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This paper aims to propose a strategy to analyze management governance in China.

This paper incorporates data on 989 Chinese listed firms over 2006 to 2016. A fixed effects model with panel data and an F-test are applied to exploit the relationship between management ownership and firm performance. A threshold model is introduced to explore the impacts of other governance mechanisms on management governance.

This paper finds an inverted U-shaped relationship between management ownership and firm performance. Furthermore, the threshold model demonstrates that large shareholders strengthen the positive effects of management governance and attenuate its negative effects; board size strengthens the positive effects of management governance but cannot attenuate its negative effects; and independent directors attenuate the negative effects of management governance.

This paper indicates that increasing management ownership could motivate managers to ameliorate the agent’s moral hazard problem which link the firm value premium when management ownership is less than 20.286 per cent. However, equity incentives are very rare in China. Thus, the authors expect that equity incentives will be a common phenomenon in Chinese listed firms.

This paper contributes to corporate governance literature by shedding some light on management ownership to explore the effects of management ownership. Specifically, this paper explores the effects of management ownership on firm performance and the impacts of other governance mechanisms on management governance to shape the management governance in China.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the governance mechanism of overcoming or solving three problems: cooperation problem, coordination problem and appropriation problem. Also to raise the value chain cost efficiency and to elevate the value chain competitive advantage.

The methodology is the experimental study. The authors design an experience simulating the transaction process across firms to explore the separate and joint governance effects of trust and incentive on the cost of value chain.

According to the experimental results it is found that the high level of trust between firms and the incentive based on the joint interests of value chain can effectively mitigate or avoid the cooperation, coordination and appropriation problems, and thus have significant governance effects on the cost of value chain. Incentive is out of effect when a much lower level of trust across firms exists, which reflects that there is a significant complementary relationship between trust and incentive mechanisms.

The research limitation is that the practical experience and the cognition of experimenters of the researchers will influence the conclusion of the experiment, so the research on the influences of other factors must be deepened.

The paper's value is in setting out a value chain cost management theory frame, demonstrating trust and incentive as two kinds of governance mechanism in the value chain cost management mechanism, adopting experiment method to verify the above theory, and providing the relevant behavior evidence for future research.

Based on an empirical study, proposes requirements for and measures of the formation of internal incentive systems as instruments for internal innovation management. Uses the knowledge of experience of individuals taking an active part in innovation for the formulation of such proposals. The necessity for the implementation of integrated incentive systems, which allow for material fundamental demands beyond those peculiar to individual career expectations, becomes obvious.

Krull (2004) finds that US multinational corporations (MNCs) increase amounts designated as permanently reinvested earnings (PRE) to maximize reported after-tax earnings and meet earnings targets. We extend this research by examining the relationship between executive equity compensation and the opportunistic use of PRE by US MNCs, and the market reaction to earnings management using PRE designations. Firms use equity compensation to incentivize executives to strive for maximum shareholder wealth. One unintended consequence is that executives may engage in earnings management activities to increase their equity compensation. In this study, we examine whether the equity incentives of management are associated with an increased use of PRE. We predict and find strong evidence that the changes in PRE are positively associated with the portion of top managers' compensation that is tied to stock performance. In addition, we find this relationship to be strongest for firms that meet or beat forecasts, but only with the use of PRE to inflate income, suggesting that equity compensation incentivizes managers to opportunistically use PRE, especially to meet analyst forecasts.

Further, we provide evidence that investors react negatively to beating analysts' forecasts with the use of PRE, suggesting that investors find this behavior opportunistic and not fully convincing. This chapter makes an important contribution to what we know about the joint effects of tax policy, generally accepted accounting principles, and incentive compensation on the earnings reporting process.

This study examines the effect of target-and-incentive-consistency of unexpected positive earnings news on investors’ use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance information in their pricing decisions.

A 2 × 2 full factorial between-participants experiment is conducted.

Target-and-incentive-consistency of unexpected positive earnings news moderates the effect of CSR performance on investors’ pricing decisions.

Its findings shed insights on investors’ use of a mix of CSR, financial and governance information, support the financial information elasticity effect and add to the effect of financial information on investors’ use of nonfinancial information.

The effect of inelastic financial information in mitigating the CSR information effect can benefit investors who do not plan to use a CSR investment strategy. Knowledge of investors’ conditional use of CSR information can benefit firm managers and policy makers.

Its findings support a heretofore unexamined theoretical underpinning for the effect of financial information on investors’ use of nonfinancial information.

In recent years, China has been making progress in internationalizing its financial reporting system. However, it is believed that earnings management from legitimate accounting choices to fraud that violates generally accepted accounting principles, is common in the mainland. The purpose of this study is to identify the most frequently used earnings management techniques in China and the underlying factors that motivate firms to engage in earnings management.

Data were gained through a questionnaire sent to managers and accountants in mainland Chinese companies.

The results show that the size and form of ownership of companies materially influence earnings management incentives and techniques in China. Public ownership companies have stronger incentives to manage earnings for management compensation, while private ownership companies pay more attention to tax expense savings. Also, several popular techniques employed in China are revealed.

This study presents a general picture of earnings management in China by surveying the opinions of accountants and financial managers in Chinese companies.

