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This study aims to examine how sharia supervisory board (SSB) characteristics are determinants of the maqashid sharia performance (MSP) of Islamic banks (IBs) and how MSP has implications for profitability and for profit-sharing investment account holders (PSIAHs).

MSP is ascertained by semi-structured interviews. The SSB characteristics measured are size, cross-membership, education level, expertise, reputation, rotation and remuneration. Annual reports of Indonesian and Malaysian IBs from 2010 to 2018 are analysed using panel data regression.

In Indonesia, SSB education level attenuates MSP, while other characteristics have only minor influence. However, in Malaysia, SSB size, education and reputation reinforce MSP, while others are ineffective. MSP in both countries is pseudo-Islamic; so their customers ignore religiosity. However, MSP in Malaysia can improve profitability because sharia assurance is more transparent; meanwhile, MSP in Indonesia cannot improve profitability because sharia assurance is less transparent.

In order for MSP to improve in Indonesia, the regulators need to increase SSB size, reduce cross-membership and arrange the format for sharia assurance in SSB reports, while IBs need to increase SSB education and expertise.

MSP is constructed in accordance with legal and social requirements to achieve IBs’ Islamic, economic, social and ethical objectives. Resource dependence theory is used to evaluate SSB, while PSIAH and profitability are investigated to demonstrate the impact of MSP. Finally, comparing SSB capabilities in Indonesia and Malaysia could be beneficial to regulatory and IB policies.

This paper is an empirical study of the effect of the characteristics of the Sharia supervisory board (SSB) on the financial performance of Islamic banks.

Using 42 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Islamic banks outside the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and non-Islamic countries during the 2011/2018 period, a random-effects generalized lease square method for the regression analyzes is applied.

The obtained results show that the characteristics of the SSB affect the financial performance of Islamic banks. The results also affirm that a large-sized board of directors and the number of SSB meetings improve banking performance while the cross-mandate seems to destroy it. On the other hand, the SSB members’ competence and reputation and the proportion of women sitting in SSB have no impact on the financial performance of Islamic banks.

This paper gives a comprehensive literature survey on the effect of the characteristics of the SSB on the financial performance of Islamic banks.

This study offers insights into the practitioner and Islamic banking regulators interested in enhancing the legitimacy of corporate governance in Islamic financial institutions.

This paper is among the few studies that investigate the effect of the characteristics of SSB on the financial performance of Islamic banks in particular in Islamic banks in the MENA region outside the GCC and in non-Islamic countries.

The purpose of this paper is to systematically review the study of the relationship between sharia governance (SG), which is represented by the Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB), and internal sharia compliance, and whether it can affect the performance of Islamic banking.

Literature search consists of two steps: random literature review and systematic literature review. The methodology adopted in this article is a systematic literature review.

The variable of internal sharia compliance, sharia risk and internal sharia audit on one of the indications of SG newly researched variable which will later be used as a new paradigm, to measure the implementation of Islamic sharia principles in sharia banking.

The development of a conceptual framework by using measurement of the new SG has practical implications for sharia bank, which can later be applied to also increase sharia banking performance by complying with Islamic sharia principles. This new concept can be used as a reference by the Financial Service Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan) to establish regulations regarding SG framework, especially in Indonesia.

Further research can add more of it or replace it with other variables that are more relevant, in such a way that it could be empirically tested on how the independence and remuneration (lit. performance allowance) of SSB and the internal sharia control team can affect the performance of sharia banks.

The purpose of this study is to discuss the extent to which Indonesian Islamic banks (IBs) disclose corporate social responsibility (CSR) according to the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) index. It also empirically examines the determinants of CSR disclosure in Indonesian IBs, based on disclosure from AAOIFI index, which is based on Islamic principles.

The determinant used in this paper is the corporate governance (CG) mechanism, which focuses on the board of commissioners (BOC) and Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) and their characteristics. The paper uses multiple regression analysis to examine the influence of these variables on CSR.

The results indicate that the level of CSR disclosure of IBs measured by the AAOIFI index continues to be low. The statistical results reveal that CSR disclosure has an insignificant relationship with BOC size and SSB qualifications, while the other results show a negative association between the composition of independent BOCs and CSR disclosure, and the frequency of BOC and SSB meeting has a positive effect on this.

