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Earnings management are euphemisms referring to accounting practices that may follow the letter of the rules of standard accounting practices, but certainly deviate from the spirit of those rules. Companies across the world follow earning management practices in a way so as to show a favourable position to their stakeholders. Satyam scam in India was a similar type of case. The present study has been carried out with the aim of examining the perception of auditors on earnings management in Indian perspective.

A questionnaire was administered on 65 auditors and was analysed using descriptive statistics and factor analysis methods.

The analysis shows that most of the firms indulge into such practices even in the presence of regulatory framework available to keep a check on these practices. The management tries to interpret and modify the law provisions as per their will and do manipulations in the financial results.

The research findings would guide regulators and management to curb such malpractices. The auditors, top management and government have to become more aware, socially responsible, have ethical behaviour, become more transparent to protect the interests of stakeholders associated with the organizations.

The paper provides an insight into auditor's perception on earnings management during a time when financial scams like Satyam in India have taken place and auditor's integrity is questioned.

The importance of corporate governance was recognized aftermath the major corporate scandal and regulators all over the world tightened regulations. When Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, President of United States George W. Bush proclaimed that “the era of low standards and false profits are over.” Following the path, SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) introduced clause 49 to the listing agreement to enhance transparency and integrity to financial statements. Adequate disclosures thus ensure good governance. The concept of corporate governance is more than a decade old in India. Following Satyam Scandal, Indian Industry groups and regulators advocated a number of reforms which led to MCAs (Ministry of Company Affairs) Corporate Governance Voluntary guidelines 2009 to encourage and guide companies to adopt superior practices like appointing board committees, the appointment and rotation of external auditors, and creating a whistle blowing mechanism. The new Companies Amendment bill made the corporate governance disclosures even more stringent. Hence this is an attempt on our part to construct an objective overall corporate governance score to reflect the whole firm governance practices as per the disclosure requirements of clause 49 of the listing agreement of SEBI as well as the insights from the various academic studies to score each element of corporate governance and study the impact of governance on corporate performance represented by Tobin Q.

In light of frequent corporate scams and frauds, this paper aims to investigate the relationship of corporate illegality with the board of directors’ characteristics in Indian manufacturing companies.

The board of director characteristics of sample companies charged with violation of the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) regulations from 2008 to 2013 are matched to an equivalent-sized control data set. A cross-sectional logistic regression model is applied to test the hypothesized association.

The findings suggest that the SEBI violations are less likely to occur when a large fraction of the board of directors consists of independent directors and when the individual directors have multiple appointments on the boards of other companies. However, it is observed that the size of the board and its meetings have no observable association with violation of the SEBI regulations.

This work is likely to aid future research in exploring the impact of governance mechanisms on the occurrence of illegality. In future, studies may be conducted to investigate the probability of illegal corporate events using a larger sample size and corporate governance variables which have not been examined in the present study.

The analysis provides corporate policy makers and investors an insight to evaluate the vulnerability of a company being engaged in illegality based on its board features.

The present study is distinct from previous reports as it makes a novel attempt to gauge the relationship between the board of directors’ characteristics and the occurrence of illegality in the Indian corporate section.

The study examines the influence of a firm's life cycle on the cash flow classification of Indian firms.

The study employs Dickinson's (2011) cash flow patterns to classify firm years under various life-cycle stages. Cash flow classification is employed to measure a firm's classification shifting (CS) practices. The study includes Indian firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange during 2012–2020, an ordinary least squares regression model, a fixed-effect model and a panel corrected with standard error regression method.

Firms face different opportunities and challenges at different stages of the firm's life cycle and therefore adopt cash flow CS. The results show that firms adopt cash flow CS during introduction, growth and decline stage of life cycle either to boost or to reduce operating cash flows.

This study is one of its kind to study the influence of a firm's life cycle on the cash flow classification of Indian firms.

The aim of this study is to understand a family firm's choice of related-party transaction (RPT) types and analyze their value impacts to separate the abusive from benign RPTs.

It uses a 10-year panel of BSE-listed 378 family (and 200 non-family) firms. The fixed effects, logit and difference-in-difference (DID) models help examine value effects, propensity and persistence of harmful RPTs.

Loans/guarantees (irrespective of counterparties) destroy firm value. Capital asset RPTs decrease the firm value but enhance value when undertaken with holding parties. Operating RPTs increase firm value and profitability. They improve asset utilization and reduce discretionary expenses (especially when made with controlled entities). Family firms have larger loans/guarantees and capital asset volumes but have smaller operating RPTs than non-family firms. They are less likely to undertake loans/guarantees (and even operating RPTs) and more capital RPTs vis-à-vis non-family firms. Family firms persist with dubious loans/guarantees but hold back beneficial operating RPTs, despite RPTs being in investor cross-hairs amid the Satyam scam.

Rent extractability and counterparty incentives supplement each other. (1) The higher extractability of related-party loans and guarantees (RPLGs) dominates the lower extraction incentives of controlled parties. (2) Holding parties' bringing assets, providing a growth engine and adding value dominate their higher extraction incentives (3) The big gains to the operational efficiency come from operating RPTs with controlled parties, generally operating companies in the family house. (4) Dubious RPTs seem more integral to family firms' choices than non-family firms. (5) Counterparty incentives behind the divergent use of RPTs deserve more research attention. Future studies can give more attention to how family characteristics affect divergent motives behind RPTs.

