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21 – 30 of over 2000Nathalie Del Vecchio and Carine Girard
Purpose – This chapter presents the results of an exploratory study carried out on activist institutional investor strategies. It aims to identify the way in…
Abstract
Purpose – This chapter presents the results of an exploratory study carried out on activist institutional investor strategies. It aims to identify the way in which different types of institutional investors are reacting to new institutional pressures in the French context.
Design/methodology/approach – Our methodology is based on a series of semi-directive interviews, combined with additional relevant data.
Findings – The interpretation of results makes use of institutional theory, more specifically the work of Oliver (1991). Our study shows that active institutional investors may opt for different responses when confronted with new institutional pressures, and that these responses would seem to depend on antecedents underlined by Ryan and Schneider (2002), which in turn depend on the nature of their business relationships with the firm in which they invest. Whereas pressure-sensitive investors (such as banks and insurance companies) generally adopt acquiescence responses, pressure-resistant investors (such as pension funds and investment funds) pursue joint strategies of co-optation, influence or control with key actors such as local and international proxy advisors and French investor associations. Acting conjointly, certain pressure-resistant investors are often considered as institutional entrepreneurs in that they initiate changes and actively participate in the implementation of new norms in the field of shareholder activism in the French context. In parallel to this ongoing professionalization, other pressure-resistant investors such as activist hedge funds seem to lack sufficient legitimate power to be effective.
Originality/value – This chapter illustrates that the level of institutional investor activism depends largely on the relevant national legal framework. It also shows how institutional investor coalitions take advantage of new institutional pressures to enhance their legitimacy or increase the effectiveness of their action.
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The practice of corporate chief executive officer (CEOs) engaging in sociopolitical activism on issues both related and unrelated to their companies is gaining attention in the…
Abstract
Purpose
The practice of corporate chief executive officer (CEOs) engaging in sociopolitical activism on issues both related and unrelated to their companies is gaining attention in the popular press and among management scholars. The purpose of this paper is to explore the antecedents and motivations of CEO sociopolitical activism in a typology of influences internal and external to the CEO and to the organization. This study’s typology highlights the need for greater understanding of CEOs’ sociopolitical activism for the CEO as an individual actor and for the company they represent.
Design/methodology/approach
This study’s approach is to conceptually review the literature on CEO activism and to create a theoretic framework for future analysis of the antecedents and motivations and ramifications of CEOs’ sociopolitical activism for the CEO as an individual actor and for the company they represent. The author highlights four theories and seeks future application of these theories to the phenomena in a typology.
Findings
The typology highlights the application of management theories to various ramifications of CEO activism to four influences on CEO activities. Upper echelons theory helps explain the motivation of a CEO internally, whereas agency theory applies to CEO activism internal to the CEO and external to the organizational operations. External to the CEO, organizational culture theory supports responses internal to the organization, and stakeholder theory provides insight into responses external to the CEO and the organization.
Originality/value
This study provides conceptual support for the study of CEO activism and encourages future research on the topic.
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Following the traditions of stakeholder salience theory, this paper aims to contend that some institutional investor activists and tactics have more power, legitimacy and urgency…
Abstract
Purpose
Following the traditions of stakeholder salience theory, this paper aims to contend that some institutional investor activists and tactics have more power, legitimacy and urgency than others.
Design/methodology/approach
The author undertakes an empirical test of a saliency table looking at the effects of institutional investor heterogeneity on portfolio firm responses using ordinal logistic regression.
Findings
This study found heterogeneity for institutional investor type to drive firm responses but not tactic type raising the importance of the attributes of each type of investor activist. The author found a rank ordering of public pension plans, hedge funds and then private multiemployer funds in saliency to portfolio firms. In addition, the use of proxy-based tactics did not help or hurt each investor type. Both findings challenge prior empirical work.
Originality/value
The rank ordering based upon the heterogeneity of institutional investor activists and their tactical interactions are tested providing empirical evidence of the most influential activist investors and tactics in one study, which is rare in the literature.
