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Institutional actors are critical allies for grassroots movements, but few studies have examined their effects and variations within the non-democratic context. This chapter argues that while institutional allies are heavily constrained and unlikely to give open endorsement to grassroot activists, some institutional activists indirectly facilitate movement mobilization and favorable outcomes in the process of advancing their own political agendas. Drawing upon in-depth interviews conducted in 2008 and 2012, I illustrate this argument by examining the Anti-PX Movement – a landmark grassroots environmental movement against a chemical plant – in Xiamen, China. I find that the environmental institutional actors were constrained and divided, yet some still fostered opportunities for movement mobilization and in turn exploited the opportunity created by the protesters to pursue their policy interests, thus facilitating positive movement outcomes. As long as the claims are not politically subversive to the authoritarian rule, this type of tacit and tactical interaction between institutional activists within the state and grassroot activists on the street is conducive to promoting progressive policy changes.

This study aims to broaden the understanding of activist public relations in developing contexts. The power of formal laws and policies in developing contexts diminishes by traditional norms and authorities, and therefore, a great deal of activist public relations efforts is devoted to controlling destructive norms and informal authorities. Activist public relations literature often assumes powerful formal institutions that are capable to control behaviors. The authors challenge this assumption by exploring activist public relations against gender-based violence (GV) in Bangladesh.

This study took an interpretative and social constructionist approach to examine public relations practices of two GV activist organizations in Bangladesh. The data were collected through observation, interviews and document analysis of four campaigns. The data were coded in NVivo.

The data show that the activist organizations used public relations campaigns for informal institutional work. The campaigns included educating various publics and storytelling to build supporting identities, norms and networks to address GV in Bangladesh.

The study has been limited to advocacy campaign of the non-governmental organizations.

The knowledge from this study can be applied to the social development sectors where public relations is used to activate activism. In addition, the public relations practitioners and scholars can find how activists public relations is emerging in developing context.

The findings suggest that activist public relations in developing contexts carry out institutional work and create informal institutions to compensate for the formal institutional voids. In addition, this paper highlights the role of public relations in institutional work, to create and maintain contributory institutions or disrupt disturbing institutions.

This paper aims to demonstrate that state shareholders are confronted with contradictory logics leading to institutional contradictions that activist shareholders can exploit. The competing logics of the state as shareholder and their impact on corporate governance and shareholder activism offer fertile grounds for research advances in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs).

Through an extensive literature review of state ownership, institutional contradictions and shareholder activism, this paper analyzes two case studies involving the French State as shareholder.

In the French context, these two cases illustrate how institutional contradictions result in opportunities for shareholder activism. By focusing on the institutional contradictions of the state shareholder, this investigation suggests a need for experimental research to observe how shareholder activists adapt to each institutional change in CMEs. This experimentation can help policymakers to avoid creating additional conditions that shareholder activists can exploit.

This focuses only on France and its state shareholdings. To generalize results, studies of other CMEs and state shareholders are needed.

Policymakers should consider all legislative proposals for their potential to deviate from corporate governance practice by experimenting with them in a laboratory setting. Shareholder activists can compare state shareholders’ actions against the state’s legislation to emphasize institutional contradictions that counter minority shareholders’ rights.

This research is the first to analyze how the state as shareholder can exploit its competing logics to resist against shareholder activism and support management or to become itself a shareholder activist.

Purpose – This chapter presents the results of an exploratory study carried out on activist institutional investor strategies. It aims to identify the way in which different types of institutional investors are reacting to new institutional pressures in the French context.

Design/methodology/approach – Our methodology is based on a series of semi-directive interviews, combined with additional relevant data.

Findings – The interpretation of results makes use of institutional theory, more specifically the work of Oliver (1991). Our study shows that active institutional investors may opt for different responses when confronted with new institutional pressures, and that these responses would seem to depend on antecedents underlined by Ryan and Schneider (2002), which in turn depend on the nature of their business relationships with the firm in which they invest. Whereas pressure-sensitive investors (such as banks and insurance companies) generally adopt acquiescence responses, pressure-resistant investors (such as pension funds and investment funds) pursue joint strategies of co-optation, influence or control with key actors such as local and international proxy advisors and French investor associations. Acting conjointly, certain pressure-resistant investors are often considered as institutional entrepreneurs in that they initiate changes and actively participate in the implementation of new norms in the field of shareholder activism in the French context. In parallel to this ongoing professionalization, other pressure-resistant investors such as activist hedge funds seem to lack sufficient legitimate power to be effective.

Originality/value – This chapter illustrates that the level of institutional investor activism depends largely on the relevant national legal framework. It also shows how institutional investor coalitions take advantage of new institutional pressures to enhance their legitimacy or increase the effectiveness of their action.

This paper aims to investigate the long-term impact of shareholder activism on Brazilian listed companies.

This study uses a sample of 194 companies in 2010, 2012 and 2014 and a two-stage data envelopment analysis to generate an efficiency score based on corporate governance, ownership structure and financial characteristics of companies. In the second stage, the study applies a bootstrap truncated regression to identify whether there is a relationship between the efficiency scores and a company-level activism index.

The results show a negative correlation between the efficiency scores and the activism index, suggesting that activist shareholders tend to target less efficient companies. A time analysis over the period 2010-2014 does not offer evidence of impacts of activism on changes of the efficiency scores.

Activist shareholders target less efficient companies. Shareholder activism increased after regulation that facilitated shareholder voting and required greater company transparency was introduced.

The two-stage nature of the procedure used in the analysis ascertains that this result is not spurious, assuring data separability between productive resources and contextual variables. This study contributes to the scarce literature on activism in emerging markets.