First, the study does not single out family firms for dubious use of all RPTs. Second, investors, auditors or creditors must pay close attention to RPLGs as a special expropriation mechanism. Third, operating RPTs (and capital RPTs with holding parties) benefit family firms. However, solid procedural safeguards are necessary. Overall, results may help clarify the dilemma Indian regulators face in balancing the abusive and business sides of RPTs.

The study fills the gap by arguing why some RPTs may be dubious or benign and then shows how RPTs' misuse depends on counterparty types. It shows operating RPTs enhance operating efficiencies on several dimensions and that benefits may vary with counterparty types. It also presents the first evidence that family firms favor dubious RPTs more and efficient RPTs less than non-family firms.

The case highlights a $1.4 billion fraud committed by the founder of a NYSE listed, Information Technology Services firm in India. In response to the crisis, the Indian government appointed an interim board to find a strategic investor in the company. The case traces the events leading to the fall of the company. Students are asked to analyze the governance and intermediation failures, assess the financial position of the company and to estimate the intrinsic value of the company from an acquirer's perspective.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of ethical climate types on trust in management using Victor and Cullen’s framework, which is based on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development and Gouldner’s sociocultural theory of organizations.

A sample of 270 employees from 10 organizations in India was used to investigate the specific relationships between ethical climate types and trust in management. Data were collected through self-report questionnaires. Exploratory factor analysis was used to identify the different types of ethical climates existing in the organizations. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to explore the relationship between ethical climates and trust in management.

It was found that ethical climates characterized by caring, laws and codes, and rules and procedures are significant predictors of trust in management. However, no support was obtained for any impact of ethical climates emphasizing company profit, self-interest or independence on trust in management.

Future research should examine trust in management as a mediating or moderating variable in the relationship between ethical climates and other organizational variables such as commitment, citizenship behaviour or productivity. Additionally, research could also examine different cultural and organizational contexts in testing out these relationships. The role of other constructs such as personality of supervisors and ethical sensitivity in developing trust in management may also been investigated.

Organizations should try to develop climates based on caring and also emphasize adherence to laws and codes as well as rules and procedures to enhance trust in the management.

The findings of the study are unique and original because literature examining ethical climates and trust is scarce, and this is the first study to explore how ethical climates can impact trust in management in the Indian context. In particular, the results are unique for. Contrary to expectations, no negative impact of climates of self-interest, company interest and independence on trust in management could be seen in this study. The results throw open new directions to theory building on ethical climates and trust in the Indian context.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the aspects of the corporate governance system and suggest ways to foresee a corporate fraud in the offing. It aims to explore ways by which key stakeholders may view “early warning signs” in their assessments of an inefficient corporate governance system.

Secondary method was used to collect data from several corporations that failed or faltered over the past decade due to poor corporate governance.

Findings suggest that corporate governance system failures of most corporations could have been foreseen before they became public if the five key early warning signs described in the paper were closely monitored.

Paying closer attention to the early warning signs mentioned here may help identify lacunas in the corporate governance system and may avert corporate debacles.

The key early warning signs identified here appear to address most aspects of failure in corporate governance system.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature and perception of corporate frauds in India and their consequences in the business and economic systems, and it highlights the emerging issues so that existing legal and regulatory obligations can be redefined and structured.

An exploratory research was conducted through a combined mode of literature review; case studies; structured questionnaires from 346 sample companies; and 43 interviews with the corporate professionals, management, investors, government offices and authorities having wide experience.

It was found that the regulatory system is weak, and there is dire need to redefine the role of auditors. Coordination among different regulatory authorities is poor, and after every scam, there is a blame game. Reporting of fraud and publication of fraud prevention policy are missing. Banks and financial institutions are ineffective on due diligence, and there is a lack of professionalism on the board and other executive levels in companies.

This study assumes that fraud could be mitigated by proactive and conscious action by auditors, and corporate executives are willing to avoid perpetrating financial fraud despite pressures from investors, government securities regulators and exogenous market fluctuations. The authors relied on the honesty of the respondents during the sample collection and recorded semi-structured interviews. A minimum level of five years’ work experience relative to preventing, detecting or investigating fraud has been considered a valid determinant in selecting the purposive sample.

The study suggests mandatory publication of fraud prevention policy; constitution of special purpose corporate offence wing; recognition to companies for improved corporate governance; true adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards; due diligence by banks and financial institutions; compulsory appointment of professionals by shareholders and fixation of responsibility on independent professionals; intellectualisation of audit committee; and more powers to the regulators, especially Securities and Exchange Board of India.

Prevention of corporate frauds reduces anxiety, improves corporate image and builds up confidence of the investors, which is essential for resource channelling in financial markets.

The research work is based on a thorough analysis of regulatory framework and fraud case studies and primary data collected from companies, banks and other government and developmental institutions.

As a part of the overhaul of the corporate governance norms, the Indian Government recently introduced class action suits for shareholders in India. This paper aims to analyze the efficacy of the existing legislation in its present form. It also examines whether the Indian law is equipped to handle the globalized markets, wherein shareholders are spread across different continents.

The paper relies on meta-analyses. This study analyzes the existing case laws, news reports and legislative materials.

The author, through her analyses, has concluded that the introduction of class action suits into the Indian corporate governance regime is only a half-hearted attempt. The Indian lawmakers have failed to learn from their foreign counterparts. There are no provisions to deter frivolous litigation. Furthermore, it is contentious whether the Indian law will be able to cater to transnational class action suits.

This paper is original. There is a scarcity of literature on Indian corporate governance norms. This paper examines the very nascent concept of class action suits in India. India has become an investment hub in the past decade. Therefore, this paper has practical implications in understanding the Indian legal setup, in comparison to its foreign counterparts.