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The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) calls for far-reaching changes to the way economic activity will occur in EU digital markets. Before its remedies are imposed, it is critical to assess their impacts on individual markets, the digital sector, and the overall European economy. The European Commission (EC) released an Impact Assessment in support of the DMA that purports to evaluate it using cost/benefit analysis.

An economic evaluation of the DMA should consider its full impacts on dynamic competition. The Impact Assessment neither assesses the DMA's impact on dynamic competition in the digital economy nor evaluates the impacts of specific DMA prohibitions and obligations. Instead, it considers benefits in general and largely ignores costs. We study its benefit assessments and find they are based on highly inappropriate methodologies and assumptions. A cost/benefit study using inappropriate methodologies and largely ignoring costs cannot provide a sound policy assessment.

Instead of promoting dynamic competition between platforms, the DMA will likely reinforce existing market structures, ossify market boundaries, and stunt European innovation. The DMA is likely to chill R&D by encouraging free riding on the investments of others, which discourages making those investments. Avoiding harm to innovation is critical because innovation delivers large, positive spillover benefits, driving increases in productivity, employment, wages, and prosperity.

The DMA prioritizes static over dynamic competition, with the potential to harm the European economy. Given this, the Impact Assessment does not demonstrate that the DMA will be beneficial overall, and its implementation must be carefully tailored to alleviate or lessen its potential to harm Europe’s economic performance.

This chapter defines a learning culture and discusses the relationship between knowledge and learning. The authors explain why learning is essential to bringing knowledge to life and incentivizing knowledge flows and use. The chapter addresses the interplay between knowledge and learning cultures. A key point in the chapter is the value of mistakes as learning opportunities. The authors explain how mistakes are viewed in the industrial economy and how this perspective impedes critical organizational learning. Specifically, we define mistakes, explain the double cognitive bias of mistakes, explain the tendency and impact of hiding mistakes, the side effects of double mistake bias, learn to learn from mistakes, and take on the challenge of reconciling mistake acceptance and avoidance. Finally, the chapter addresses the importance of cultivating a learning climate to realize your learning culture.

Due to its high leverage nature, a bank suffers vitally from the credit risk it inherently bears. As a result, managing credit is the ultimate responsibility of a bank. In this chapter, we examine how efficiently banks manage their credit risk via a powerful tool used widely in the decision/management science area called data envelopment analysis (DEA). Among various existing versions, our DEA is a two-stage, dynamic model that captures how each bank performs relative to its peer banks in terms of value creation and credit risk control. Using data from the largest 22 banks in the United States over the period of 1996 till 2013, we have identified leading banks such as First Bank systems and Bank of New York Mellon before and after mergers and acquisitions, respectively. With the goal of preventing financial crises such as the one that occurred in 2008, a conceptual model of credit risk reduction and management (CRR&M) is proposed in the final section of this study. Discussions on strategy formulations at both the individual bank level and the national level are provided. With the help of our two-stage DEA-based decision support systems and CRR&M-driven strategies, policy/decision-makers in a banking sector can identify improvement opportunities regarding value creation and risk mitigation. The effective tool and procedures presented in this work will help banks worldwide manage the unknown and become more resilient to potential credit crises in the 21st century.

There is growing empirical evidence that firm heterogeneity is technologically non-neutral. This chapter extends the Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2020) proxy variable framework for structurally identifying production functions to a more general case when latent firm productivity is multi-dimensional, with both factor-neutral and (biased) factor-augmenting components. Unlike alternative methodologies, the proposed model can be identified under weaker data requirements, notably, without relying on the typically unavailable cross-sectional variation in input prices for instrumentation. When markets are perfectly competitive, point identification is achieved by leveraging the information contained in static optimality conditions, effectively adopting a system-of-equations approach. It is also shown how one can partially identify the non-neutral production technology in the traditional proxy variable framework when firms have market power.

The malfunction variables of power stations are related to the areas of weather, physical structure, control and load behaviour. To predict temporal power failure is difficult due to their unpredictable characteristics. As high accuracy is normally required, the estimation of failures of short-term temporal prediction is highly difficult. This study presents a method for converting stochastic behaviour into a stable pattern, which can subsequently be used in a short-term estimator. For this conversion, K-means clustering is employed, followed by Long-Short-Term Memory (LSTM) and Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) algorithms are used to perform the Short-term estimation. The environment, the operation and the generated signal factors are all simulated using mathematical models. Weather parameters and load samples have been collected as part of a data set. Monte-Carlo simulation using MATLAB programming has been used to conduct experimental estimation of failures. The estimated failures of the experiment are then compared with the actual system temporal failures and found to be in good match. Therefore, for any future power grid, there is a testbed ready to estimate the future failures.

While uncertainty has always been a feature of the healthcare environment, its pace and scope are rapidly increasing, fueled by myriad factors such as technological advancements, the threat and frequency of disruptive events, global economic developments, and increasing complexity. Contemporary healthcare organizations thus persistently face what is known as “deep uncertainty,” which obscures their ability to predict outcomes of strategic action and decision-making, presenting them with novel challenges and threatening their survival. Persistent, deep uncertainty challenges us to revisit and reconsider how we think about uncertainty and the strategic actions needed by organizations to thrive under these circumstances. Simply put, how can healthcare organizations thrive in the face of deeply uncertain environments? We argue that healthcare organizations need to employ both adaptive and creative strategic approaches in order to effectively meet patients' needs and capture value in the long-term future. The chapter concludes by offering two ways organizations can build the dynamic capabilities needed to employ such approaches.