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Purpose – The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship of the efficient management of shareholder value as the main objective of corporate governance systems with stakeholder theory.

Design/Methodology – The study uses data from 29 emerging market economies from 1997 to 2006. In order to control possible endogeneity issue, generalized two-stage least squares (G2SLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation techniques were conducted using country-level panel data.

Findings – The results provide evidence that the efficient management of shareholder value is strongly associated with managers' credibility, social responsibility, employment, and customer satisfaction, suggesting that emerging market economies should consider the interests of stakeholders for the efficient management of shareholder value.

Originality/Value – This is the first study of its kind that attempts to explore the association of the efficient management of shareholder value with country-level determinants of stakeholder theory.

Research Limitations/Implications – The lack of sufficient data is a major problem in international studies. This study also has some limitations in this respect as some emerging economies have not been included in the sample.

This paper studies the impact of ownership structure on performance in European banking both prior and during the recent crisis. We use a panel of European banks during the period 1996–2011 and utilize random effects estimations in order to identify differences in bank performance (profitability, loan quality, and cost efficiency) due to differences in ownership structure. Both stakeholder and shareholder banks have distinct advantages, shareholder banks showing better profitability before the crisis but stakeholder banks having higher loan quality before and during the crisis. Differences in profitability and loan quality between stakeholder and shareholder banks before the crisis are especially pronounced in countries that experienced a banking crisis after 2007. There is strong a heterogeneity in performance between different stakeholder ownership groups. With the exception of private savings banks, profitability and loan quality of stakeholder banks has improved relative to that of general shareholder banks during the crisis years. The paper contributes to the previous literature by comparing pre-crisis and crisis performance and includes more refined ownership classifications. The results indicate that the survival of the stakeholder model is due to its competitive advantages. Our findings provide support for those arguing that the diversity of organizational structures is worth preserving. Ownership pluralism should become a policy objective in the banking industry.

This study aims to present a pedagogical approach that allows students to discuss and debate the differences between two competing models of corporate governance – the shareholder primacy philosophy and the stakeholder value viewpoint.

This study first presents the conceptual bases for each framework, noting that while shareholder primacy is the historically dominant approach to corporate governance that guide strategic business actions in the USA, pressures from investor and societal groups and government agencies have forced publicly traded companies to recognize the need to take stakeholder interests into account in strategic decision-making, as is the dominant model in Europe and other parts of the world. This study then provides a pedagogical structure on how these opposing perspectives can be used to foster discussion, debate and reflection within the classroom.

This paper presents a pedagogical structure that allows students to recognize the competing pressures that businesses face of maximizing profits versus concerns over social causes. There are a number of positive pedagogical outcomes that can be realized from a classroom discourse on the differing perspectives on strategic management, corporate governance and social responsibility.

This pedagogical structure should help future business leaders throughout the world understand the differences between the two models of corporate governance. This study offers suggestions on how this pedagogical structure can be used in the student assessment process.

This study fills a gap in the literature by providing a pedagogical structure to guide discussion and debate on the competing theories of corporate governance and how organizational decision-makers can devise strategies to manage the potential competing demands that can arise from the shareholder versus stakeholder models. It is highly relevant and well-suited for courses such as Business Law, Business Policy, Business and Society and Ethics.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between corporate governance structures and stakeholder and shareholder value maximization perspectives in 267 African banks from 2006 to 2011.

The authors used the Prais–Winsten ordinary least squares and random effect regression models to explore this relationship to ensure consistency and efficiency in results. The data for this study were collected from Bankscope.

The results of this study show that corporate governance structures such as CEO duality, nonexecutive members and extreme large board size lead to a reduction in both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. However, audit independence and board size also promote both shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. Although gender diversity promotes profit maximization, it was not significant in any of the models estimated. The results further suggest that the same corporate governance structures promote and detract shareholder and stakeholder value maximization in Africa although the effect of corporate governance structures was weightier on shareholder value maximization confirming the agency theory.

From these findings, bank management must pursue the institution of good corporate governance structures and avoid weak corporate governance structures to promote shareholder and stakeholder value maximization. Also equity holders may have to pay particular attention to corporate governance structures because they benefit the most from the institution of good corporate governance structures.

This study explores and compares how corporate governance structures promote shareholder and stakeholder value maximization separately in African banks. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first of such studies.

