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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether cumulative voting can help ease the conflicts between board of directors and minority shareholders.

The authors use voting result of shareholder proposals as an indicator of the level of conflicts between board and minority shareholders. OLS regression and non‐parametric Kruskal‐Wallis tests have been applied in the analysis.

It was found that cumulative voting can help ease the conflicts between board of directors and minority shareholders. Also, the tension between board and minority shareholders is affected by both corporate governance factors and a company's stock performance.

In general, the research result indicates that cumulative voting is still an effective mechanism that can lower investors' costs on monitoring boards of directors.

Considering the huge amount of resources used in shareholder campaigns, the research result indicates that cumulative voting can be an efficient choice to alleviate the confrontation between dissenting shareholders and board of directors.

With the change of minority shareholder structure, it is necessary to examine whether the corporate world needs to reconsider the adoption of cumulative voting.

The authors use a novel proxy, voting results of investor proposals, to measure the conflicts between board of directors and minority shareholders. This is also one of the few papers focusing on the monitoring cost side of the agency cost problem in corporate governance literature.

This chapter investigates which factors contribute to (small) shareholder attendance using a hand-collected panel data set with information about turnout rates, voting behaviour and ownership structures of companies that are listed in seven Member States. We document how ownership concentration positively affects total shareholder turnout, but has a negative effect on small shareholder turnout. Voting power also affects small shareholder turnout rates; the greater small shareholder voting power, the greater their eagerness to vote. In addition, total and small shareholder turnout is higher the more important the meeting agenda. And, small shareholders tend to free-ride on large institutional shareholders and corporate insiders, but the magnitude of the free-rider effect is larger for the latter category of blockholders. Our results provide some important insights for the debate on shareholder rights and the role of the AGM in corporate governance. The results show that, despite the criticism, the AGM still plays an important role in small shareholder monitoring. Some topics seem to clearly motivate small shareholders to attend, while others are less relevant. Policy makers can stimulate shareholder monitoring by focusing on the factors that are determined in this study, but it is important to consider possible endogeneity issues as well.

E-corporate governance or the use of technologies and information systems (ISs) in corporate governance, is still a subject that is too seldom addressed in business research. This paper is at the intersection between two fields of research (corporate governance and the management of ISs), which are interdependent in ways that are still unexplored. The paper analyzes the implications of internet voting (IV) at shareholders’ annual meetings (SAM) for the corporate governance of listed companies in France, in particular for the relationship between executives and shareholders. Most of the studies that have dealt with IV at SAM have focused on techno-legal issues and were often conducted by business law researchers. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the implications of the new voting system through the prism of corporate governance.

The authors proceeded by triangulation of methods. This qualitative study is based on observations, interviews and documentary analysis. It assessed the IV implications for both the issuing companies and the shareholders.

The new voting system brings undeniable competitive advantage to the issuing company and facilitates shareholders’ activism, yet it has serious risks both for the corporations and for certain categories of the shareholder. Interestingly, the authors propose an original and field-grounded typology that distinguishes the risks and benefits associated with IV in relation to executives’ attitudes.

The paper shows that the resolving of identified deficiencies with IV development could contribute to the alignment of companies’ interests with those of shareholders. Moreover, the study calls for policymakers to appoint an official body to regulate the practical implementation of the new system and to prevent its dissemination being held hostage to the executives’ willingness.

An original aspect of this research lies in the effective operationalization of the constructs of corporate governance effectiveness with a view to examining corporate governance as a set of technologically mediated practices. Moreover, this study emphasizes the key role of the construct of “executives’ willingness” in facilitating/impeding IV diffusion. This underlies their attempts to reverse the corporate governance relationship.

The purpose of this paper is to study filer identities and voting outcomes of Canadian shareholder proposals and their impact on shareholders' wealth during the period from 2001 to 2008.

