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In this paper, we explore an extensive panel data set covering more than 4,000 listed firms in 16 European countries to study the effects of shareholder protection on ownership structure and firm performance. We document a negative firm-level correlation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration. Differentiating between shareholder types, we find that this pattern is mainly driven by strategic investors. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between shareholder protection and block ownership of institutional investors, in particular when we restrict the analysis to independent institutional investors. Finally, we find that independent institutional investors are positively associated with firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. The opposite applies for strategic investors. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that (i) high shareholder protection and (ii) limited ownership by strategic investors make small investors and investors interested in security returns more confident in their investments.

This paper aims to examine how country-level corporate governance structures influence the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in the context of Africa.

Data are collected from the world competitiveness report for the period 2010-2015. To examine the validity of the study’s hypotheses empirically, the authors use ordinary least squares with correlated panel-corrected standards error (PCSE).

This paper offers additional empirical evidence on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in Africa. It highlights that country-level corporate governance structures such as efficacy of corporate boards, strength of investor confidence, regulations of securities exchanges and the operation of the Big 4 accounting firms have significant positive impacts on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

This paper fails to include all African countries because of non-availability of a report for some African countries. Thus, the findings on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in a country are applicable to the countries used in this study.

This paper emphasizes on the relevance of country-level corporate governance structures to ensuring a reasonable level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

This paper partially fills the gap regarding the absence of an empirical cross-country study on how country-level corporate governance structures influence the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of legal protection of bank minority shareholders (noncontrolling shareholders) and bank creditors (e.g. depositors or debt-holders) on bank dividend payout policies using a panel data set of 5,918 banks from 52 countries over the period 1998-2007, after controlling for country-level deposit insurance coverage and bank- and country-level regulatory pressures.

Tobit panel regression models are used to examine the impact of legal protection of shareholders and creditors on bank dividend payout amounts. And, logit panel regression models are used to examine the impact of legal protection of shareholders and creditors on banks’ likelihood to pay dividends.

The authors support the outcome hypothesis by finding that banks pay higher amount of dividends and, are more likely to pay dividends in strong minority shareholder protection countries. However, the authors reject the substitute hypothesis by finding that banks pay higher dividends and are more likely to pay dividends in weak creditor rights countries, and banks do not substitute weak creditor rights with lower dividend payout amounts. Contrary, the authors support the literature which argues the importance of creditor rights for capital market development because one possible reason for low dividend payouts in strong creditor rights countries could be that the banks retain more profits for extending more loans.

By finding that creditor rights index has a negative relation with bank dividend policies in contrast to its positive relation with nonfinancial firms’ dividend policies, the authors support the literature which argues that managers of banks give less importance to factors such as current degree of financial leverage, the contractual constraints such as dividend restrictions in debt contracts, and the financing considerations such as the cost of raising external funds, while deciding about the dividend payments. The authors also suggest to keep financial and nonfinancial firms separate, to better understand the dividend puzzle.

Extant literature recognizes that legal institutions such as shareholder protection and creditor rights affect corporate firms’ dividend policies significantly but largely excludes banking sector. This paper, by examining the relations between legal protection of shareholders and creditors and bank dividend policies, fills this research gap.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of some corporate governance mechanisms on the market risk (stock price return and volatility, exchange rate) and on the exchange rate and Treasury Bill during the financial crisis. In order to better clarify the firms’ resistance to financial crises, the effect of exchange rate, Treasury Bill and the market risk are also considered.

The study uses a sample data of the SBF 120 on a panel of 99 French firms over the period between 2006 and 2015 divided into three sub-periods: the first sub-period, which covers the period between December 31, 2006 and December 31, 2009, was characterized by the outbreak of the subprime crisis. The second sub-period considers the sovereign debt crisis in Europe between December 31, 2010 and December 31, 2012. The last sub-period includes the post-crisis period (December 31, 2013 to December 31, 2015). The GARCH and BEKK models are used to capture the effect of volatility and conditional heteroskedasticity of both corporate governance and market risk.