The recent financial crisis has restarted the debate of the value of both shareholder and stakeholder theories. This paper aims to continue this discussion.

The paper reviews existing literature and examines the benefits and problems associated with these frameworks through the lens of the recent events which have taken place during the financial crisis.

The main assertion of this paper is that shareholder theory is in itself a sound theory. Yet, some executives following this theory could have brought disrepute to it. In contrast, the stakeholder theoretical framework has yet to assert its influence because the concept is not yet unambiguously defined, which makes it difficult for the framework to become operational in practical business settings.

Future research should seek consensus on the scope and definition of the stakeholder model, as well as who the stakeholders should include. It should also focus on developing the tools and techniques necessary for the incorporation of stakeholder theory into business operations.

Policy makers could work with industry bodies and business leaders to encourage them to place greater emphasis on the interests of non‐shareholders and encourage collaboration between various groups of stakeholders to achieve corporate goals.

The paper continues the shareholder and stakeholder theory debate in light of the recent economic crisis.

Scanning both the academic and popular business literature of the last 40 years puzzles the alert reader. The variety of prescriptions of how to be successful (effective, performing, etc.) 1 Organizational performance, organizational success and organizational effectiveness will be used interchangeably throughout this paper.1 in business is hardly comprehensible: “Being close to the customer,” Total Quality Management, corporate social responsibility, shareholder value maximization, efficient consumer response, management reward systems or employee involvement programs are but a few of the slogans introduced as means to increase organizational effectiveness. Management scholars have made little effort to integrate the various performance-enhancing strategies or to assess them in an orderly manner.

This study classifies organizational strategies by the importance each strategy attaches to different constituencies in the firm’s environment. A number of researchers divide an organization’s environment into various constituency groups and argue that these groups constitute – as providers and recipients of resources – the basis for organizational survival and well-being. Some theoretical schools argue for the foremost importance of responsiveness to certain constituencies while stakeholder theory calls for a – situation-contingent – balance in these responsiveness levels. Given that maximum responsiveness levels to different groups may be limited by an organization’s resource endowment or even counterbalanced, the need exists for a concurrent assessment of these competing claims by jointly evaluating the effect of the respective behaviors towards constituencies on performance. Thus, this study investigates the competing merits of implementing alternative business philosophies (e.g. balanced versus focused responsiveness to constituencies). Such a concurrent assessment provides a “critical test” of multiple, opposing theories rather than testing the merits of one theory (Carlsmith, Ellsworth & Aronson, 1976).

In the high tolerance level applied for this study (be among the top 80% of the industry) only a handful of organizations managed to sustain such a balanced strategy over the whole observation period. Continuously monitoring stakeholder demands and crafting suitable responsiveness strategies must therefore be a focus of successful business strategies. While such behavior may not be a sufficient explanation for organizational success, it certainly is a necessary one.

Considering the standards developed by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), this study aims to examine whether the link between material sustainability and financial performance depends on the extent to which the company is oriented toward stakeholders.

To test the predictions, 13,942 firm-year observations from 43 different countries are used, covering the period from 2010 to 2019. Using a hand-mapping approach to match the indicators suggested by the SASB with those of the ASSET4, the authors realize that there are 170 material sustainability indicators among 466 indicators of the ASSET4. The authors use three different methods to verify if the materiality matters, including the alphas obtained from the Fama and French factor models, comparing the average abnormal returns of the portfolios and the bootstrapped Cramer technique.

The findings show that companies investing in material sustainability activities perform better than those investing in immaterial activities. Also, consistent with the theoretical foundations, the authors find that the effect of investing in material sustainability activities is more pronounced in stakeholder-oriented countries than that in shareholder-oriented countries. The results are robust to a battery of sensitivity tests.

Owing to COVID-19 in late 2019, data from 2020 to 2022 have not been used to obtain reliable results.

The results obtained in the current research provide valuable guidance for investors to make investments considering the degree of materiality of sustainability activities in different industries. It also helps managers to increase the company’s financial performance, make efficient decisions related to investment in sustainability activities and find investment strategies on the material sustainability issues in their industries.