In the last 10 years or so, a growing body of research has highlighted the importance of social movements as the mechanism through which fields change or new fields emerge. This article contributes to this body of research by studying how an organization was able to promote institutional change from the center of a field by channeling the legitimacy generated by local religious movements. Data comes from the archives of a special commission within the Catholic Church that developed rules for adjudicating miracles performed by candidates to sainthood. The social movement is composed of candidates and their supporters who mobilized local communities using miracles. The period of the analysis was the aftermath of the Protestant Schism, when long-established practices and beliefs were fundamentally challenged. By approving miracles that created ties between individuals that spanned across kinship and social status boundaries, the commission was able to channel legitimacy into the wounded core of the Church. At the same time, receiving Rome’s approval reduced the competition the candidate’s supporters faced from other religious activists. The noncontentious interaction that occurred between the two actors gave birth to the field of modern sainthood. The main implication for organization theory is that, even in the absence of conflict, a new environment and ideology can emerge endogenously from the center of a field and transform both the organization and the social movement.

Introduction:Shareholder activism comprises a range of activities by public companies’ shareholders who desire some change in the corporation and intervene in the management’s decisions. The goals of activists are various. They may seek to change the company’s strategy, financial structure, management, or board in general. More specifically they may seek to change the capital allocation strategy (stock buybacks, dividends, or company’s acquisitions policies), the board composition, the company’s executive compensation plans, or the company’s certain functions (risk management, audit).

Purpose:The purpose of this literature review research study is to explore the concept of shareholder activism. According to a point of view, these activist actions stimulate better corporate governance practice in the companies and ultimately lead to an increase in the company’s stock price in the short term. The others claim that activism increases the company’s share price volatility in the long term. In the near future, the impact of shareholder activism will continue to rise and the ways how the companies respond to it is gaining importance. This study sheds light on the types of shareholder activism, when they are likely to approach a company and which tactics they most likely use.

Methodology:Considering the rapid expansion of shareholder activism concept in the world the author makes a review of literature on shareholder activism. The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, the characteristics of shareholder activism are introduced. Second, the theoretical background of this concept is given in detail. Third, the types of shareholder activism are discussed. Finally, the conclusion comprises a summary of shareholder activism.

Findings:The study finds out that shareholder activism has started to have a significant influence on corporate governance policy that a firm adopts in recent years. Shareholder activism increases levels of shareholder engagement in firm decisions and fosters a long-term corporate governance culture. As institutional investors get a higher portion from global equity investments, their role in shareholder activism will increase. There are opinions suggesting that investor activism will lead to better corporate governance practices in firms, leading to an increase in firm share prices in the short term. The shareholder activism phenomenon seems to be on the agenda of all companies in the near future.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, disability rights found a place on the U.S. policy agenda. However, it did not do so because social movement groups pressured political elites or because politicians were responding to changes in public preferences. Drawing from recent work in neo-institutionalism and social movements, namely the theory of strategic action fields, I posit that exogenous shocks in the 1960s caused a disability policy monopoly to collapse giving way to a new policy community. Using original longitudinal data on congressional committees, hearings, bills, and laws, as well as data from the Policy Agendas Project, I demonstrate the ways in which entrepreneurs pursued a new policy image of rights within a context of increasing committee involvement, issue complexity, and space on the policy agenda, and the consequences this had on policy.

This study aims to analyze withdrawn shareholder proposals to gain insight into the role of shareholder proposals in the governance of public corporations.

A cursory look at the data suggests that unions are the most likely group to withdraw proposals. The authors focus on the behavior of unions and find that unions often resubmit a shareholder proposal which had garnered significant support in the previous year, only to withdraw the proposal in the second year.

The contention is that the proposals were withdrawn in Year 2 because the issue was settled in a manner agreeable to the union. Furthermore, this research suggests that unions are more likely to withdraw proposals when the prior years’ appeal is higher, when firms have a record of poor performance, lower insider ownership or relatively independent boards. This phenomenon suggests that unions submit and withdraw shareholder proposals strategically. The authors contend that unions use shareholder proposals and the withdrawal of proposals to improve conditions for union workers at the expense of shareholder value.

This study suggests that unions submit and withdraw shareholder proposals strategically. The authors contend that unions use shareholder proposals and the withdrawal of proposals to improve conditions for union workers at the expense of shareholder value.

This chapter explores the advantages (for large investors) of directly owning productive assets, compared with indirect ownership through stock in corporations. Significant factors are agency costs and recent changes in the tax and regulatory environment. Recent corporate scandals have led to legislative and regulatory responses that significantly increase the monitoring costs and other burdens of becoming or remaining a public corporation. As a result, there has been a substantial increase in going-private transactions, particularly among smaller public companies. Acquisitions and minority equity positions that allow large corporations to join with smaller companies have also increased. The pressures to go private are not entirely new, however. This chapter, reflecting collaboration by professors of finance and business law, traces the legal concept that the corporation is an entity separate and apart from its owners, showing how the legal status of corporations hinders resolution of conflicts among the parties to the enterprise. Thus, there have long been fundamental flaws inherent in the corporation as the form of organization for certain activities. The current wave of Sarbanes–Oxley restructuring via private equity firms is part of a significant increase in direct ownership of major assets by institutional investors. Direct ownership prevents management expropriation of resources, and is preferable to corporate ownership whenever other alternatives for indemnification or liability limitation are available (such as insurance, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, etc.). Finally, the renewal of direct ownership is not a radical shift, but a return to long-established tradition in the organization of business activities.