As the complexity and uncertainty of megaprojects make it difficult for traditional management models to address the difficulties, this paper aims to design a performance incentive contract through IT applications, thereby promoting the formation of an information-based governance mechanism for megaprojects and facilitating the transformation and upgrading of the construction management model of megaprojects to informatisation.

This paper introduced IT applications into the performance assessment and used the proportion of IT applications replacing traditional manual management as a variable. It analysed different replacement ratios to obtain the optimal solution for the change of contractors behaviours and promote the optimal performance incentive for the informatisation in megaprojects.

The results show that under the condition of the optimal replacement ratio, achieving the optimal state of a mutual win-win situation is possible for the benefit of both sides. The counter-intuitive finding is that the greater the replacement ratio is not, the better, but those other constraints are also taken into account.

This study enriched the research of the performance configuration incentive from a practical perspective. It extended the research framework of IT incentive mechanisms in the governance of megaprojects from a management theory perspective. It clarified the role of IT applications in incentive mechanisms and the design process of optimal incentive contracts under different performance incentive states. The incentives made the contractors work harder to meet the owner's requirements, and it could improve the efficiency of megaprojects, thus better achieving megaproject objectives.

This paper aims to examine how the use of environmental, social and governance (ESG) incentives intersects with top management power and various corporate governance mechanisms to affect excess annual cash bonus compensation.

The authors use a novel artificial intelligence (AI) technique to obtain data about ESG incentives use by firms in the S&P 500. The authors test the hypotheses with an endogenous treatment-regression and a contrast test.

When the top management team has power and uses ESG incentives, there is a 32% reduction in excess annual cash bonuses implying ESG incentives are an effective corporate governance tool. However, nuanced analyses reveal that when powerful management teams with ESG incentives are from environmentally sensitive industries, have a corporate social responsibility (CSR) committee or have long-term view institutional shareholders, they derive excess bonuses.

Stakeholders will better understand management’s motivations for the inclusion of ESG incentives in executive compensation contracts and be able to identify situations which require closer scrutiny.

Given the increased popularity of ESG incentives, society, regulators, boards of directors and management teams will be interested in better understanding when these incentives might be effective and when they might be abused.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the use of ESG incentives in relation to excess pay. The authors contribute to both the CSR and executive compensation literatures. The work also uses a new methodological technique using AI to gather difficult-to-obtain data, opening new avenues for research.

This paper aims to investigate the combined effect of two interventions, perspective taking and incentives, on auditors’ professional skepticism (hereafter skepticism) when auditing complex estimates. Specifically, this paper examines the different ways that perspective taking (management versus inspector) and incentives (absent versus reward versus penalty) combine to impact skepticism.

This paper uses an experiment with 177 experienced Big 4 auditors. The experiment used a 2 (management vs inspector perspective) × 3 (absent vs reward vs penalty incentives) between-subjects design.

In the absence of incentives, adopting a management perspective raises situational skepticism when measuring skepticism as appropriateness of management’s fair value estimate while adopting an inspector perspective raises situational skepticism when measuring skepticism as need for more evidence. The authors find some evidence that incentives complement perspective-taking by enhancing those aspects of skepticism for which perspective-taking performs poorly. When assessing management assumptions, auditors adopting an inspector perspective enhance their skepticism more substantially than those adopting a management perspective, and this enhancement is greater with rewards than with penalties. However, this study does not detect an interaction between incentive type and perspective-taking on auditor skepticism in relation to gathering additional evidence.

This paper extends the literature by shifting the focus from a single perspective to a comparison of two perspective-taking approaches and discusses how each of these approaches enhances different aspects of skepticism. This paper also illustrates the importance of the interplay between perspective-taking and incentives in enhancing auditor skepticism.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a framework for the application of evidence-based management to chronic disease healthcare.

Chronic healthcare is specially characterized by recursive patient-physician interactions in which evidence-based medicine (EBM) is applied. However, implementing evidence-based solutions to improve healthcare quality requires managers to effect changes in many different areas: organizational structure, procedures, technology and in physician/provider behaviors. To complicate matters further, they must achieve these changes using the tools of resource allocation or incentives. The literature contains many systematic reviews evaluating the question of physician and patient behavior under various types and structures of incentives. Similarly, systematic reviews have also been done regarding specific changes to the healthcare process and their effectiveness in improving patient outcomes. Yet, these reviews uniformly lament a lack of appropriate data from well-organized studies on the question of “Why?” solutions may work in one instance while not in another. The authors present a new theoretical framework that aids in answering this question.

This paper presents a new theoretical framework (Influence Model of Chronic Healthcare) that identifies: the critical areas in which managers can effect changes that improve patient outcomes; the influence these areas can have on each other, as well as on patient and physician behavior; and the mechanisms by which these influences are exerted. For each, the authors draw upon, and present the evidence in the literature. Ultimately, the authors recognize that this is a complex question that has not yet been fully researched. The contribution of this model is twofold: first, the authors hope to focus future research efforts, and second, provide a useful heuristic to managers who must make decisions with only the lesser-quality evidence the literature contains today.

This model can be used by managers as a heuristic either ex ante or ex post to determine the effectiveness of their decisions and strategies in improving healthcare quality. In addition, it can be used to analyze why actions or decisions taken achieved a given outcome, and how best to proceed to effect further improvements on patient outcomes. Last, the model serves to focus attention on specific questions for further research.