Search results

This study compares parallel philosophies of the work of American educator John Dewey in Art as Experience and the arts infused educational approach of the Reggio Emilia Schools of Italy.

This historical and contemporary comparative, cross-cultural analysis explores educational approaches that incorporate the arts in the process of learning and the use of democratic processes in collaborative learning approaches. Data sources include primary source historical documents, field observations, interviews, and primary source educational materials.

Similarities are identified across cultures and time in the examples analyzed for commonalities including arts creation as central to the processes of learning, democratic processes in collaborative project learning experiences, community involvement as an integral part of the learning processes, and imagination and communication as consistent elements in the experiences of the school. This study provides a historical and contemporary context for the cross-cultural analysis of the use of art in the learning processes as described by American educator John Dewey and the educators in the Reggio Emilia schools of Italy.

A large literature studies why firms self-regulate and “signal green.” However, it has ignored that regulators have enforcement discretion, and may act strategically. We fill this gap. We build a game theoretic model of whether a firm should signal its type through substantial self-regulation. We find self-regulation is a double-edged sword: it can potentially preempt legislation, but it can also lead regulators to demand higher levels of compliance from greener firms if preemption fails. We show how self-regulatory decisions depend upon industry characteristics and political responsiveness to corporate environmental leadership. We have made a number of simplifying assumptions. We assume activist groups cannot challenge regulatory flexibility in court, and that regulatory penalties are fixed and are not collected by the regulator. Firms with low compliance costs confront a tradeoff regarding self-regulation. They can blend in with the rest of the industry, and take few self-regulatory steps. This reduces the risk of regulation somewhat, and preserves their ability to obtain regulatory flexibility should regulation be imposed. Alternatively, they can step up with substantial self-regulation. This better mitigates the risk of regulation, but at the risk of signaling low costs and becoming a target for stringent enforcement should regulation pass. Recent work has found negative market reactions to corporate claims of voluntary emissions reductions, despite the conventional wisdom that it “pays to be green.” We offer a new explanation to scholars and managers: regulatory discretion may undermine the ability of industry self-regulation to profitably preempt mandatory regulatory requirements.