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As the carrier of knowledge, intellectual capital plays a crucial role in technology capability. However, most of the previous studies focus on technological capability from a static perspective, rather than take dynamic technology capability into consideration. Based on this research gap, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of intellectual capital and its sub-dimensions on dynamic technology capability, measuring by the factor scores of five technological input and output variables.

The authors combine the system dynamic method and empirical study to guarantee the internal and external validity. Specifically, the authors design the system dynamic model and simulation to analyze the system mechanism of intellectual capital and its sub-dimensions on dynamic technology capabilities from four cause and effect feedback loops. Then, the authors propose eight hypotheses based on this system dynamic model. In the empirical test phase, the authors employed a panel data set pertaining to Chinese manufacturing firms from 2007 to 2017, and adopted the fixed effect panel model according to Hausman test.

The authors find that intellectual capital efficiency (ICE) and its sub-dimensions (i.e. human capital efficiency, organizational capital efficiency and capital employed efficiency (CEE) have significantly positive impacts on dynamic technology capability. The results also show that the positive effects of ICE and OC on dynamic technology capability would be strengthened in state-owned enterprises compared with non-state-owned enterprises, while this moderation effect is weakened on the relationship between CEE and dynamic technology capability.

In this study, the authors first introduce the system dynamic method to explore the relationship of intellectual capital and dynamic technology capability, which is a valuable trial on combining system science and empirical study. Additionally, the authors continue to expand the dynamic technology capability from the intellectual capital perspective, and also find the moderating effect from the ownership aspect. It is beneficial to the theoretical development of intellectual capital and dynamic technology capability. Furthermore, the authors provide significant inspirations and implications for enterprise’s managers.

China has achieved continuous economic growth and become more integrated with the global economy since the start of the current financial crisis in late 2008. As the second largest economy in the world, China's political policies, economic and social development have influence on global economy. Attention has been paid worldwide to the current Chinese legal system, political policies and the development of economic reform since China entered the World Trade Organisation in November 2001. The corporate governance reform is the centre of the enterprise reform. In September 1999, The Fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's 15th central Committee identified that corporate governance is the core of the modern enterprise system. In recent years China has made significant progress in developing the foundations of a modern corporate system. There are more than 1,200 companies which have successfully diversified their ownership through public listing and 80% of small and medium size companies have been transformed into non-state-owned enterprises. More and more state-owned enterprises are on the way to transforming into corporations. China has formed a legal framework for corporate governance.

Following China entered the World Trade Organisation in November 2001, attention has been paid worldwide to the current Chinese legal system, political policies, and the development of economic reform. Recent debates on corporate governance in China have become a global topic of interest. The corporate governance reform is now the centre of the enterprise reform. This paper evaluates the development of corporate governance reform in China and identifies its changes in legislation on corporate control. This paper provides evidence to show that China has been making significant progress in the development of corporate governance reform. It concludes that China has established a fundamental legal framework for corporate governance. The changes in regulations on corporate control indicate that the development of a more sophisticated corporate governance system is under way. However, corporate governance reform in China is still at an early stage of development. The existing problems are still significant. Laws and legal institutions have experienced difficulties keeping up with the changes that have been taking place in China. The rights of selecting management of state‐owned enterprise still remain in the hands of the state. The reform of the banking system lags behind the development of the market economy and state‐owned banks are still under government's control. The paper argues that in Chinese context as far as the rights of selecting management remain in state's hand, the independent board of directors will have less power to achieve the goals in corporate control. Thus the agency problems will not be solved, and it is very difficult to excise and protect minority shareholders' interest. In today's Chinese market the corporate governance cannot provide the protection of minority investors' interests. This paper also argues that it is very dangerous for individual investors to invest in the Chinese market and they have to bear higher risks. This paper suggests that increasing the Sophistication of the corporate governance system of both internal and external control is the key for the Chinese market. This is because the Chinese context is very complicated. There are so many regulations and laws applied in business practice. Different companies and enterprises apply different laws. This paper points out when a national corporate governance system is established it should serve the whole economic market. Thus the further reform of state‐owned enterprises and also the banking system should take place so that China can build up a real economic market structure according to international regulations. This paper also suggests that in the long‐term, building up a cultural background for applying corporate governance system is very important in Chinese society. Improving the culture in the social environment could help to improve the corporate governance in business practices.