The paper found that during the financial crisis (first sub-period, the sovereign crisis period), the high shareholders’ protection had a positive and significant impact on the stock market returns. Furthermore, the shareholders’ protection, the Treasury Bill, the institutional investors, the board’s size, had a negative and significant effect on the stock returns volatility. During the post-crisis period, the high protection and the board’s size had a negative and significant effect on the volatility of the stock returns.

This result implies that during the financial crisis, the high shareholders’ protection played a role in increases the stock market return and minimized the stock return volatility.

This study helps in improving the legal protection of investors and helps managers, shareholders and investors to evaluate their investments. This study also provides implications for policymakers and legal environment in order to evaluate the importance of the current corporate governance frameworks in place.

This result implies that the institutional investors, as the results suggest, should follow the shareholders’ protection in all the countries to make decisions about their investments since the high shareholders’ protection increases the firm’s stock returns and decreases the stock return volatility.

The paper examines the relationship between board effectiveness and audit fees for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Furthermore, given the unique nature of SOEs, the paper assesses country-level influences, such as economic freedom, political democracy and protection of minority shareholders, which can impact board effectiveness and audit fees.

A combination of two-stage and ordinary least squares regression is used to examine the board characteristics-audit fee relationship for SOEs in a multinational setting during the period from 2016 to 2018.

The results indicate that board characteristics that represent a high level of effectiveness are associated with higher audit fees in SOEs. Furthermore, the findings suggest SOE's operating in countries evidencing medium levels of democracy and economic freedom and medium to high levels of protection of minority shareholders may be motivated to reduce agency conflicts by promoting accountability and transparency, thereby demanding increasing levels of corporate governance, monitoring and audit quality, thereby increasing audit fees.

The results provide further support for the OECD (2015) guidelines promoting the use of high-quality external audits in SOEs.

As a result of the scarceness of research in this area, the current study extends the literature by examining the role of corporate governance and audit fees in SOEs, while examining the influence of economic freedom, political democracy and protection of minority shareholders.

The purpose of the study is to investigate whether the relationship between financial development/investor protection and corporate commitment to sustainability is related to social contagion, neighborhood effect, and community effect.

The study applies correlation analysis, difference tests, and regression model to a sample comprised of 369 large firms listed on FTSE Global 500 covering 11 industries, located in 31 countries. This paper examines three country‐level variables, financial development index, shareholder rights index, and strength of investor protection, and five corporate commitment to sustainability measures, Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index, Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions (direct, electricity indirect, and other indirect GHG emissions), and the corresponding carbon intensity.

The results support the view that the relationship between financial development/investor protection and corporate commitment to sustainability is associated with social contagion, neighborhood effect, and community effect. Companies are more willing to commit to carbon disclosure for countries with higher financial development. Corporate commitment to sustainability is lower if neighbor countries' financial development or shareholder rights are high. Similarly, companies place less strategic importance on climate change issues if their community countries protect investors better, notwithstanding their relatively low level of other indirect GHG emissions.

Future research may build on this research by supplementing the current data with more variables such as domestic financial sector liberalization or measures, such as business environment, financial stability, and size, depth, and access. The negative relationship between commitment to sustainability and investor rights suggests that investor rights and commitment to sustainability are singing different tunes. Corporate commitment to sustainability does not keep pace with investor rights especially for countries with better shareholder rights or investor protection.

This study provides a new perspective on the relationship between financial development/investor protection and commitment to sustainability. This study contributes to the existing literature by using five measures of corporate commitment to sustainability based on firm‐specific data using a sample of the FTSE Global 500. This paper provides a better understanding of the relationship between country‐level characteristics and commitment to sustainability in an environment where global integration is relatively high.

The purpose of this paper is to study the capital structure of firms when controlling shareholders decide on the level of debt financing in an environment with poor legal protection.

Theoretically this paper uses a dynamic model to analyze how the controlling shareholder expropriates the firm's benefit through debt financing. Empirically this paper uses a sample of Chinese publicly listed firms from 2004 to 2007, through the method of OLS and panel data, to verify the theoretical predictions.

Theoretically this paper finds that firms with controlling shareholders will take excess debt financing in an environment of controlled interest rate and poor legal protection to minority shareholders. Government intervention exacerbates while controlling shareholder's cash flow rights constrains excess debt financing. The empirical results conclude that the improvement of the legal environment, limiting government intervention, and raising controlling shareholder's cash flow rights will effectively reduce excess debt level, as well as long‐term debt ratio.

