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Prior research on user-generated content (UGC) contributions has primarily focused on self-centered or other-centered motives, paying limited attention to the concept of enlightened self-interest, in which both motives coexist in a single organism. Additionally, the factors influencing enlightened self-interest and their effects in different circumstances are yet to be explored. Drawing on theoretical lenses rooted in the switching barriers perspective and stimulus–organism–response framework, this study posits that dedication-based switching barriers (community–member relationship quality, member–member relationship quality, and content attractiveness) positively relate to enlightened self-interest, whereas constraint-based switching barriers (switching costs) moderate the relationship between dedication-based switching barriers and enlightened self-interest in social media communities (SMCs). Members' enlightened self-interest in turn influences both the creation and co-creation of UGC.

This study comprised two quantitative studies: an online survey-based study (Study 1) and an online scenario-based experiment (Study 2). Study 1 surveyed 613 respondents, while Study 2 included 749 participants. Both studies employed structural equation modeling and bootstrapping techniques for analysis.

The findings indicate that dedication-based switching barriers positively affect users' enlightened self-interest, which in turn is positively associated with UGC creation and co-creation. Switching costs moderate the relationship between relationship quality (community–member and member–member) and enlightened self-interest.

This study complements the current understanding of how the association between dedication- and constraint-based switching barriers and users' enlightened self-interests influence user-generated contributions.

Researchers have proposed a variety of models to depict, explain, and understand ethical decision-making processes. Rest (1986) proposed a four-stage, individually oriented model, in which a person who makes a moral decision must (1) recognize the moral issue, (2) make a moral judgment, (3) establish moral intent, and (4) make moral decisions. Similarly, Ferrell, Gresham, and Fraedrich (1989) developed a five-stage model that included awareness, cognitions, evaluations, determination, and actions. Finally, Trevino (1986) proposed a slightly different model that begins with the recognition of an ethical dilemma and proceeds to a cognition stage in which individuals make moral judgments that further affect their ethical or unethical decisions (see Jones, 1991, for a review).

This chapter makes a case for Adam Smith’s description of the market as a moral exemplar. More specifically, it argues that the behavior of the individual agents who inhabit Smith’s market is indeed morally exemplary.

The basis for this argument is that economic self-interest drives market participants to look beyond any inherent prejudice or tendency to discriminate on the basis of preconceived opinions or beliefs. Some historical context is provided that illustrates conservative opposition to this perspective from unlikely sources.

A simple moral framework is created to provide one possible representation of Smith’s interpretation of the market. In this framework self-interest is characterized as a “trump” that overcomes potential prejudices. It is further argued that this framework can be considered a moral exemplar, and that it is also important in facilitating exchange between participants.

The central argument is tested when the self-interest criterion is exposed to competition from the alternative moral value of altruism. The moral framework presented, and the principle of economic self-interest in particular, is resilient against this moral challenge.

The social implications of this argument relate directly to our normative understanding of how individuals should behave in a market context. The chapter establishes a link between this moral framework and the functioning of the market.

The chapter is original in its attempt to defend the underlying morality of Smith’s market without recourse to his other works, such as the Theory of Moral Sentiments. It also links an understanding of market egalitarianism with a broader moral framework of market activity. Furthermore, it offers a clarification of why economic self-interest, and not altruism, is the appropriate motivation for market activity.

The aim of this paper is to critically explore the behavioral assumptions of organizational politics, as well as to reconsider and redefine the premises of political behavior in the workplace. The main objective is examination of the presuppositions associated with the possibility of constructive politics in organizational settings.

The deficiencies of explaining managerial activity as solely regulated by self‐interest are discussed, as well as a revised version of self‐interest that may enrich current understanding of workplace politics. Drawing on the respective literature, the authors develop some propositions and suggest, assess and discuss a conceptual framework that integrates self‐interest and constructive politics.

The paper represents an attempt toward inferring positive political behavior through adopting an alternative view of established behavioral assumptions. This view purports to reduce the existing discrepancy between different types of political behavior in defending the possibility of an inclusive, participative and welfare‐enhancing political process, founded on the pro‐social and reciprocating aspects of human interaction. Boundedly selfish organizational members are expected to demonstrate these qualities that are in position to transform the very nature of political activities to the direction of greater organizational good.

The paper reevaluates the self‐interested nature of organizational politics through the introduction of a bounded self‐interest assumption as more representative of actual human behavior. This new construct embodies those constraints that make trust formation, networking and reciprocities operative in environments effectively embedding political behavior in broader, organizational goal‐oriented processes and structures.

