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The success rate of business rescue in South Africa is concerningly low as it currently ranges between 10% and 12%. This study intends to make a positive contribution towards addressing this problem by obtaining insight from professional business rescue practitioners regarding the feasibility of making use of the practice of business rescue to assist South African state-owned enterprises to avoid them going into insolvency and indefinitely stopping operations. This study, which is a generic qualitative study, will rely solely on the experience and insights of the business rescue practitioners in order to obtain a better understanding of the problem at hand. Nine participants were interviewed during September and October 2020. The study found that business rescue practitioners are confident that the business rescue proceedings are a solution to preserving state-owned enterprises. However, the level of political interference by the unions, government officials, and also the continued bailouts from the government to support these state-owned entities are some concerns raised by the participants as they hinder the effectiveness of the proceedings with regard to state-owned enterprises. Academically, the study expands to the literature on business rescue in the context of state-owned enterprises and what challenges are hindering the process. For managers, the study identifies the key constraints which are most likely to be encountered when conducting business rescue proceedings in a state-owned enterprise which, if not observed, will negatively impact the success rate.

The purpose of this paper is to expand the investor sentiment’s effect on investment efficiency to the layer of “credit financing,” studying whether investor sentiment can affect credit financing level and the inner mechanism of the effect.

The authors obtain firm-level data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets and using panel estimation techniques examine whether investor sentiment can affect credit financing level and the inner mechanism of the effect.

This paper finds that credit financing plays the role of partial media in the process of investor sentiment affecting investment efficiency. Based on the funds increasing effect, with the high-investor sentiment and increasing credit financing, corporations alleviate the financing constraints, but also provide a convenient for the abuse of corporate funds. So, investor sentiment positively associates with enterprises’ overinvestment, while investor sentiment negatively associates with enterprises’ underinvestment. Relying on the particular system background and property right environment in China, this paper finds that investor sentiment has an effect on the overinvestment of state-owned enterprises and the underinvestment of private enterprises through credit financing channel, while it does not function in the overinvestment of private enterprises. The reason of the difference is that under the soft budget constraint in the country, the credit preference of state-owned enterprises and the creditor’s rights management of banks are partially absent.

By fusing the special financial environment and institutional background, this thesis further includes in the analysis frame the difference in governance effect by credit financing between state-owned and privately owned listed companies, and further analyzes the difference in impact on investment efficiency in enterprises of different natures after investor sentiment has affected enterprise credit financing.

This paper has verified the constraint assumption and deepened the research work on bank credit supply and answered practical questions such as whether the banks in the country exercise supervision function over the listed companies and on which kind of listed companies the supervision function plays a more effective role.

As an unofficial substitution mechanism, bank-enterprise relationship can elevate the investment efficiency by private owned enterprises. Based on the timely research results on credit financing, reference is provided for private listed companies to utilize investor sentiment to improve its investment efficiency.

This paper has proved the specific path which creates the dual effects on resources allocation by investor sentiment, that is, the intermediary transmission in credit financing, clarifying the mechanism of action by which investor sentiment affects the efficiency of enterprise investment and making incremental contribution to the research of how investor sentiment affects the efficiency of enterprise investment.

This paper aims to comment upon the governance systems of state‐owned enterprises in Shanghai and to consider the adequacy or otherwise of those governance structures.

The paper presents a study of existing governance arrangements and structures and considers areas for possible reform.

A sound corporate governance system is of great significance not only to the healthy development of enterprises but also for the enterprises to survive when they face the economic crisis. With the continuous spread of the world economic crisis, how to improve the corporate governance of state‐owned enterprises in Shanghai so that they can pass the financial crisis period safely has become one urgent and critical issue.

The study presents detail and reform areas for further reflection.

China has achieved continuous economic growth and become more integrated with the global economy since the start of the current financial crisis in late 2008. As the second largest economy in the world, China's political policies, economic and social development have influence on global economy. Attention has been paid worldwide to the current Chinese legal system, political policies and the development of economic reform since China entered the World Trade Organisation in November 2001. The corporate governance reform is the centre of the enterprise reform. In September 1999, The Fourth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party's 15th central Committee identified that corporate governance is the core of the modern enterprise system. In recent years China has made significant progress in developing the foundations of a modern corporate system. There are more than 1,200 companies which have successfully diversified their ownership through public listing and 80% of small and medium size companies have been transformed into non-state-owned enterprises. More and more state-owned enterprises are on the way to transforming into corporations. China has formed a legal framework for corporate governance.