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Pornanong Budsaratragoon, Suntharee Lhaopadchan and David Hillier
We investigate whether limited investor attention is a factor in the effectiveness of institutional shareholder activism. Prior research has shown that an inability of market…
Abstract
We investigate whether limited investor attention is a factor in the effectiveness of institutional shareholder activism. Prior research has shown that an inability of market participants to allocate sufficient intellectual effort to the investment decision can have an impact on market price and volume behavior. We extend this research in an applied setting by considering the effectiveness of the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) focus list, whose aim is to improve the performance and corporate governance of target firms. We find that the share price and volume response to being included in the focus list is a function of the investor attention in a stock, which in turn has an impact on the subsequent managerial response. This suggests that when attention is a scarce cognitive resource, the proactive exploitation of news signals can be an efficient activism strategy.
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Timothy A. Kruse and Kazunori Suzuki
This paper seeks to analyse Steel Partners' investments and activism targeting United Industrial, Ronson, and BKF Capital to provide context for the debate surrounding shareholder…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper seeks to analyse Steel Partners' investments and activism targeting United Industrial, Ronson, and BKF Capital to provide context for the debate surrounding shareholder activism by hedge funds and how incumbent management should cope with it. Steel Partners is one of the busiest and most controversial activist investors in both the USA and Japan.
Design/methodology/approach
An in‐depth clinical analysis of Steel Partners activism at three targets is performed. Context is then provided with a broader study of 63 companies targeted by Steel Partners.
Findings
The paper reveals that Steel achieved remarkably different degrees of success with each target. This analysis suggests the use of longer post‐activism windows to examine performance, more nuanced definitions of successful activism, and the inclusion of officer and director ownership as a predictor of activist success and target performance.
Practical implications
Managers wishing to maintain their independence face a difficult balancing act. One option is simply to refuse to negotiate, preferably while maintaining a substantial ownership stake. However, the activist might launch a proxy fight or hostile bid, file a lawsuit, or even encourage a wolf‐pack type campaign. For activists, target selection, especially managerial ownership, and patience are important. Steel quickly achieved its goals at BKF and failed at Ronson despite maintaining its stake for more than 13 years. It suffered large losses in both cases.
Originality/value
This paper provides researchers and practitioners with additional insights into the debate concerning the value of hedge fund activism. It also suggests several new questions to researchers examining corporate governance and activism.
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Carlo D'Augusta, Francesco Grossetti and Claudia Imperatore
The authors study the effect of increasing environmental awareness on shareholders' activism. Specificallly, this study aims to examine whether growing environmental awareness is…
Abstract
Purpose
The authors study the effect of increasing environmental awareness on shareholders' activism. Specificallly, this study aims to examine whether growing environmental awareness is reflected in more aggressive environmental shareholder proposals.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster as an exogenous event that increased shareholders' environmental awareness. This study analyzes the spill’s effect on the tone of proposals about environmental issues and nonenvironmental topics.
Findings
After the disaster, the tone of environmental proposals (i.e. the treatment group) is significantly more negative. In contrast, the tone of nonenvironmental proposals (i.e. the control group) is unaffected. This study interprets this finding as direct evidence that the oil spill led to increased shareholder environmental activism through proposals that targeted the environmental risks surrounding the business more aggressively. By contrast, this study finds no effect of the oil spill on the tone of managers' responses to the proposals, consistent with managers refraining from emphasizing environmental threats.
Originality/value
Anecdotal evidence and recent studies suggest a link between environmental disasters and shareholder pressure for corporate change. However, no prior research has investigated the channel through which shareholders could have exerted such pressure or has looked for direct evidence of it in the negotiations between shareholders and managers. By finding such evidence in shareholder proposals, this study fills in this gap.
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Irfan Rashid Ganie, Arunima Haldar, Tahir Ahmad Wani and Hemant Manuj
This study aims to examine the role of institutional investors (using proxy voting and voice) in influencing the decisions and governance landscape of their investee firms.
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine the role of institutional investors (using proxy voting and voice) in influencing the decisions and governance landscape of their investee firms.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use exploratory research design due to the underdevelopment of the problem phenomena, especially in the context of emerging economies. Using asset management companies (AMC) as a proxy for institutional investors, the authors use a multiple case study design. This design was relevant in the setting as it assured triangulation by studying the same phenomenon across firms with distinct characteristics. The authors sourced the data for the multiple cases from primary sources (such as semi-structured interviews) and secondary sources (such as official Webpages and social media pages of AMC and examination of archival documents). Finally, the authors used qualitative content analysis to analyse the data.