This study provides a clearer understanding of investment in sustainability activities in different industries by separating material and immaterial sustainability activities in stakeholder and shareholder-oriented countries, and the results obtained can change the perspective of investors and company managers regarding investing in such activities in different countries. Investing in more materiality sustainability activities than the immateriality dimension can be new opportunities for companies to achieve predetermined goals, help retain and attract business partners or be a source of innovation for new product lines or services. Internal morale and employee engagement may increase while increasing productivity and firm performance. This discussion opens the way for future research.

This study provides insight into the effect of investing in material and immaterial sustainability activities in different industries on the company’s performance in shareholder and stakeholder-oriented countries.

In recent years, many corporations have initiated downsizing programs to eliminate jobs, close facilities and withdraw from major lines of business. These initiatives have been justified in the name of creating “lean and efficient” organizations. In many cases, top management is rewarded with large bonus compensation packages. Such rewards are considered to be consistent with the goal of maximizing shareholder value. We compare stakeholder and shareholder value models of management accountability to gain insights into the broader economic and societal consequences of the current financial reporting model. Specifically, we examine downsizing at United Technologies Corporation to demonstrate how current financial reporting practices privilege shareholder/management interests over other stakeholders and favor actions that may result in detrimental effects to corporate stakeholders and society at large. This paper extends extant research by providing a concrete example of how “generally‐accepted” financial reports may be used to analyze economic events (like corporate downsizing) through multiple perspectives.

This paper aims to show how organisation theory can be used to understand the controversy between the shareholder and the stakeholder perspectives. Rationalistic and open system theories may enhance research on corporate governance by offering well-defined concepts and by specifying core relationships.

This paper applies descriptions of the two perspectives in organisation theory as a “method” for illustrating how they are linked to and support the shareholder versus the stakeholder perspectives.

The controversy stems from the fact that the shareholder and the stakeholder perspectives address different relationships. The shareholder perspective captures two relationships that accord with rationalistic organisation theory: shareholders are managing the managers and the organisation, and managers are managing the corporation on behalf of the owners. The stakeholder perspective focuses on three relationships that are not concordant with system theory: managers are managing the shareholders (i.e. the symbolic management of stockholders), managers are managing the corporation (i.e. general management theory) and managers are managing the stakeholders.

Organisation theory provides suggestions for more fruitful definitions of the often-used concepts of direction, control, administration and influence. These terms may be substituted with the well-defined concepts of management, power and control.

Proponents of organisation theory find it theoretically difficult to deal with the topic of corporate governance, if they do at all. When they do, they do it only perfunctorily.

Organisation theory may strengthen research on corporate governance if we insist on both theoretical clarifications of major relationships and on the use of more strictly defined concepts.

The purpose of the paper is to clarify the relationship between stakeholder interests and the ownership of a company, and to specify the distinctions between three types of maximization: shareholder‐, stakeholder‐owner‐ and total stakeholder maximization.

This conceptual paper first analyzes how company‐related rents are connected to different stakeholder groups. These rents are defined as the monetary and non‐monetary returns from stakeholder involvement in a company, in excess of what stakeholders could achieve from their best alternatives. The paper distinguishes between general stakeholder benefits and the additional owner benefits a stakeholder secures by having controlling ownership. The stakeholder having the highest net benefits (benefits minus costs), and thus paying the highest price for ownership, will be the controlling owner. The controlling stakeholder‐owners' benefits are those which are maximized by the company. This leads to the second part of the paper, which analyzes different types of maximization.

The general type of maximization that companies pursue is stakeholder‐owner maximization. Maximization of shareholder value is a special case of stakeholder‐owner maximization. Only under quite restrictive assumptions is shareholder maximization larger or equal to stakeholder‐owner maximization. Total stakeholder maximization is calculated on the sum of the returns to all stakeholders including shareholders. Because of problems of measurement and practical application, total stakeholder maximization is difficult or impossible to achieve. Firms generally approximate to total stakeholder maximization by implementing stakeholder‐owner maximization under constraints defined by other stakeholder interests. With stronger regulation, pressure from different stakeholder groups, and more emphasis on corporate social responsibility, the decision area where the company can simultaneously maximize stakeholder‐owners' returns and stakeholder interests will be increased.

This paper breaks new ground by linking controlling ownership and stakeholder interests/rents. This is used to give precise definitions on three types of maximization: shareholder‐, stakeholder‐owner, and total stakeholder maximization.