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It has been said that standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) are more congruent with a principles-based approach to standards setting than those of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Revelations concerning accounting manipulations at Enron Corp., and the ensuing scandal resulting from these revelations, have prompted the FASB to reassess its approach to accounting standards setting with the possible intent of moving FASB standards-setting processes closer to a principles-based approach. One area that IASB standards tend to emphasize more than FASB standards is the concept of substance over form. The bankruptcy of Enron Corp. provides a vivid illustration of how companies may use the legal form of transactions to obscure their economic substance. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the concept of substance over form by investigating Enron’s use of misleading accounting practices in the following areas: (1) off-balance sheet financing; (2) revenue recognition; and (3) financial statements disclosures. In these three areas of accounting concern, the chapter sets forth the relevant US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) requirements, along with the ways in which Enron manipulated GAAP while concealing the economic substance underlying the transactions. It is the argument of this chapter that had the concept of substance over form been properly applied at Enron, investors and creditors would have been provided with a more realistic view of the company’s financial position and its results of operations, perhaps avoiding what became the one of the largest corporate bankruptcies in US history. The conclusion is that the FASB should focus on the concept of substance over form as it contemplates moving toward a principles-based approach to accounting standards setting.

This paper asks whether market fundamentals can explain the run-up and collapse of Enron’s stock price and price-earnings ratio. We use a variant of the discounted cash flow model proposed by Miller and Modigliani (1961) to show that the growth rates implied by the stock’s valuation have rarely been achieved in recorded business history. We also provide evidence of earnings management by the company that may have contributed to extravagant investor expectations of earnings growth. Between 1990 and 2000 the firm’s reported earnings met or exceeded analysts’ earnings forecasts 77% of the time. Furthermore, beginning in 1997 Enron used asset sales (often to related parties) to generate as much as 83% of its annual earnings.

At the time of its demise in 2001, the Enron Corporation could boast of its comprehensive, state-of-the-art management control and governance systems. Yet these controls were rendered ineffective in the company's last few years. This article identifies the radical change in Enron's corporate culture that took place from the Lay-Kinder era (1986–1996) to the Lay-Skilling era (1997–2001). It argues that this was a major cause of neutralizing these controls, which in turn proved to be a major factor in Enron's fall into bankruptcy. The article draws on Schein's (1993, Legitimating clinical research in the study of organizational culture, Journal of Counselling and Development, 71, 703–708; 1996, 2004) framework of cultural practice to develop our analysis. Thus, it supports Simon's (1990, 1995) urging to more meaningfully include corporate culture in management control research studies. The article contributes to the literature by drawing attention to the rich but untold story of Enron's governance and control and also extends the research linking corporate culture and control systems.

The bankruptcy of Enron and the subsequent demise of Arthur Andersen brought intense scrutiny to the accounting profession. That these events would have an effect on auditor going concern modification judgments and accounting regulation would not be surprising. This study aims to look at 1,204 publicly traded firms that filed bankruptcy in the period January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2005.

The observations are divided into pre‐Enron and post‐Enron periods. The paper finds the 18 largest bankruptcies represented 47 percent of the total assets entering bankruptcy in this period.

The going concern modification rate in the pre‐Enron period was 44.5 percent, in the post‐Enron period, 61.9 percent. Findings show auditors, in the presence of a consistent standard, nevertheless modify their decision making as a result of external events. This study further looks at the impact of outliers on this decision and on differences by firm size.

By considering the entire population of publicly traded firms filing bankruptcy, overall implications and statistics are provided. This method does not allow the use of certain traditional modeling techniques.

The research shows auditors, despite a consistent standard, vary their going concern judgments based upon external events. The paper also suggests that “one size fits all” regulatory models may not be cost effective across the population of public firms.

The research provides a summary of the characteristics of the population of firms filing bankruptcy for an extended period across a changing reporting and regulatory environment.

Between October and November 2001 the world witnessed the collapse of Enron, a major US publicly traded corporation with global operations. The Enron case highlights the impact corporate failure has on American society and capital markets and underscores the need for better enforcement of regulations and ethical business behavior. This paper discusses the role played by Enron’s senior management, its board of directors, Enron’s auditors, consultants, bankers, Wall Street and the government, in the spectacular rise and fall of this corporate giant. It also examines the impact of Enron’s failure on its employees, the employees of Andersen, and on thousands of ordinary Americans who invested in the stock via their pensions and mutual funds. This paper highlights the conflicts of interest that pervade the financial system and discusses the social and financial impact of a combined business and oversight failure. Students and teachers of finance, corporate governance, and business strategy may be interested in this paper as a pedagogical tool to teach undergraduate finance, business ethics, business strategy, and corporate governance.

The collapse of Enron was almost entirely unexpected and shockingly rapid. While the major cause of this and other mega meltdowns has been determined to be financial manipulation and questionable accounting practices, the fall of these organizations has also raised questions about whether, and to what extent, their intellectual capital/intangible asset intensive business models contributed to their failure. This paper examines three core issues affecting the role of intellectual capital that have been highlighted by Enron's business failure: the linked issues of the effect of moving from a more traditional trading model to an intangible intensive trading model and the requirements for a viable intellectual capital/intangibles business model; changes in the accounting framework to ensure the integrity of an intellectual capital/intangibles‐based organization; and the implications of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) mandated changes in measuring and managing for goodwill and intangibles

The authors look at the way in which Enron used hedging techniques before the corporate collapse of the organization triggered a crisis of confidence in US business practices and standards. They provide an analysis of how the system was structured and show how the transactions worked before analysing the roots of the company’s downfall.

The bankruptcy of Enron Corp. has evolved into a scandal of enormous proportions involving allegations of fraud, corruption and unethical practices on the part of Enron’s corporate executives, members of its board of directors, external auditors, and high government officials in the USA. No doubt there will be many articles written about various aspects of the Enron scandal. The focus of this paper is on the relationships between Enron’s business model and the deregulatory phase of the American economy during the 1980s and 1990s. It is the argument of this paper that deregulation in the US electricity and natural gas industries fostered the creation of the Enron business model, and that this model was unsustainable, resulting in the demise of Enron Corp. Furthermore, while Enron can be viewed as an example of capitalistic excess, the paper reveals how the Enron business model developed as an American form of a public private partnership, similar to the types of public private partnerships that have been created in recent years in the UK. Investigating Enron as a public private partnership may help us to better understand the role of public private partnerships in contemporary capitalism and shed some light on the advisability of deregulatory schemes and the unintended consequences that can result from such schemes.