Findings
The findings suggest that shareholder activism by institutional investors has grown in India over the period, particularly in matters related to corporate governance, related party transactions, remuneration and compensation. These AMC in India use proxy voting services for advising on voting resolutions in their investee companies. However, voting by AMC does not generally affect resolution results. This is particularly true in the presence of a high concentration of promoter holdings in investee companies.
Originality/value
The study is a novel attempt in an emerging market context to explore the role of institutional investors in influencing firm decisions and improving the governance landscape of the company using proxy voting and voice. This is especially important as the institutional framework in emerging markets is not as strong as in developed markets.
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Melissa Carlisle, Melanie I. Millar and Jacqueline Jarosz Wukich
This study examines shareholder and board motivations regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) to understand boards' stewardship approaches to environmental issues.
Abstract
Purpose
This study examines shareholder and board motivations regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) to understand boards' stewardship approaches to environmental issues.
Design/methodology/approach
Using content analysis, the authors classify CSR motivations in all environmental shareholder proposals and board responses of Fortune 250 companies from 2013 to 2017 from do little (a shareholder primacy perspective) to do much (a stakeholder pluralism perspective). The authors calculate the motivational dissonance for each proposal-response pair (the Talk Gap) and use cluster analysis to observe evidence of board stewardship and subsequent environmental disclosure and performance (ED&P) changes.
Findings
Board interpretations of stewardship are not uniform, and they regularly extend to stakeholders beyond shareholders, most frequently including profit-oriented stakeholders (e.g. employees and customers). ED&P changes are highest when shareholders narrowly lead boards in CSR motivation and either request both action and information or information only. The authors observe weaker ED&P changes when shareholders request action and the dissonance between shareholders and boards is larger. When shareholders are motivated to do little for CSR, ED&P changes are weak, even when boards express more pluralistic motivations.
Research limitations/implications
The results show the important role that boards play in CSR and may aid activist shareholders in determining how best to generate change in corporate CSR actions.
Originality/value
This study provides the first evidence of board stewardship at the proposal-response level. It measures shareholder and board CSR motivations, introduces the Talk Gap, and examines relationships among proposal characteristics, the Talk Gap, and subsequent ED&P change to better understand board stewardship of environmental issues.
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Jun Yang, Eric Zengxiang Wang and Yunbi An
The purpose of this paper is to study filer identities and voting outcomes of Canadian shareholder proposals and their impact on shareholders' wealth during the period from 2001…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to study filer identities and voting outcomes of Canadian shareholder proposals and their impact on shareholders' wealth during the period from 2001 to 2008.
Design/methodology/approach
In total, 762 Canadian shareholder proposals and related information on targeted firms were collected from the Shareholder Association for Research and Education (SHARE) and the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) databases. Statistical analyses are carried out on the features of shareholder proposals. Regression analyses are performed on voting outcomes, and an event study is conducted to test the impact of shareholder proposals on stock prices.
Findings
The authors' analyses show that proposals submitted by institutions or coordinated shareholder groups receive stronger support than those submitted by individuals and religious groups. Targeted firms are more willing and more likely to reach agreements with institutional investors, which in turn prompts activists to withdraw their proposals. The voting behavior of the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan (OTPP) has a significant impact on voting outcomes. The targeted firms' stock prices respond substantially to news on proposals submitted by institutional and coordinated investors and proposals on social and environmental issues.
Originality/value
In addition to in‐depth analyses (issues, filers, voting outcomes, and impacts on stock price) of Canadian shareholder proposals, this paper explores the voting behaviour and impact of a large institutional shareholder that has been passive in filing shareholder proposals. Special attention is paid to Canadian features of shareholder activism, and differences between Canadian and US shareholder proposals are highlighted and discussed. The paper thus extends shareholder activism studies from focusing on open shareholder activists to investigating passive institutional shareholders.
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