The study focuses on Indonesian IBs. The variables of the CG mechanism are limited to the BOC and SSB, while the BOC exists only in countries that adopt two-tier boards.

IBs should provide a wider range of information to be disclosed. The government should establish specific items that need to be disclosed by IBs, considering there are no specific CSR disclosure regulations for IBs in Indonesia.

This study uses the AAOIFI index, which may be a suitable measure of CSR in IBs. The study also analyzes why certain items in the index have a high disclosure level and others do not.

This study aims to provide empirical evidence on the contingency factors that affect the implementation of education strategies and the impact of education strategy misfit on the performance and effectiveness of the board’s moderating role on the misfit level and performance of Islamic banks.

This research is a quantitative study with pooled ordinary least square panel data during the years 2007-2014 from all Indonesian Islamic commercial banks. Islamic bank performances are measured by the level of profitability and sharia financial performance. Board effectiveness is analysed by measuring the effectiveness of both the board of commissioners (BoC) and the sharia supervisory board (SSB).

This study proves that organisational competent qualities and chief executive officer tenure are the contingency factors that affect the implementation of the education strategy. This study’s results indicate that the effectiveness of both the BoC and SSB has a positive impact on the bank’s profitability and sharia financial performance. The results also show that misfit has a negative effect on sharia financial performance and that board effectiveness is proved to reduce the negative impact of a misfit on sharia financial performance. However, there is no strong evidence that board effectiveness reduces the negative impact of a misfit on profitability.

This study emphasises the importance of enhancing the competence and innovation of organisations in the implementation of education strategy and the need for synergy and increased capabilities among board members to achieve well-established Islamic bank performance.

The authors explore the level and determinants of compliance with Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institution’s (AAOIFI) financial and governance standards by Islamic banks (IBs).

The sample consists of 43 IBs across eight countries. The authors use ordinary least squares regression analyses to examine the impact of bank-specific characteristics and corporate governance (CG) mechanisms concerned with Board of Directors (BOD) and Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) on the levels of compliance with AAOIFI standards.

The paper finds that the average compliance level based on AAOIFI standards concerning the SSB is 68 per cent; corporate social responsibility (CSR) is 27 per cent; and presentation of financial statements (FSs) is 73 per cent. The aggregate disclosure based on the three indices is 56 per cent. The analysis also shows that size, existing Sharia-auditing department, age and CG of SSB are the main determinants of compliance levels.

The determinants of compliance with AAOIFI standards for IBs around the world have not been explored before, and therefore, this paper is the first of its kind to this issue.

This study aims to examine diversity in the composition of Shariah supervisory boards (SSBs) of Islamic banks (IBs). It investigates diversity from two perspectives: existing composition of SSBs and the regulatory frameworks and standards of selected Organisation of Islamic Cooperation countries. Diversity characteristics include education, nationality, gender and age.

A list of all full-fledged Islamic commercial banks (FFICBs) globally has been carefully prepared and confirmed. Conventional banks with Islamic windows, non-commercial banks, takaful companies and other Islamic financial institutions are excluded. The available profiles of 428 SSB members have been scrutinised and analysed. These board members occupy 522 SSB positions in 238 FFICBs operating in 52 countries around the globe. From the regulatory perspective, 12 national and international Shariah governance frameworks and standards have been examined.

Findings of this paper indicate various levels of diversity in SSBs of the reviewed IBs. The level of diversity in educational background and in the nationality of SSBs can be described as generally acceptable. However, a lack of diversity in gender and age among SSB members is evidently observed in IBs. While the lack of age diversity in SSBs may be relatively justified as a common trend in the composition of corporate boards, SSBs of IBs are seriously lagging behind in gender diversity. On the regulatory level, this study concluded that provisions on diversity as a requirement in SSBs are almost non-existent in the existing regulatory frameworks and standards.

The major limitation of this study is the lack of available information on the SSB members.

This paper provides insights for IBs and policymakers concerned with the corporate governance of IBs and all Islamic financial institutions. First, it offers an excellent bird’s-eye view of the status of diversity in SSBs of IBs. Second, it motivates policymakers and standard-setting bodies to ensure, through the relevant regulatory frameworks, adequate levels of diversity in the composition of SSBs. Diversity in SSBs of IBs and Islamic financial institutions should be given special emphasis, not only in boards and top management positions but also in the workplace. This is of profound significance to the reputation of Islamic finance industry which has been recently under mounting pressure to translate the rhetoric about the Islamic finance industry being ethical, fair, just, equitable and inclusive into genuine implementations.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first of its kind to examine the diversity of SSB members from the regulatory as well as from the implementation perspective.

