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The role played by corporate governance mechanisms on corporate deleveraging policies has not been clarified. Empirical evidence is confined to developed economies, even with conflicting and inconclusive results. This paper aims to examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership structure, board composition and CEO dominance, in explaining corporate deleveraging policies.

Using a sample of listed Pakistani firms between 2010 and 2022, this study resorts to binary response models to examine the effects of governance mechanisms on firms’ decision to go debt-free.

A greater ownership concentration, institutional ownership and family ownership increase the propensity for zero leverage. Board gender diversity decreases the propensity for deleveraging policies, which seems to indicate that the presence of females reinforces the monitoring function of the board. Finally, lower managerial ownership or CEO dominance decreases the propensity toward zero leverage (interest convergence hypothesis), but higher managerial ownership or CEO dominance increases the propensity toward zero leverage (managerial entrenchment hypothesis).

Risk-averse managers who prefer to control a firm using little or no debt will find it easier to implement these financing policies in firms with greater ownership concentration and where institutional holders have a substantial stake. For shareholders, this study suggests that investing in firms with females on board reduces the risk of corporate deleveraging policies being adopted for entrenched reasons.

The presence of females on board seems to decrease the propensity of managers to adopt opportunistic actions and may also contribute to enhancing human welfare and society in developing countries.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study considering the effect of board diversity on zero leverage. Another singularity is that this study exhibits a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and corporate deleveraging policy.

This study aims to examine the effect of CEO compensation risk, as measured by the proportion of equity-based pay (option and stock awards) relative to total compensation and pay sensitivity to stock volatility, on CEO pay for luck asymmetry. This paper also empirically examines CEO compensation risk as a mediating variable between the regulatory changes and CEO pay for luck asymmetry.

This paper test the proposed two hypothesis that CEO compensation risk is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry; and the pay related regulations implemented around 2006 could mitigate the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry using the fixed-effects regression models.

Consistent with the managerial talent retention hypothesis, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk, as measured by the equity-based pay as a proportion of CEO total compensation and CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility, is positively associated with the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, this paper find that CEO pay for luck asymmetry is significantly reduced by the major regulatory changes on executive compensation implemented around 2006.

This study is among the very few studies exploring the impact of CEO compensation risk on pay for luck asymmetry in the literature. While the major purpose of the widely used stock options is to align executive interests and shareholder values, it also tends to increase the risk level of CEO compensation. So, a well-designed CEO pay package should protect risk-averse CEOs from bad luck for the retention purpose, which is also beneficial to shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, future research on executive compensation needs to examine the issue from various perspectives.

For board of directors who is responsible for the compensation of CEOs, it is necessary to consider a broad range of factors when designing an optimal CEO pay package.

The findings on the impact of regulations on CEO pay for luck asymmetry suggest that the executive-pay-related regulations around 2006 have indeed achieved some of their intended goals to significantly lower pay for nonperformance asymmetry, whereby CEO pay sensitivity to stock volatility has been identified as a major mediating variable.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck asymmetry in several perspectives. First, this paper finds that CEO compensation risk has a positive impact on the degree of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. Second, this paper finds that the CEO pay for luck asymmetry has been mitigated after 2006 when various regulatory changes on executive compensation began to be implemented in the USA. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is among the very few studies investigating these issues in the literature.

Supply chain revamping (SCR) is an important strategy for firms to improve their supply chain operations in a rapidly changing environment. The purpose of this study is to shed light on the impact of SCR on shareholder value.

Based on Signaling Theory and 184 SCR announcements published by US-listed firms from 2013 to 2018, this study employs event study methodology and empirically examines three issues: Antecedents of SCRs; Primary purposes and actions of SCRs; In addition to the impact of SCRs on shareholder value using stock returns, we also examined the factors that can influence the extent of stock returns.

Firstly, our results indicate that SCRs are primarily driven by firms’ poor prior performance, CEO turnover and external control threats (ECTs). Secondly, the stock market favors SCRs aiming to meet customer needs and those accomplished through network remodel. However, the market reacts negatively to SCRs aiming at cutting costs, improving poor performance, and those implemented through network trim. Finally, the cross-sectional analysis indicates that shareholders prefer firms operating in more competitive or faster-growing industries and those adopting an expansionist strategy than those adopting a streamlining strategy.

Our study provides managers with valuable insights into when firms can benefit from initiating SCRs not only by examining the purposes and actions of SCRs but also by examining the industry- and strategy-specific moderators. Our study illuminates the conditions under which SCR will positively affect shareholder value. Additionally, this study contributes to the existing literature by deepening the understanding of the impact of supply chain decisions on firm performance and identifying the marginal conditions under which the stock market will react positively to SCR announcements.

This study aims to investigate the association between the co-option of the chief financial officer (CFO) and dividend payments, assessing whether the talent of the CFO affects this association.

The empirical analyses were based on hand-collected data for 922 firm-year observations from 157 European listed firms, during the period 2013–2019. Empirical models, based on a two-step estimation procedure, involved the use of instrumental variables and the generalised moment method.

The results show that CFO co-option is negatively associated with the level of dividend payments. It was also found that the degree of CFO talent moderates the negative association between CFO co-option and dividend payments.