Following China entered the World Trade Organisation in November 2001, attention has been paid worldwide to the current Chinese legal system, political policies, and the development of economic reform. Recent debates on corporate governance in China have become a global topic of interest. The corporate governance reform is now the centre of the enterprise reform. This paper evaluates the development of corporate governance reform in China and identifies its changes in legislation on corporate control. This paper provides evidence to show that China has been making significant progress in the development of corporate governance reform. It concludes that China has established a fundamental legal framework for corporate governance. The changes in regulations on corporate control indicate that the development of a more sophisticated corporate governance system is under way. However, corporate governance reform in China is still at an early stage of development. The existing problems are still significant. Laws and legal institutions have experienced difficulties keeping up with the changes that have been taking place in China. The rights of selecting management of state‐owned enterprise still remain in the hands of the state. The reform of the banking system lags behind the development of the market economy and state‐owned banks are still under government's control. The paper argues that in Chinese context as far as the rights of selecting management remain in state's hand, the independent board of directors will have less power to achieve the goals in corporate control. Thus the agency problems will not be solved, and it is very difficult to excise and protect minority shareholders' interest. In today's Chinese market the corporate governance cannot provide the protection of minority investors' interests. This paper also argues that it is very dangerous for individual investors to invest in the Chinese market and they have to bear higher risks. This paper suggests that increasing the Sophistication of the corporate governance system of both internal and external control is the key for the Chinese market. This is because the Chinese context is very complicated. There are so many regulations and laws applied in business practice. Different companies and enterprises apply different laws. This paper points out when a national corporate governance system is established it should serve the whole economic market. Thus the further reform of state‐owned enterprises and also the banking system should take place so that China can build up a real economic market structure according to international regulations. This paper also suggests that in the long‐term, building up a cultural background for applying corporate governance system is very important in Chinese society. Improving the culture in the social environment could help to improve the corporate governance in business practices.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether corporate ownership affects corporate capital structure. This study also seeks to find out whether there is difference in dynamics of the capital structure between these two groups of firms.

Based on panel data of China's listed firms from 1998 to 2007, this paper employs a static empirical model to validate the difference in capital structure between these two groups of firms, and then, a dynamic empirical model is used to explore the dynamic adjustment of the capital structure.

The empirical results show that there is structural difference in static capital structure between state-owned and private listed firms. Further study results tell us that the adjustment to an optimal capital structure is to be faster for the private firm than for the state-owned firm.

The findings suggest that compared with state-owned firms, private firms face higher financial friction in financing activities, but have more incentive to adjust toward optimal capital structure to maximize the shareholders' benefit. This study offers insights to corporate managers interested in privatization, when a state-owned firm is privatized, that firm becomes subject to the disciplining forces of the market and more active to pursue maximum market value of the firm, thus the adjustment to an optimal capital structure to be faster for private firm than for state-owned firm.

This paper for the first time looks at the influence of ownership on capital structure, from both static and dynamic perspective. And this study is helpful for regulators, and corporate managers to understand the corporate financial management behavior.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the factors impacting corporate knowledge's assimilation and exploitation; to posit the relationship between assimilation and exploitation, and build up a research model to compare the differences of these relationships in companies with different ownership identities.

Structure equation model.

The paper finds that the function of communicational capability and social capital on knowledge's assimilation and exploitation is impacted by ownership identity.

In China, persons making decisions on innovation strategy of knowledge should consider the ownership identity.

The paper shows that the institutional factor indeed impacts knowledge transfer and innovation. Social capital and communicational capability can reduce the obstacles to knowledge's capture and diffusion, however, the institutional distance will change their function's direction and degree.

The purpose of this paper is to explain theoretically the relation between large shareholders, legal institutions, and capital structure, then empirically deduce how large shareholders and legal institution affected capital structure decision by integrating Chinese institutions.

This paper adopted cross‐section data of non‐financial listed companies in China and applied series of ordinary least square to empirically test the relationship between large shareholders, legal institution, and capital structure decision.

The empirical evidence provided by this paper indicates that large shareholders and legal institution do affect capital structure decision, specifically in seven areas.

This paper, based on the institutions of China, takes the largest shareholder, ultimately the controller, the relation of legal institution and capital structure into the research framework for the first time and systematically studies how the capital structure decision making is affected by the controlling shareholders, the nature of ultimately controllers, the concentration degree of shares held by a few large shareholders and legal institution. It is the first to empirically test whether the concentration degree of shares held by a few large shareholders and legal institution will affect the relation between controlling shareholders and capital structure, and compensates for the deficiencies in previous studies.

In view of the significant changes in the capital structure of China’s real estate industry and enterprises in recent years, this chapter employs financial indicators and the linear regression function to analyze the relationship between corporate debt ratio and the performance of 111 A-share listed real estate enterprises in China. This study finds that the corporate debt ratio of China’s real estate enterprises in the past decade has a significant negative impact on enterprises’ performance. The study also finds that among China’s real estate companies, the corporate debt ratio has a more significant negative impact on the performance of non-state-owned enterprises than state-owned enterprises. In addition, a high debt ratio has a more significant negative impact on return on equity (ROE) than on return on assets (ROA). However, when Tobin’s Q serves as a proxy for firm performance, the negative impact of the corporate debt ratio becomes insignificant in the presence of the firm size factor. The research results of this chapter can provide some reference for subsequent policy-making and investment decisions in the Chinese real estate market.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship among negative media coverage, law environment and tunneling of controlling shareholders.

Under the Chinese especial institutional background, this paper empirically test the relationship among negative media coverage, law environment and tunneling of controlling shareholders with the sample of 2009-2011 Chinese listed companies.

The empirical results demonstrate that negative media coverage can reduce tunneling of controlling shareholder, and compared with state-owned listed companies, negative media coverage have a greater effect on tunneling in non-state-owned listed companies; and negative media coverage have a greater effect on tunneling in areas with better law environment. Further study shows that the reduction of controlling shareholder’s behavior of tunneling can improve company performance, and the improvement is more significant in non-state-owned listed companies and areas with better law environment. The research results indicate that media coverage play a very active role on restraining stakeholder’s behavior and perfecting corporate governing.

First, this paper will study of tunneling from the perspective of media coverage for the first time. Second, this paper further analyzes how the decrease of tunneling improves corporate performance following the research of how media coverage influence tunneling. Third, this study enrich literatures about the effects of media coverage on corporate governance in Chinese capital market.