial behavior, making the firm deviate from or further build on what is assumed by stewardship and agency theories (i.e. proorganizational versus opportunistic behavior, respectively), which determine the governance structure over time. Workplace deviance, asymmetric altruism and patriarchy on the one hand, and proorganizational behavior, relationship building and long-term commitment on the other, are found to determine how the manager behaves and thus characterize the owner's reactions in terms of governance mechanisms. This enables us to present a dynamic view of governance structures, which adapt to the actual attitudes and behaviors of employed managers.

As time is a relevant dimension affecting individual behavior and triggering change in an organization, one must consider family business governance as being dynamic in nature. Moreover, it is not family membership that determines the most appropriate governance structure but the owner–manager relationship that evolves over time, thus contributing to the 4C model.

The proposed model integrates social exchange theory and the 4C model to predict changes in governance structure, as summarized in the final framework we propose.

This paper aims to clarify the relationship between the voting and engagement behaviour of institutional investors, i.e. institutional investor stewardship behaviour, and the enactment of stewardship by corporate boards. In doing so, this paper contributes to the evaluation of contemporary corporate governance systems and provides recommendations for the redesign of these systems.

This paper is based on a qualitative exploratory descriptive research study into assumed, prescribed and the actual behaviour of institutional investors. Their behaviour is explored through a survey and in-depth interviews with global institutional investors.

The prescription of institutional investor stewardship behaviour and the exploration of actual behaviour from an investors’ perspective led to the conclusion that assumed institutional investor stewardship exists variously as either “in form” (i.e. measured by compliance to the relevant corporate governance code) or “in substance” (i.e. the actual behaviour from the investors and investee companies’ perspective). The results suggest that that institutional investors’ actual stewardship behaviour as global investors requires a nuanced conclusion about the existence of institutional investor stewardship.

Although the number of semi-structured interviews with institutional investors was limited to just 14, these interviewees represent the majority share in terms of market capitalisation of Dutch listed companies. Additional research could clarify the perspective of other investors, such as pension funds and private investors.

The outcome of this research can serve as input for corporate governance reforms in the preambles of governance codes and the prescribed principles and best practice provisions of corporate governance and stewardship codes. This research identifies opportunities for further academic research to enrich the understanding of the role of institutional investors in enacting corporate stewardship.

This paper contributes to furthering the understanding of the mechanisms by which institutional investors, through their behaviour, contribute to enacting stewardship through their corporate boards. This is an important part of the corporate social responsibility of institutional investors. It also triggers a dialogue about the social and environmental impacts of stock listed companies.

This paper fulfils an identified need to develop knowledge about new paradigms and offers a more integrated approach to corporate governance reforms in terms of the role of institutional shareholders in the promotion of good corporate governance.

The paper explores the nature and facilitating conditions of “stewardship organizations,” that is, organizations in which stewardship behavior rather than principal–agent behavior defines the operative principles of management.

The paper falls into two parts: the first part of the analysis develops a theory of the stewardship organization, and the second part develops a contingency framework concerning the feasibility of stewardship organizations.

Stewardship organizations are characterized by three interlocking traits: (1) the overall mission of the organization, (2) the organization's internal control systems and (3) the “motivational environment” of the stewardship organization. Since stewardship organizations cannot be identified on the basis of stated mission alone, it is necessary to determine whether the mission involves a higher calling that has been internalized by organizational members to the point of constituting a vital part of how the organization runs on a day-to-day basis.

One key role of leadership in such organizations is to manage mission drift and to reduce the ambiguity of the mission and organization goals.

Litmus tests are proposed for identifying an authentic stewardship organization in contradistinction to those whose socially minded values are ancillary or a marketing ploy.

This is the first systematic attempt to characterize the stewardship organization. After providing three specific examples of such organizations, the contribution identifies key markers of bona fide stewardship organizations.