This investigation responds to the call for literature which examines how chief executive officer (CEO) – CFO relationships influence firms’ policies and outcomes. The study offers novel evidence for the individual-level characteristics of CFOs which are likely to reduce the effectiveness of CEO power and increase monitoring on corporate decisions on dividends.

The study sheds light on the effect of the interactions between CEOs and CFOs, which are important for investors’ expectations. In this regard, investors may be interested in the CFO profiles which may reduce CEO power over dividend policies.

Unlike previous research, which focused on CEOs, the authors are the first to shed light on the role of CFOs as key decision makers in influencing the dividend policies in modern corporations.

The aim of this paper is to propose a basis upon which accounting reporting can be developed to reflect real values and the real economy. It aims to address the environmental considerations discussed in the UN debate (Bebbington and Unerman, 2020) and the concern for a “better life-world”, which is the theme of this special issue.

Addressing the task involves the application of the philosophy of pragmatic constructivism (which explains how people can relate to their reality in ways that lead to successful action) and the philosophical concept of the “good life” (which establishes the values to be pursued through action and so defines action success). Also, it outlines the necessary characteristics of measurement frameworks if they are to be effective in the development and control of human practices to achieve desired values.

This paper proposes a conceptual framework for guiding the measurement of how a sustainable good life has improved and/or deteriorated as a result of organisational activities. It outlines a system of concepts on basic and instrumental values for analysing the condition of maintaining a sustainable good life in real terms. This is related to the financial results and societal regulations to analyse and adjust controls according to the real economic goals. Also, it provides a system of value measurands to produce valid information about the development of a sustainable good life. The measurand makes accounting reporting reflect the conditions of the good life that constitute the real economy instead of merely the financial economy driven by shareholder capitalism. Providing tools to analyse whether the existing practices of business and social regulations promote or counteract the real economic goals of producing a sustainable good life means the measurement system proposed makes the invisible hand of the market visible.

The mechanism proposed to enable accounting reporting to reflect real values and the real economy is a new conceptual framework that will allow accounting to more fully realise its potential to contribute to a “better world”. In aiming to serve a sustainable good life, accounting reporting will inherently foster ethical social practices.

This study examines how corporate litigation, both securities-related and not, is affected by hedge fund (HF) activism.

We use a difference-in-differences (DiD) method, along with propensity score matching and firm fixed effects and a comparison of HF and non-HF activists for identification.

We find that companies that are targeted by HFs face operation-related lawsuits, mainly from stakeholders or competitors. This effect does not seem to be caused by targets' higher tendency to settle the cases. Our evidence shows that HF activists increase firm value for the target firms that are prone to litigation.

Therefore, our evidence supports the idea that the higher operation litigation risks are unintended consequences of improving firm efficiency through cost savings or restructuring of target firms by the activists.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and the environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure score on bank performance and financial stability. Further, this paper analyses how this relationship varies over the different ownership structures.

The paper uses a sample of 41 Indian banks (including both public sector and private sector banks) over the period ranging from 2008 to 2020. The data is analyzed in both static and dynamic frameworks using panel regression and system generalized methods of moments.

The results indicate that the frequency of board meetings has a negative influence on the performance of the banks. Gender diversity reveals both linear and non-linear relationships with bank performance. In the sample of public sector banks, the board size and promoters’ ownership have a significant negative effect on the bank's performance. In private sector banks, CEO duality adversely affects performance. Further, the results indicate that ESG disclosure score is positively linked with the profitability of banks.

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and ESG disclosure scores on bank performance and stability in the context of the Indian economy. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there has been no empirical investigation or study that has been conducted in this respect.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and how chair-chief executive officer (CEO) generational difference is related to debt financing.

This paper adopts the pooled ordinary least squares and system generalized method of moments estimation procedures to analyze listed firms in Malaysia from 2013 to 2017.

The results reveal that chair-CEO generational difference is negatively associated with leverage. The evidence suggests that substantial age gaps between the chair and CEO precipitate cognitive conflicts, which lead to better monitoring and control. This results in better governance and less information asymmetry, causing firms to depend less on debt as a board monitoring mechanism. The findings provide support to the theory posited in this paper on the substitutability of chair-CEO generational difference and debt financing.

This is the first attempt to investigate the substitutability of chair-CEO generational difference and debt financing.

The purpose of this study is to determine the moderating effect of group affiliation (GA) while examining the relationship of corporate governance (CG) with firm performance (FP) and firm risk-taking (FRT).

The study employed a sample of 100 non-financial firms, selected randomly from the top 500 companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) based on their market capitalisation for 2013–2022. The random effects and fixed effect models are employed for the analysis. Furthermore, the generalised estimating equations (GEE) population-averaged model is used for added robustness.

The results reveal that while strong CG improves FP, GA modifies the effect of CG on FP. Both GA and CG have beneficial effects, but their synergy is insignificant. However, in the context of CG and FRT, the study unveils that a strong CG is associated with a reduction in FRT, and this relationship is more pronounced for standalone firms.

To the best of the authors' knowledge, the present study is a maiden attempt to investigate the moderating effect of GA while examining the relationship of CG with FP and FRT.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.