State-owned firms play important roles in Chinese cross-border acquisition (CBA) activities. However, compared with private firms, state-owned firms have a lower likelihood of acquisition completion and take longer to complete a deal. This paper aims to determine why this phenomenon exists and how state-owned firms can overcome the constraints of their identity.

By integrating organizational learning theory with institutional theory, this paper attempts to answer the research questions from a legitimacy perspective. Employing Chinese CBA data from 1982 to 2014, the authors use a logit model and a random effects model to test the hypothesis.

The results show that a state-owned identity easily causes legitimacy concerns among host country regulatory agencies; thus, it may result in longer and more uncertain evaluation behaviors, which lead to a lower likelihood of CBA completion and a longer deal duration. Only experience with failed acquisitions can increase CBA completion probability. Furthermore, in very complex decision-making environments, such as that surrounding deal duration, only specific types of experience (i.e. experience of failed international acquisitions) can trigger learning behavior, whereas general experience (i.e. failed acquisition experience) has little influence. Favorable bilateral relationships may not improve the completion rate and efficiency of state-owned firms, but high-quality host country institutions lead to a higher likelihood of CBA completion among state-owned firms; however, this may be not conducive to decreasing the time needed to complete an acquisition deal.

First, by discussing the completion rate and duration of CBAs conducted by state-owned firms and analyzing the factors that influence them, this paper enriches and develops the theory of organizational overseas mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Second, by adopting a legitimacy perspective and integrating institutional theory, the authors theorize how state-owned status influences firms’ M&A completion rate and time and test the hypotheses empirically; thus, this paper improves and deepens institutional theory. Third, by discussing how different types of experience (i.e. successful experience vs failed acquisition experience) influence the acquisition completion rate and duration and how general experience and specific types of experience affect these two dependent variables differently, this paper explains how state-owned firms can learn effectively from experience, contributing to organizational learning theory.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether corporate ownership affects corporate capital structure. This study also seeks to find out whether there is difference in dynamics of the capital structure between these two groups of firms.

Based on panel data of China's listed firms from 1998 to 2007, this paper employs a static empirical model to validate the difference in capital structure between these two groups of firms, and then, a dynamic empirical model is used to explore the dynamic adjustment of the capital structure.

The empirical results show that there is structural difference in static capital structure between state-owned and private listed firms. Further study results tell us that the adjustment to an optimal capital structure is to be faster for the private firm than for the state-owned firm.

The findings suggest that compared with state-owned firms, private firms face higher financial friction in financing activities, but have more incentive to adjust toward optimal capital structure to maximize the shareholders' benefit. This study offers insights to corporate managers interested in privatization, when a state-owned firm is privatized, that firm becomes subject to the disciplining forces of the market and more active to pursue maximum market value of the firm, thus the adjustment to an optimal capital structure to be faster for private firm than for state-owned firm.

This paper for the first time looks at the influence of ownership on capital structure, from both static and dynamic perspective. And this study is helpful for regulators, and corporate managers to understand the corporate financial management behavior.

The impact of globalization and worldwide competition has become excruciatingly noticeable in China. The purpose of this study is to examine China’s transformation of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) to competitive, capable organizations by identifying the dominant challenges and forces for change to State‐Owned Enterprises in China (SOE), the nature of SOE responses to those forces, and the degree of SOE success in making the necessary transformations to compete in a global business environment.

This paper investigates the relationship between product market competition and firms’ water information disclosure and how firms’ ownership type can affect this relationship in China, offering new insights into corporate water management.

The authors investigated 303 Chinese listed companies in highly water-sensitive industries to examine how product market competition influences corporate water information disclosure by subdividing the product market competition into market competition at the firm level and the industry competition intensity at the industry level.

The results show that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between industry competition and water information disclosure; enterprises with the highest market power in a mildly competitive industry are more willing to voluntarily disclose water information and play an industry benchmarking role. Further tests demonstrate that the relationship between industry competition intensity and water information disclosure is stronger for state-owned enterprises than for private enterprises.

The current water resources regulations in China are relatively lax and the water risk awareness of firms is weak, which may affect the applicability of the results. In addition, water information disclosure research is a relatively new field and a quantitative index system for water information disclosure is still in the exploratory stage. Further developments, including the selection, definition and measuring methods of a water index are required.