Based on the approach/inhibition theory of power, this study explores the relationship between sense of power and exploitative leadership. We particularly examine the role of self-interest as a mediator and the role of ambition at work as a moderator.

The data were collected from 189 supervisors and 702 employees. We analyzed the data using path analysis to test the research model.

The results show the following: (1) sense of power positively affects exploitative leadership; (2) the effects of sense of power on exploitative leadership are mediated by self-interest; (3) the effects of self-interest on exploitative leadership are moderated by ambition at work.

The current study identifies self-interest as a key mediator that links sense of power to exploitative leadership and demonstrates that ambition at work moderates the process of self-interest to exploitative leadership.

Drawing on social information processing theory, this study constructs a multilevel moderated mediation model. This model seeks to delve into the intricate and previously overlooked interplay between supervisor bottom-line mentality (BLM) and knowledge hiding. Within this context, we introduce self-interest as a mediating factor and incorporate performance climate as a team-level moderating variable.

The time-lagged data involve 336 employees nested in 42 teams from 23 automobile sales companies in five regions of China. The analysis was meticulously executed using Hierarchical Linear Modeling, complemented by bias-corrected bootstrapping techniques.

The findings reveal that self-interest acts as a full mediator in the positive link between supervisor BLM and knowledge hiding. Furthermore, the performance climate plays a moderating role in both the relationship between supervisor BLM and self-interest, and the entire mediation process. Notably, these relationships are intensified in environments with a high performance climate compared to those with a low one.

This research stands as one of the pioneering efforts to integrate supervisor BLM into the discourse on knowledge hiding, elucidating the underlying psychological mechanisms and delineating the boundary conditions that shape the “supervisor BLM–knowledge hiding” relationship. Further, our insights provide organizations with critical guidance on strategies to curtail knowledge hiding among their employees.

Darwin’s theory of natural selection, which explains how individual organisms can become exquisitely adapted to their environments, does not explain the evolution of adaptive societies with equal ease. To understand the nature of the problem, imagine a mutant individual who behaves in a way that increases the survival of everyone in her society, including herself, to an equal degree. Such a “no-cost public good” might not appear very feasible (and will soon be amended), but is useful for illustrative purposes. By increasing the fitness of everyone, the mutant trait will not increase in frequency within the society (other than by drift, which can equally cause a decrease in frequency). This example illustrates the elementary fact that natural selection is based on relative fitness. It’s not enough for a mutant trait to increase its own survival and reproduction; it must do so more than alternative traits in the population. The relative nature of fitness makes the evolutionary forces within a population insensitive to the welfare of the population as a whole.

The Neoclassical approach to analysing personal choice is compared with an approach contained in a Biblical Christian mode of analysis. This paper compares the Neoclassical and Christian positions via analysis of characteristics of the Neoclassical rational choice model. The main characteristic examined is a basic assumption of the rational choice model that human choice is explained as the optimisation of utility via rational self‐interest. The two positions are compared in terms of how they treat self‐interest and rationality, the degree to which basic assumptions about human behaviour are specified, the importance they attach to the realism of assumptions underlying their models, and the explanatory and predictive purposes for which the models are used. The conclusion of the comparison is that the Biblical Christian perspective encompasses the variables regarded as important in Neoclassical explanation, but presents them in the context of a more embracing worldview perspective than the Neoclassical. This Christian belief perspective is applicable to human behaviour in both “economic” and “non‐economic” domains.

The affinities of Smith′s invisible hand notion and Hegel′s cunning of reason are examined through a study of all the key locations in which the invisible hand and cunning of reason are introduced. Despite their differences in orientation and philosophy, both writers reach similar conclusions regarding the play of self‐interest and the emergence of the social good. Specifically, each requires a deus ex machina – Providence or Geist – to generate the necessary telosthat supplements their respective logical arguments concerning the concrete play of interest. At the same time, each view provides little to explain how individualism creates the greater social good, so that recourse in each argument to an extra‐social entity obscures the actual functioning of the social order. The common approaches of the two very different thinkers thus reflects on the general requirements and dilemmas of arguments concerning the social good and individual interest.

A species of moral malaise afflicts the professions today, a malaise that may prove fatal to their moral identities and perilous to our whole society. It is manifest in a growing conviction even among conscientious doctors, lawyers, and ministers that it is no longer possible to practice their professions within traditional ethical constraints. More specifically, the belief is taking hold that unless professionals look out for their own self‐interest, they will be crushed by commercialization, competition, government regulation, malpractice actions, advertising, public and media hostility, and a host of other inimical socio‐economic forces. This line of reasoning leads the professional to infer that self‐interest justifies compromises in, and even rejection of, obligations that standards of professional ethics have traditionally imposed.