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Technology-facilitated abuse, so-called “tech abuse,” through phones, trackers, and other emerging innovations, has a substantial impact on the nature of intimate partner violence (IPV). The current chapter examines the risks and harms posed to IPV victims/survivors from the burgeoning Internet of Things (IoT) environment. IoT systems are understood as “smart” devices such as conventional household appliances that are connected to the internet. Interdependencies between different products together with the devices' enhanced functionalities offer opportunities for coercion and control. Across the chapter, we use the example of IoT to showcase how and why tech abuse is a socio-technological issue and requires not only human-centered (i.e., societal) but also cybersecurity (i.e., technical) responses. We apply the method of “threat modeling,” which is a process used to investigate potential cybersecurity attacks, to shift the conventional technical focus from the risks to systems toward risks to people. Through the analysis of a smart lock, we highlight insufficiently designed IoT privacy and security features and uncover how seemingly neutral design decisions can constrain, shape, and facilitate coercive and controlling behaviors.

This chapter analyses the Norwegian authorities’ presence on Twitter during the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks. Twitter activity by two official institutions is analysed in particular, namely, the blood bank at Oslo University Hospital and the Norwegian Police Security Services (PST). Our findings show that the Norwegian authorities were almost completely absent on Twitter during the critical hours of the terrorist attack, and that there was no coordination and synchronisation of communication from the authorities. This official silence allowed the diffusion of speculation and misinformation to take place; these were neither corrected nor addressed, as the analysed PST case shows. In contrast, the blood bank used Twitter to mobilise blood donors to address an acute problem: a shortage of blood to treat casualties. The chapter concludes by offering recommendations to the authorities for future major incidents.

In recent years, there has been a growing dialogue around community-based and systems-based approaches to security risk management through the introduction of top-down and bottom-up knowledge acquisition. In essence, this relates to knowledge elicited from academic experts, or security subject-matter experts, practitioner experts, or field workers themselves and how much these disparate sources of knowledge may converge or diverge. In many ways, this represents a classic tension between organisational and procedural perspectives of knowledge management (i.e. top-down) versus more pragmatic and experience focussed perspectives (i.e. bottom-up).

This chapter considers these approaches and argues that a more consistent approach needs to address the conflict between procedures and experience, help convert field experience into knowledge, and ultimately provide effective training that is relevant to those heading out into demanding work situations. Ultimately, ethics and method are intricately bound together in whichever approach is taken and the security of both staff and at-risk populations depends upon correctly managing the balance between systems and communities.

In many security domains, the ‘human in the system’ is often a critical line of defence in identifying, preventing and responding to any threats (Saikayasit, Stedmon, & Lawson, 2015). Traditionally, such security domains are often focussed on mainstream public safety within crowded spaces and border controls, through to identifying suspicious behaviours, hostile reconnaissance and implementing counter-terrorism initiatives. More recently, with growing insecurity around the world, organisations have looked to improve their security risk management frameworks, developing concepts which originated in the health and safety field to deal with more pressing risks such as terrorist acts, abduction and piracy (Paul, 2018). In these instances, security is usually the specific responsibility of frontline personnel with defined roles and responsibilities operating in accordance with organisational protocols (Saikayasit, Stedmon, Lawson, & Fussey, 2012; Stedmon, Saikayasit, Lawson, & Fussey, 2013). However, understanding the knowledge that frontline security workers might possess and use requires sensitive investigation in equally sensitive security domains.

This chapter considers how to investigate knowledge elicitation in these sensitive security domains and underlying ethics in research design that supports and protects the nature of investigation and end-users alike. This chapter also discusses the criteria used for ensuring trustworthiness as well as assessing the relative merits of the range of methods adopted.

This chapter summarises the findings of a case study on social media activity during the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway. Based on these findings and on theories and previous research on the role of social media in situation awareness (SA) configuration during crisis situations, the chapter offers seven recommendations for key communicators in official crisis management and response institutions, journalistic institutions, NGOs and others: (1) acknowledge social media as important and master monitoring and management of features across social media; (2) synchronise communication and establish a standard operating procedure (SOP); (3) establish and make known a joint social media emergency account; (4) participate, interact and take the lead; (5) be aware of non-hashtagged content; (6) implement verification tools and practices and (7) engage with and learn from celebrities.

Innovation in a decentralized blockchain infrastructure can be used by medicine as a prerequisite for the exchange of patient data. Developments in the medical device industry that support the technology of the internet of things and wireless sensor networks also facilitate the examination of patient medical records that no longer require visits to the practice of doctors or hospitals which in some cases takes in a considerable time. Not to mention the consideration of traffic congestion and busy routine in the work. Patients can check their healthcare concerns using only sensors such as e-Health Sensor Shield Platform which then sends recording results through the transmission line to the data lakes. However, this patient’s medical record data is very confidential and may only be accessed by certain parties only. This required the design of the concept of security in the transmission of data so that the data does not leak to parties who are not eligible. This paper attempts to provide an overview of the concept of using encryption with an asymmetric key for securing data from sensors to data lakes before forwarding to a decentralized, interconnected blockchain infrastructure.