In total, 762 Canadian shareholder proposals and related information on targeted firms were collected from the Shareholder Association for Research and Education (SHARE) and the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) databases. Statistical analyses are carried out on the features of shareholder proposals. Regression analyses are performed on voting outcomes, and an event study is conducted to test the impact of shareholder proposals on stock prices.

The authors' analyses show that proposals submitted by institutions or coordinated shareholder groups receive stronger support than those submitted by individuals and religious groups. Targeted firms are more willing and more likely to reach agreements with institutional investors, which in turn prompts activists to withdraw their proposals. The voting behavior of the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan (OTPP) has a significant impact on voting outcomes. The targeted firms' stock prices respond substantially to news on proposals submitted by institutional and coordinated investors and proposals on social and environmental issues.

In addition to in‐depth analyses (issues, filers, voting outcomes, and impacts on stock price) of Canadian shareholder proposals, this paper explores the voting behaviour and impact of a large institutional shareholder that has been passive in filing shareholder proposals. Special attention is paid to Canadian features of shareholder activism, and differences between Canadian and US shareholder proposals are highlighted and discussed. The paper thus extends shareholder activism studies from focusing on open shareholder activists to investigating passive institutional shareholders.

This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.

In this chapter, we assess the ownership characteristics for the companies in our sample. For this, we do not only use ownership concentration measures such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman index but also voting power measures since ownership and voting power are not necessarily equivalent. We find that, in line with previous studies, ownership concentration and voting power of large shareholders is generally higher in continental European countries, which has important implications for corporate governance.

Blockholders can behave opportunistically because small shareholder voting suffers from coordination problems. In this chapter, we investigate the features of small shareholder voting using a theoretical framework. Specifically, we investigate when defeating a blockholder’s resolution is optional for shareholders. Regulatory initiatives that facilitate communication between small shareholders or focus on institutional investors and corporate governance tools that alter or add the threshold in the voting game also contribute to solving the coordination problem. These corporate governance initiatives can increase the relevance of AGMs in Europe.

Since we have seen in the previous chapter that only small part of the shareholder rights is harmonized at the European level, we explore the national regulations in this and the subsequent chapter. In this chapter, we focus in particular on procedural and information rights, including the organization of the meeting, forum rights and the disclosure of ownership information. We find that, inter alia, there are many differences in the national provisions regarding shareholder forum rights, despite article 9 of the Shareholder Rights Directive that provides shareholders with the right to ask questions. Also in the meeting’s organization there are large differences between countries, for example, regarding the use of EGMs.

In this chapter, we assess shareholder voting behaviour in our sample of seven European Member States. We consider the AGM’s agenda, shareholder proposals, rejected voting items and dissent rates. Our research shows, inter alia, that certain voting items receive higher dissent rates than others. These are, for instance, director elections and say-on-pay resolutions. Other voting items, such as the approval of the annual accounts, are merely a formality.

This study aims to examine the role of institutional investors (using proxy voting and voice) in influencing the decisions and governance landscape of their investee firms.

The authors use exploratory research design due to the underdevelopment of the problem phenomena, especially in the context of emerging economies. Using asset management companies (AMC) as a proxy for institutional investors, the authors use a multiple case study design. This design was relevant in the setting as it assured triangulation by studying the same phenomenon across firms with distinct characteristics. The authors sourced the data for the multiple cases from primary sources (such as semi-structured interviews) and secondary sources (such as official Webpages and social media pages of AMC and examination of archival documents). Finally, the authors used qualitative content analysis to analyse the data.

The findings suggest that shareholder activism by institutional investors has grown in India over the period, particularly in matters related to corporate governance, related party transactions, remuneration and compensation. These AMC in India use proxy voting services for advising on voting resolutions in their investee companies. However, voting by AMC does not generally affect resolution results. This is particularly true in the presence of a high concentration of promoter holdings in investee companies.

The study is a novel attempt in an emerging market context to explore the role of institutional investors in influencing firm decisions and improving the governance landscape of the company using proxy voting and voice. This is especially important as the institutional framework in emerging markets is not as strong as in developed markets.