First, this paper provides a theoretical model to explain the mechanism of how the ownership structure, legal environment and government intervention interact to impact debt financing. This result also provides a theory to explain the “paradox” in a transitional economy that better legal protection lowers debt level and long‐term debt ratio. Second, this paper provides further evidence on controlling shareholder's expropriation to minority shareholder through debt financing.

Considering corporate governance (CG hereinafter) practices' variety across Anglo-American and European countries, this study relies on contingency and complexity theories to investigate the effect of environmental sustainability performance (ESP hereinafter) on shareholder value under various configurations of board of directors (BoD hereinafter), firm and country characteristics.

The author used the Thomson Reuters Environment Pillar Score (ASSET4) and the Total Shareholder Return to assess ESP and shareholder value respectively. The author applied a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA hereinafter) to an unbalanced panel of 2,284 observations from 486 European and Anglo-American non-financial listed firms over the period 2016–2020.

The author found a positive association between ESP and shareholder value and he displayed notable differences between Anglo-American and European economies regarding causal predictors of this positive association. Within European firms operating under civil law code where investor protection is low and family ownership is widespread, ESP creates shareholder value under configurations of causal predictors that significantly differ from those of their Anglo-American peers. The author's findings are robust to different identification strategies.

This study assists researchers, practitioners, shareholders and policymakers the significant roles that BoD diversity, organisational and institutional traits are jointly playing as determinants of the ESP-shareholder value relationship.

The author's study offers a more encompassing, complete and theoretically richer picture of the key drivers and outcomes of ESP.

A company that is registered with share capital may issue different classes of shares and may confer rights on members, which place them in different classes in the company’s organisational structure. This paper is concerned with the propensity for encroachment on such vested class rights as companies strive to wriggle out of business challenges spawn by the COVID-19 pandemic. The purpose of this study is to ascertain the extent of protection that the law accords to the different classes of shareholders and members in a company especially when the company seeks to vary the vested class rights.

A doctrinal methodology, which relies on existing literature, case law and statutory instruments, is adopted to explore the nature of class rights and the adequacies of the remedial measures availed by statute to the aggrieved bearers of class rights in the context of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 with inferences drawn from the UK companies statute and case law.

The findings indicate that accessing the remedies available to aggrieved shareholders under the relevant statutory provisions are fraught with conditionality, which could make them elusive to those who may seek to rely on such provisions to vindicate any encroachment on their class rights.

The paper embodies cogent information on the interpretation and application of the relevant statutory provisions geared at the protection of shareholders class rights, which should serve as guides to companies and the courts in dealing with matters that affect the vested class rights of shareholders and members of a company.

The paper shows that protections offered to classes of shareholders under the law can also be extended to classes of members who are not necessarily shareholders, and that shareholders who seek to vindicate their class rights may conveniently rely on Section 163 that provides for unfair prejudice remedy to avoid the onerous conditions under Section 164 of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008, which directly deals with class rights.

The cultural and legal differences between foreign acquirers and African target firms can be substantial. There is also a large variation in cultures and legal systems within Africa. However, there is limited research on merger and acquisition (M&A) performance by foreign firms in Africa. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by exploring the “spillover by law” hypothesis (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008) that focuses on the influence of the external environment on the governance and performance of foreign M&As in Africa.

The data set covers 415 M&A transactions by foreign firms in Africa during the period of 1999–2016. Dynamic data covering the country’s legal, cultural and political environment are collected from the World Bank, the Heritage Foundation and Transparency International.

The authors find that the legal environment significantly affects the returns of bidders on African firms. For complete acquisitions, bidder returns are significantly higher when the bidder’s country has higher shareholder protection and higher creditor protection compared with the target firm’s country. The results show that the effects are significant when there is a full control change (including a change in the target firm’s nationality) but not in the case of partial control transfers. The results are consistent with the “spillover by law” hypothesis.

The authors contribute to the literature on cross-border M&As by separately studying the valuation effects of full, majority and minority changes in control; by being the first study of the legal spillover effects in Africa; and by being the most extensive study of the legal determinants of the valuations of non-African acquirers of African firms.