The authors developed a new direction of enterprise water management activities from the perspective of market competition. Based on the market conditions in China, the authors also investigated the impact of the ownership type of the enterprises on the relationship between market competition and water information disclosure.

The authors suggested that the government should improve laws and regulations and adopt incentive mechanisms to encourage enterprises to implement water resource management. In addition, the government should encourage high market status enterprises to actively fulfill their environmental responsibilities so that the entire industry is encouraged to follow suit.

This study represents an important development in the field of environmental accounting and is the first research on corporate water information disclosure; it also extends the research on the influence mechanisms of market competition on the environmental management practices of enterprises.

In view of the significant changes in the capital structure of China’s real estate industry and enterprises in recent years, this chapter employs financial indicators and the linear regression function to analyze the relationship between corporate debt ratio and the performance of 111 A-share listed real estate enterprises in China. This study finds that the corporate debt ratio of China’s real estate enterprises in the past decade has a significant negative impact on enterprises’ performance. The study also finds that among China’s real estate companies, the corporate debt ratio has a more significant negative impact on the performance of non-state-owned enterprises than state-owned enterprises. In addition, a high debt ratio has a more significant negative impact on return on equity (ROE) than on return on assets (ROA). However, when Tobin’s Q serves as a proxy for firm performance, the negative impact of the corporate debt ratio becomes insignificant in the presence of the firm size factor. The research results of this chapter can provide some reference for subsequent policy-making and investment decisions in the Chinese real estate market.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Polish economic situation was extremely difficult: high public debt, shortages, high inflation and more than 8,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) waiting to be restructured and/or privatised; along with a GDP per capita lower than in Ukraine.

This chapter provides an overview of the Polish economic transition, and presents the results of this process, taking into account four aspects of the changes, i.e. stabilisation, liberalisation, institutional reforms and privatisation. Special attention is paid to intentionally unfinished privatisation and the still significant role of state-owned enterprises, which have remained important economic agents.

Critical analyses were made of the literature dedicated to the economic transition and of the role and characteristics of state-owned enterprises. Empirical evidence is drawn from original datasets about the scale of SOEs in the contemporary economy and rotations in management and supervisory boards in Polish joint-stock companies.

Despite the unfavourable initial conditions, Poland soon emerged as a leader in economic growth, successfully stabilising, liberalising and privatising its economy. The institutional foundations of a democratic market economy were consistently built, and the applications for membership in the OECD, the EU and NATO were an important driver of institutional reforms. In terms of state institutions, political and economic freedom and quality of governance, Poland is more similar to the G7 countries than to the other post-socialist countries, though the need to maintain high-quality state institutions is still a priority. The significant share of SOE is regarded as a challenge of the Polish economy because state-owned enterprises are an object of rent-seeking by politicians and political parties.

There are two opposite views about whether the Antitrust Law is conducive to the development of the economy. One view is that the Antitrust Law can restrain monopoly, maintain market competition and benefit economic growth. The other view is that the Antitrust Law inhibits innovation by monopolistic firms and fosters rent-seeking, which is bad for economic growth. To provide a possible perspective for clarifying the controversy, this paper aims to answer the following two questions: first, will the Antitrust Law inhibit corporate innovation? Second, does the antitrust enforcement agency discriminate against private enterprises?

Based on the samples of A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013, the authors use the implementation of China’s Antitrust Law in 2008 as a policy shock, take the monopoly enterprises in each industry as the treatment group and competitive enterprises as the control group, using the difference-in-differences method to test the impact of the implementation of the Antitrust Law on corporate innovation activities.

The results show that compared with competitive enterprises, the patent output of monopolistic enterprises was significantly reduced after the implementation of the Antitrust Law, which indicates that the Antitrust Law does inhibit the innovation activities of monopolistic enterprises. Further research finds that the innovation suppression effect of the Antitrust Law is more prominent in state-owned enterprises, which means that the government does not have “selective law enforcement” against private enterprises in the process of law enforcement. Therefore, the results provide evidence for the idea that government intervention is neutral.

First, the paper enriches and expands the research on the factors affecting corporate innovation from the perspective of market structure. Second, it enriches and expands relevant research on the consequences of implementing the Antitrust Law from the perspective of corporate innovation. Third, it not only provides the relevant empirical evidence for clarifying the dispute about the Antitrust Law but also is helpful to clarify whether the Chinese Government has “selective law enforcement” against private enterprises.