This study aims to analyse the relationship between management ownership and the performance of Islamic microfinance institutions (MFIs) using panel data from Indonesian Islamic rural banks (Bank Pembiayaan Rakyat Syariah [BPRS]).

This study uses unbalanced quarterly panel data from BPRS during the period from 2011 to 2016. Performance, as the dependent variable in this study, is analysed based on three sets of measures, namely, profitability, efficiency and the financing risk. Management ownership, as the independent variable in this study, is represented by ownership by the board of directors (BOD), the board of commissioners (BOC) and the sharia supervisory boards (SSB).

The results show that ownership by the BOD and BOC does not have a significant relationship with profitability and efficiency. However, the BOD ownership has a negative relationship with the financing risk and vice versa for the BOC ownership. Additionally, the study reveals that ownership by the SSB plays a positive and significant role in increasing the profitability and efficiency but does not have a significant impact on the financing risk.

This is one of the first studies to provide empirical results regarding the relationship between management (BOD, BOC and SSB) ownership and the performance of BPRS. The finding reveals that ownership by the SSB is very important to increase the profitability and efficiency of the BPRS.

This study fills the gap in the literature about Islamic MFIs in Indonesia, especially the BPRS. This research also provides an insight into corporate governance practices and Islamic MFIs’ performance using BPRS data. The findings provide useful information for policy makers and regulators.

The purpose of this study include analyzing the conformity between the General Guidelines for the Governance of the Indonesian Sharia Entities (GGG-ISE) and the implementation in the field and proposing a model of corporate governance for Islamic property developers.

This research uses a qualitative method with a case study approach. The researcher used a structured interview method and chose a purposive technique to determine the interviewees. This study has seven interviewees representing three Islamic property developer companies in Jember Regency, East Java, Indonesia. Data collection was conducted from June to July 2023, with a duration of about 60 min for each interviewee. The interviews were conducted face-to-face in each interviewee’s residential office.

The results showed that the companies had implemented several principles of GGG-ISE, namely, ethical and responsible actors, risk management, internal control, compliance, disclosure and transparency by making financial reports, shareholder rights and stakeholder rights, both internal and external stakeholders. Furthermore, this study found that GGG-ISE does not comply with the components of the organizing organ group. This study also found that governance reports have not been implemented in GGG-ISE components. In addition, this study identified a new component that must be present and not found in GGG-ISE, namely, a statement of the use of contracts for mudharib owners and between mudharib owners and stakeholders. Based on these findings, this study proposes a governance model for Islamic property developer companies called the GGG-IPDE.

This research is a pioneer in proposing a corporate governance model for Islamic property developers.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance practices on cost efficiency and financial stability for a sample of Islamic and conventional banks. In the analysis, the author uses a set of corporate governance variables that include, the board size, board independence, director gender, board meetings, board attendance, board committees, chair independence and CEO characteristics.

The author uses corporate governance data of Islamic banks that is unique in this field. In the analysis, the author also uses stochastic frontier analysis and panel vector autoregression models to quantify long-run and short-run statistical relationships between the operational efficiency of Islamic Banks and corporate governance practices.

According to the results, Islamic and conventional banks exhibit important differences in the effects of corporate governance practices on cost efficiency and financial stability. Results show that with a blind general adoption of corporate governance practices, Islamic banks may suffer a loss in their value since the adoption of the third layer of binding practices, over and above the already existing ones, imposed by the Sharia Board and the Board of Directors, may lead to cumbersome business operations. This conclusion is of importance to Islamic Banks since they struggle to survive in a very competitive international environment.

The author believes that the results may be of a certain value to regulators, policymakers and managers of Islamic banks. Based on the results, the author postulate that Islamic banks should select carefully international corporate governance practices.

Islamic banks should not adopt additional third layer of binding practices as that would result lower performance and instability that would be damaging for the economy

This study employs a unique sample of Islamic banks that includes corporate governance data hand collected. Our findings of the corporate governance impact on Islamic banks performance and stability are therefore unique in the literature.